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Abstract—In recent years, mobile devices (e.g., smartphones
and tablets) have met an increasing commercial success and
have become a fundamental element of the everyday life for
billions of people all around the world. Mobile devices are
used not only for traditional communication activities (e.g., voice
calls and messages) but also for more advanced tasks made
possible by an enormous amount of multi-purpose applications
(e.g., finance, gaming, and shopping). As a result, those devices
generate a significant network traffic (a consistent part of the
overall Internet traffic). For this reason, the research community
has been investigating security and privacy issues that are related
to the network traffic generated by mobile devices, which could
be analyzed to obtain information useful for a variety of goals
(ranging from fine-grained user profiling to device security and
network optimization).
In this paper, we review the works that contributed to the
state of the art of network traffic analysis targeting mobile
devices. In particular, we present a systematic classification of
the works in the literature according to three criteria: (i) the
goal of the analysis; (ii) the point where the network traffic
is captured; and (iii) the targeted mobile platforms. In this
survey, we consider points of capturing such as Wi-Fi access
points, software simulation, and inside real mobile devices or
emulators. For the surveyed works, we review and compare
analysis techniques, validation methods, and achieved results. We
also discuss possible countermeasures, challenges, and possible
directions for future research on mobile traffic analysis and
other emerging domains (e.g., Internet of Things). We believe our
survey will be a reference work for researchers and practitioners
in this research field.
Index Terms—Internet traffic, machine learning, mobile device,
network traffic analysis, smartphone, tablet computer.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE last decade has been marked by the rise of mobiledevices which are nowadays widely spread among peo-
ple. The most diffused examples of such mobile devices are
smartphones and tablets. When compared with traditional cell
phones, smartphones and tablets (henceforth also referred as
mobile devices) have an enormously increased computational
power, more available memory, a larger display, and Internet
connectivity via both Wi-Fi and cellular networks. Moreover,
such devices run mobile operating systems which are able
to experience multimedia contents, as well as to run mobile
applications (also called apps). Combined together, these
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elements enable both smartphones and tablets to have the
same functionalities typically offered by laptops and desktop
computers.
According to the statistics reported in [1], smartphone
users were 25.3% of the global population in 2015, and this
percentage is expected to grow till 37% in 2020. Similarly, the
statistics about tablets reported in [2] indicate a global penetra-
tion of 13.8% in 2015, expected to reach 19.2% in 2020. The
driving forces of this tremendous success are the ubiquitous
Internet connectivity, thanks to the worldwide deployment of
cellular and Wi-Fi networks, and a large number of apps
available in the official (and unofficial) marketplaces. A mobile
device typically hosts a lot of sensitive information about its
owner, such as contacts, photos and videos, and GPS position.
Such information must be properly protected, especially when
it is transmitted to remote services. Since an important fraction
of the overall Internet traffic is due to mobile devices, it
is not surprising that attackers and network traffic analysts
have soon started to target them. For this reason, the research
community investigates network traffic analysis techniques to
improve both security and privacy on mobile devices.
Network traffic analysis (henceforth simply referred as
traffic analysis) is the branch of computer science that studies
inferential methods which take the network traces of a group
of devices (from a few to many thousands) as input, and give
information about those devices, their users, their apps, or
the traffic itself as output. Network traces can be captured at
different layers (e.g., data-link layer, application layer), differ-
ent points (e.g., within a Wi-Fi network, within the devices),
and their content is often encrypted (making analysis even
more challenging). Typically, researchers follow two different
approaches to analyze mobile network traffic: (i) taking pre-
existent methods designed for traditional Internet traffic, and
adapting them to the mobile scenario; or (ii) developing new
methods tailored to mobile Internet traffic properties. It is
worth to underline that this survey focuses on Internet traffic
only. We do not consider other types of mobile traffic (e.g.,
Call Detail Records) or data transmission technologies (e.g.,
Bluetooth, infrared).
Contributions – In this paper, we survey the state of the
art of network traffic analysis on mobile devices, giving the
following contributions:
• We categorize each work according to three criteria:
1) the goal of the analysis;
2) the point where the network traffic is captured (hence-
forth simply referred to as point of capturing); and
3) the targeted mobile platforms.
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Fig. 1. Number of published works that we identified and considered relevant
to this survey, sorted by year of publication.
Moreover, we provide further insights on the models and
methods that can be used to perform traffic analysis targeting
mobile devices.
• The objective of this survey is three-fold. On the one hand,
we provide a systematic classification of state-of-the-art
techniques for the analysis of the network traffic of mobile
devices. On the other hand, we provide an overview of
methodologies adopted for the analyses and information
about the datasets used for validating the obtained results.
We also discuss possible countermeasures to thwart mo-
bile traffic analysis and provide meaningful insights about
challenges and pitfalls related to the topics that have been
investigated, as well as identify possible future research
directions. We believe that our work will both help new
researchers in this field and foster future research trends.
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to survey the
works that analyze datasets of mobile traffic that are either:
(i) logged on one or more mobile devices; (ii) extracted
from wired network traces; (iii) sniffed at one or more access
points of a Wi-Fi network; (iv) eavesdropped by one or more
Wi-Fi monitors; (v) produced by one or more mobile device
emulators; or (vi) generated via a software simulation. The
work by Naboulsi et al. [3] is the only published survey
that reviews the works in which the analyzed datasets are
collected within the network infrastructure of one or more
cellular providers (e.g., 3G and HSDPA). In fact, our survey
is complementary to the one in [3], and together they
provide a complete treatment of the research field of traffic
analysis targeting mobile devices.
Overall, we survey 59 works, published between 2010 and
2017. Figure 1 shows that the number of publications in the
considered research field has significantly increased in the
last years. We believe that this amount of work will grow
in the future as the global spreading of mobile devices is
increasing and their contribution to the worldwide Internet
traffic is becoming more significant.
Organization – The rest of the document is organized as
follows. Section II provides a road-map of the survey that helps
the reader with understanding the classifications adopted to
report the surveyed works. In the following sections, we survey
the works according to three criteria: in Section III, the goal
of the analysis performed on the mobile traffic; in Section IV,
the point of capturing used to collect the mobile traffic; and,
in Section V, the targeted mobile platforms. In Section VI,
we review the models and methods applied in the surveyed
works to perform traffic analysis targeting mobile devices. In
Section VII, we describe the validation datasets used in the
evaluation and discuss the obtained results. We discuss the
effect of network traffic encryption and other countermeasures
in Section VIII. In Section IX, we outline the current situation
in the field of traffic analysis targeting mobile devices, as well
as the trends that are likely to drive research in the next future.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section X.
II. CATEGORIZATION OF WORK
In this section, we present an overview of the classification
criteria we follow to categorize the works considered in our
survey: the goal of the analysis performed on the mobile traffic
(Section II-A); the point of capturing of the mobile traffic
(Section II-B); and the targeted mobile platform (Section II-C).
In Table I, we report the surveyed works according to these
criteria. For each work, we also indicate whether the proposed
analyses are still applicable in case of traffic encryption via
either SSL/TLS or IPsec (see Section IV for more details
about how traffic encryption affects the analyses presented in
the surveyed works). It is worth to notice that a few works
(i.e., Wei et al. [4], Le et al. [5], Alan et al. [6], Tadrous and
Sabharwal [7], and Wang et al. [8]) propose multiple traffic
analysis techniques, each affected by traffic encryption in a
different way.
A. Classification by Goal of the Analysis
The first classification takes into account the goal of the
analysis performed on the captured mobile traffic. For each
surveyed work, Table I provides this information in the Goal
of the Analysis column. We survey more in detail the works
according to this classification in Section III.
Overall, we are able to identify thirteen goals. In Figure 2,
we depict such goals by their field of pertinence: apps, mobile
users, and mobile devices. In what follows, we list and briefly
describe each goal, sorted by the number of works:
• Traffic characterization (Characterization in Table I): to
infer the network properties of mobile traffic. The knowl-
edge of such properties is crucial to effectively deploy
and configure resources in cellular networks, as well as
in Wi-Fi networks serving mobile devices. More details in
Section III-A.
• App identification (App in Table I): to identify the network
traffic belonging to a specific mobile app. This type of
analysis can help network administrators in resource plan-
ning and management, as well as in app-specific policy
enforcement (e.g., forbidding a social network app within
an enterprise network). Moreover, app identification can be
employed to uncover the presence of sensitive apps (e.g.,
dating, health, religion) in the mobile device of a target user.
See Section III-B.
• Usage study (Usage in Table I): to infer the usage habits
of mobile users (e.g., which are the most frequently used
apps). As an example, the knowledge of the places where
3TABLE I
ALL SURVEYED WORKS.
Year Paper Goal of the Analysis Point of Capturing Targeted Mobile Platform SSL/TLS IPsec
2010
Afanasyev et al. [9] Characterization, Usage APs, Wired Platform-independent 7 7
Falaki et al. [10] Characterization, Usage Devices Android, Windows Mobile 4 7
Husted et al. [11] Position Simulator Platform-independent 4 4
Maier et al. [12] Characterization, Usage Wired Platform-independent 7 7
Shepard et al. [13] Characterization Devices iOS 4 7
2011
Finamore et al. [14] Characterization, Usage Wired Platform-independent 7 7
Gember et al. [15] Characterization, Usage APs Platform-independent 7 7
Lee et al. [16] App Wired Android, iOS 7 7Characterization, Usage Platform-independent 7 7
Rao et al. [17] Characterization Wired Android, iOS 7 7
2012
Baghel et al. [18] Characterization Wired Android 4 7
Chen et al. [19] Characterization Wired Platform-independent 7 7
Ham et al. [20] Usage Devices Android 4 4
Musa et al. [21] Position Monitors Platform-independent 4 4
Shabtai et al. [22] Malware Devices Android 4 4
Stevens et al. [23] PII Leakage APs Android 7 7
Su et al. [24] Malware Devices Android 4 7
Wei et al. [25] Malware Wired Android 7 7
Wei et al. [4] Characterization Devices Android 4 4/7
2013
Barbera et al. [26] Sociological Monitors Platform-independent 4 4
Kuzuno et al. [27] PII Leakage Devices Android 7 7
Qazi et al. [28] App APs, Devices Android 4 7
Rao et al. [29] App, PII Leakage Wired Android, iOS 4 7
Watkins et al. [30] User Actions APs Android 4 4
2014
Chen et al. [31] OS APs Android, iOS 4 7Tethering Monitors, Wired Platform-independent 4 7
Coull et al. [32] User Actions, OS Devices iOS 4 4
Crussell et al. [33] Ad Fraud Emulators Android 7 7
Lindorfer et al. [34] Characterization Emulators Android 7 7
Shabtai et al. [35] Malware Devices Android 4 4
Verde et al. [36] User Fingerprinting Wired Platform-independent 4 4
2015
Chen et al. [37] Characterization Wired Android 7 7
Fukuda et al. [38] Characterization, Usage Devices Android, iOS 4 4
Le et al. [5] App, PII Leakage Devices Android 4/7 7
Park et al. [39] User Actions Wired Android 4 7
Soikkeli et al. [40] Usage Devices Platform-independent 4 4
Song et al. [41] PII Leakage Devices Android 4 7
Wang et al. [42] App Monitors iOS 4 4
Yao et al. [43] App APs, Emulators Android, iOS, Symbian 7 7
Zaman et al. [44] Malware Devices Android 7 7
2016
Alan et al. [6] App APs Android 4 4/7
Conti et al. [45] User Actions Wired Android 4 7
Fu et al. [46] User Actions APs Android 4 4
Mongkolluksamee et al. [47] App Devices Android 4 7
Narudin et al. [48] Malware Devices, Emulators Android 7 7
Nayam et al. [49] Characterization Wired Android, iOS 7 7
Ren et al. [50] PII Leakage Wired Android, iOS, Windows Phone 4 7
Ruffing et al. [51] OS Monitors Android, iOS, Windows Phone, Symbian 4 4
Saltaformaggio et al. [52] User Actions APs Android, iOS 4 4
Spreitzer et al. [53] Website Fingerprinting Devices Android 4 4
Tadrous et al. [7] Characterization APs Android, iOS 4 4/7
Vanrykel et al. [54] PII Leakage, User Fingerprinting Wired Android 7 7
Wang et al. [8] Malware Wired Android 4/7 7
2017
Arora et al. [55] Malware Devices Android 4 4
Chen et al. [56] App Emulators Android 7 7
Cheng et al. [57] PII Leakage Wired Android 4 7
Continella et al. [58] PII Leakage Wired Android 4 7
Espada et al. [59] Characterization Devices Android 4 7
Malik et al. [60] OS APs Android, iOS, Windows Phone 4 4
Taylor et al. [61] App Wired Android 4 7
Wei et al. [62] Characterization, Usage Wired Platform-independent 7 7
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Fig. 2. The goals of traffic analysis targeting mobile devices, and their pertinence to apps, mobile users, and mobile devices.
mobile devices are mostly used can drive the deployment of
cellular stations and Wi-Fi hotspots. See Section III-C.
• PII leakage detection (PII Leakage in Table I): to detect
and/or prevent the leakage of a mobile user’s Personal
Identifiable Information (PII). This type of analysis can be
employed to assess the behavior of a mobile app from a
privacy point of view, by checking which PII it actually
discloses to remote hosts. Detecting PII leakage is also the
first step to prevent such problem, since it is then possible
to block network transmissions carrying PII, or replace
sensitive information with bogus data. See Section III-D.
• Malware detection (Malware in Table I): to detect whether
a mobile app behaves maliciously (e.g., downloading and
installing malicious code from the network). This type of
analysis can be used to assess the security of an app
submitted by a developer to a mobile marketplace. In such
case, the result of the security tests decides whether the app
can be released to the public. Moreover, malware detection
algorithms can be embedded into anti-virus apps that mobile
users can use to check whether an installed app is malicious.
See Section III-E.
• User action identification (User Actions in Table I): to
identify a specific action that a mobile user performed on
her mobile device (e.g., uploading a photo on Instagram), or
to infer some information about that specific action (e.g., the
length of a mobile user’s message sent through an instant
messaging app). Researchers can employ such analysis to
discover the identity behind an anonymous social network
profile. This can be accomplished by verifying whether there
is a match between the events reported on that profile’s page,
and the actions a suspect performed while using the mobile
app of that social network. Alternatively, it is possible to
build behavioral profiles of mobile users, which are useful
for user reconnaissance within networks and, in aggregated
form, for marketing studies. See Section III-F.
• Operating system identification (OS in Table I): to dis-
cover the operating system of a mobile device. This type of
analysis is usually a preliminary phase for more advanced
attacks against mobile devices: the adversary tries to infer
the operating system of the target mobile device in order to
subsequently exploit an ad hoc vulnerability for that specific
OS. Moreover, operating system identification carried out
on a large mobile user population can be a starting point
for other types of analysis not directly related to computer
science (e.g., sociological studies). See Section III-G.
• Position estimation (Position in Table I): to estimate the
position and/or the trajectory (i.e., the movements) of a
mobile device within a geographical area. This type of
analysis helps infer social status, interests, and habits of
the owner of a mobile device. As a further step, the profiles
of several mobile users can be aggregated for marketing, as
well as sociological studies. Besides, position estimation can
aid road traffic prediction along urban streets, by leveraging
the most frequent trajectories followed by the citizens that
move along the city. See Section III-H.
• User fingerprinting (User Fingerprinting in Table I): to
detect the traffic belonging to a specific mobile user. This
type of analysis can be employed to trace a mobile user,
by approximating her position with the location of the Wi-
Fi hotspot or cellular station to which her mobile device
is connected. From this information, it is then possible to
build a behavioral profile of that mobile user. Alternatively,
it is possible to examine a mobile traffic dataset in order
to extract and group together the network traces generated
by a specific mobile user. Such data can be subsequently
used for other types of traffic analysis targeting that user.
See Section III-I.
• Ad fraud detection (Ad Fraud in Table I): to detect ad
fraud by a mobile app, i.e., to recognize whether a mobile
app is trying to trick the advertising business model (e.g.,
fabricating false user clicks on ads). This type of analysis
is valuable to ad providers, which can rely on it to protect
themselves from dishonest app developers. See Section III-J.
• Sociological inference (Sociological in Table I): to infer
some kind of sociological information about mobile users
(e.g., language, religion, health condition, sexual preference,
wealth), from one or more properties related to their mo-
bile devices (e.g., list of installed apps, associated Wi-Fi
networks). See Section III-K.
• Tethering detection (Tethering in Table I): to detect
whether a mobile device is tethering, i.e., it is sharing its
Internet connectivity with other devices, for which it acts
as an access point. Tethering constitutes a problem for
cellular network providers, since it significantly increases
the volume of network traffic generated by a single client.
Such providers are therefore interested in tethering detection
5techniques that can be used to prevent their customers from
sharing their Internet connectivity, or simply require them
to pay an extra fee to do that. See Section III-L.
• Website fingerprinting (Website Fingerprinting in Table I):
to infer which websites and/or webpages are visited by a
mobile user while navigating via the web browser of her
mobile device. Similarly to sociological inference, this type
of analysis can reveal interests, social habits, religious belief,
as well as sexual and political orientations of a mobile user.
See Section III-M.
B. Classification by Point of Capturing
The second classification considers where and how the
mobile traffic is captured. For each surveyed work, Table I
provides this information in the Point of Capturing column. It
is worth to notice that: (i) we focus on the (hardware and/or
software) equipment that captures the traffic; and (ii) we report
the point of capturing only for those datasets for which the
authors give enough details about the collection process. We
survey more in detail the works according to this classification
in Section IV.
Overall, we identify six different points of capturing. In
what follows, we list and briefly describe each of them, sorted
by the number of works in which a point of capturing is
employed:
• At one or more wired network equipments (Wired in Ta-
ble I). The size of the population of monitored mobile
devices varies according to the type of considered net-
work equipments: thousands of mobile users in the case
of edge routers (i.e., routers connecting customers to the
ISP’s backbone) and Internet gateways; from tens to a
few hundreds in the case of VPN servers and forwarding
servers (i.e., traditional desktop computers set up to log all
traffic traversing a wired link that connects a Wi-Fi hotspot
serving mobile devices to the Internet). More details in
Section IV-A.
• Within one or more mobile devices, i.e., client-side (Devices
in Table I). This type of point of capturing is particularly
useful if we want to target a specific mobile app (e.g.,
Facebook), or a particular network interface (e.g., cellular).
We specify that this category also includes the case of a
network traffic logger installed within either: (i) a mobile
device emulator; and (ii) a machine to which the mobile
traffic is mirrored using a remote virtual network interface.
See Section IV-B.
• At one or more access points of a Wi-Fi network (APs in
Table I). This type of point of capturing allows the number
of monitored mobile devices to vary from tens to a few
thousands, and it is suitable to capture the traffic of mobile
devices while their users are performing network-intensive
tasks (e.g., watching streaming videos, updating apps). See
Section IV-C.
• At one or more machines running virtual mobile devices,
i.e., emulators (Emulators in Table I). Running multiple
virtual instances of mobile devices and controlling them via
automated tools make possible to collect network traffic on
a large-scale. On real mobile devices, same data collection
would be far more expensive. It is important to highlight
that the traffic logging is performed by the host machines
or their virtualization managers. We do not consider the
case in which the traffic logging takes place within the
emulated mobile devices (such case is covered by the
Devices category). See Section IV-D.
• At one or more Wi-Fi monitors (Monitors in Table I).
Researchers usually employ this type of capturing devices
to focus the network traffic collection process on a specific
geographical area of interest (e.g., a train station). Such
approach is often the only viable solution whether it is not
possible to directly access a target mobile device, or the
network to which it is connected. See Section IV-E.
• At one or more virtual capturing points within a simulated
environment generated and managed by a software program
(Simulator in Table I). This point of capturing can help
study particular deployments of mobile devices that are not
observable in a real-world scenario because of technical,
economical, or legal constraints. See Section IV-F.
C. Classification by Targeted Mobile Platform
The third classification considers the mobile platforms that
are targeted by the traffic analysis. For each surveyed work,
Table I provides this information in the Targeted Mobile Plat-
form column. It is worth to specify that we classify a work as
platform-independent if its authors do not provide information
about the targeted mobile platforms, or such information is not
relevant to the analysis they perform on the mobile traffic (we
discuss this type of works in Section V-E). We survey more in
detail the works according to this classification in Section V.
Overall, we find four distinct mobile platforms (in what
follows, listed by their popularity in the surveyed works): An-
droid, Google’s open-source mobile operating system (we dis-
cuss it in Section V-A); iOS, the operating system of Apple’s
mobile devices (Section V-B); Windows Mobile/Phone, the
mobile counterpart of Microsoft’s desktop operating system
(Section V-C); and Symbian, the first released modern mobile
operating system (Section V-D).
III. GOALS OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS TARGETING MOBILE
DEVICES
In this section, we survey the works according to the
goal of the analysis that is performed on the mobile traffic.
Table II summarizes the goals of the surveyed works. As
shown in Figure 3, the most frequently pursued goal is traffic
characterization (eighteen works), followed by app identifica-
tion and usage study (ten works each), PII leakage detection
(nine works), malware detection (eight works), user action
identification (six works), operating system identification (four
works), and position estimation and user fingerprinting (two
works each). Each of the following goals counts one work
only: ad fraud detection, sociological inference, tethering
detection, and website fingerprinting. As shown in Table II,
twelve works pursue two goals, and one work even three.
In the following sections, we present the goal(s) and
achieved results for each surveyed work. For each goal, we
report relevant aspects and findings in the state of the art, and
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Fig. 3. Number of published works contributing traffic analysis methods
targeting mobile devices, sorted by goal of the analysis.
we discuss whether the proposed analyses work on encrypted
network traffic. For the sake of simplicity, encryption methods
that make TCP headers and IP headers unavailable to the
analysis are referred as to SSL/TLS and IPsec, respectively.
We enter in more detail about encryption as a countermeasure
against mobile traffic analysis in Section VIII-A. The treatment
of each goal takes place in its own section, and all sections
are ordered by goal popularity in the surveyed works.
A. Traffic Characterization
Network management can benefit from knowing the prop-
erties of the Internet traffic that traverses the network. Such
information can be used to efficiently deploy the hardware
equipments, as well as to setup them in order to provide the
best Quality of Service (QoS) to the users. This statement par-
ticularly holds for networks serving mobile devices, since such
devices generate traffic with peculiar properties. In light of the
rapid evolution of mobile devices, the characterization of their
Internet traffic is crucial to provide network administrators the
information they need for resource planning, deployment, and
management.
We define as traffic characterization the analysis of the
network traffic generated by mobile devices in order to infer
its properties. In Table III, we group the works that study the
mobile traffic according to the scope of the analysis:
• The works that study the network traffic of specific apps
and/or mobile services. We survey nine works belonging
to this category. Rao et al. in [17] study the Android and
iOS native apps of two video streaming services, namely
Netflix and YouTube. YouTube is targeted also by Finamore
et al. in [14]. The Android apps of Facebook and Skype are
considered in [18]. In [4], Wei et al. focus on 27 Android
apps (19 free and 8 paid). The analysis by Lindorfer et
al. in [34] covers over 1,000,000 unique Android apps.
In [37], Chen et al. analyze 5560 malicious Android apps
(from 177 malware families). In [49], Nayam et al. study 63
Android and 35 iOS free apps, all belonging to the “Health
& Fitness” category. The work presented by Tadrous et al.
in [7] focuses on five interactive apps for both Android and
iOS. In [59], Espada et al. present a framework for traffic
TABLE II
THE SURVEYED WORKS BY GOAL OF THE ANALYSIS PERFORMED ON THE
MOBILE TRAFFIC.
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2010
Afanasyev et al. [9] 4 4
Falaki et al. [10] 4 4
Husted et al. [11] 4
Maier et al. [12] 4 4
Shepard et al. [13] 4
2011
Finamore et al. [14] 4 4
Gember et al. [15] 4 4
Lee et al. [16] 4 4 4
Rao et al. [17] 4
2012
Baghel et al. [18] 4
Chen et al. [19] 4
Ham et al. [20] 4
Musa et al. [21] 4
Shabtai et al. [22] 4
Stevens et al. [23] 4
Su et al. [24] 4
Wei et al. [25] 4
Wei et al. [4] 4
2013
Barbera et al. [26] 4
Kuzuno et al. [27] 4
Qazi et al. [28] 4
Rao et al. [29] 4 4
Watkins et al. [30] 4
2014
Chen et al. [31] 4 4
Coull et al. [32] 4 4
Crussell et al. [33] 4
Lindorfer et al. [34] 4
Shabtai et al. [35] 4
Verde et al. [36] 4
2015
Chen et al. [37] 4
Fukuda et al. [38] 4 4
Le et al. [5] 4 4
Park et al. [39] 4
Soikkeli et al. [40] 4
Song et al. [41] 4
Wang et al. [42] 4
Yao et al. [43] 4
Zaman et al. [44] 4
2016
Alan et al. [6] 4
Conti et al. [45] 4
Fu et al. [46] 4
Mongkolluksamee et al. [47] 4
Narudin et al. [48] 4
Nayam et al. [49] 4
Ren et al. [50] 4
Ruffing et al. [51] 4
Saltaformaggio et al. [52] 4
Spreitzer et al. [53] 4
Tadrous et al. [7] 4
Vanrykel et al. [54] 4 4
Wang et al. [8] 4
2017
Arora et al. [55] 4
Chen et al. [56] 4
Cheng et al. [57] 4
Continella et al. [58] 4
Espada et al. [59] 4
Malik et al. [60] 4
Taylor et al. [61] 4
Wei et al. [62] 4 4
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THE SURVEYED WORKS THAT DEAL WITH TRAFFIC CHARACTERIZATION.
Year Paper
Mobile Devices
Apps/ Comparison Only
Services with non-mobile Mobile
2010
Afanasyev et al. [9] 4
Falaki et al. [10] 4
Maier et al. [12] 4
Shepard et al. [13] 4
2011
Finamore et al. [14] 4
Gember et al. [15] 4
Lee et al. [16] 4
Rao et al. [17] 4
2012
Baghel et al. [18] 4
Chen et al. [19] 4
Wei et al. [4] 4
2014 Lindorfer et al. [34] 4
2015 Chen et al. [37] 4Fukuda et al. [38] 4
2016 Nayam et al. [49] 4Tadrous et al. [7] 4
2017 Espada et al. [59] 4Wei et al. [62] 4
characterization of Android apps, and choose Spotify as case
study.
• The works that study the network traffic generated by a
population of mobile devices. We can further divide such
works into two subsets:
– The works that compare mobile traffic with non-mobile
one. We survey four works belonging to this subcategory.
The work in [12] focuses on the network traffic of mobile
devices when they are connected to home Wi-Fi networks,
while the works in [9], [15], [16] carry out the same
analysis for campus Wi-Fi networks.
– The works that only consider mobile traffic. We survey
five works belonging to this subcategory. The works
in [19], [62] target campus Wi-Fi networks, while the
works in [10], [13], [38] leverage client-side measure-
ments collected through logging apps.
The aforementioned works provide interesting results and
observations about mobile network traffic characteristics. In
what follows, we highlight the main properties that emerged
from the works we survey:
• Compared to residential broadband traffic, the daily volume
of traffic per mobile user is roughly one order of magnitude
smaller [10].
• Mobile devices generate more downlink than uplink traffic,
clearly following a client-server behavior [10], [4], [38], [7].
• At the network layer, IP flows of mobile devices have a
shorter duration, a much higher number of packets, and a
much smaller packets, compared to IP flows of non-mobile
devices [16].
• Most of the transport-layer traffic is carried over TCP [10],
[15], [19], and more than half of the overall TCP traffic is
encrypted [10]. Transfers within TCP connections are small
in size [10], [15], causing a high overhead for lower-layer
protocols, particularly when transport-layer encryption is in
place [10].
• Most of the application-layer traffic is carried over HTTP or
HTTPS [10], [15], [16], [19], [34], [37], [62]. Moreover, the
analysis carried out by Chen et al. in [19] highlights that:
(i) the adoption of HTTPS is increasing (a trend confirmed
by Nayam et al. in [49] and by Wei et al. in [62]); and (ii)
Akamai and Google servers serve nearly 40% of the global
mobile traffic.
• Mobile devices contact a less diverse set of hosts compared
to non-mobile devices [15], [19].
• Mobile devices experience a low loss rate on Wi-Fi net-
works [19]. Instead, mobile traffic on cellular networks suf-
fers high delays and losses, as well as low throughputs [10].
• An important fraction of mobile traffic is due to video
streaming [12], [15], mainly on the YouTube platform [14].
• Android apps typically do not encrypt their network traffic
(i.e., they simply rely on HTTP), they connect to several
different hosts, and part of their network traffic is toward
Google’s services [4].
• A significant part of the network traffic generated by An-
droid and iOS free apps is due to advertisement and tracking
services [49].
• Netflix and YouTube apps for Android tend to periodically
buffer large portions of the video to be played, while
their counterparts for iOS tend to initially buffer a large
amount of data, then periodically buffer small portion of
the video to keep playback ongoing (although the YouTube
app employs large-block buffering under favorable network
conditions) [17]. Moreover, Netflix and Youtube apps for
iOS create a large number of TCP flows to provide a single
video to cope with TCP timeouts caused by the delays
of cellular networks. This causes an overhead that is not
necessary when mobile devices are connected to Wi-Fi
networks [17], [19].
B. App Identification
The Internet connectivity and multi-purpose apps are two
key aspects of the success and widespread adoption of mobile
devices. Most of the apps can send and receive data through
the network interfaces of mobile devices (i.e., Wi-Fi and
cellular), and often this capability is mandatory for apps to
work properly.
The network traffic patterns related to an app (or type of
app) constitute a behavioral network fingerprint which can be
recognized in unseen network traces. We refer to this analysis
as app identification. It is worth to notice that this approach
also takes into consideration the network traffic generated by
an app that is not directly related to any user actions (e.g., the
data exchanged because of background activities).
App identification brings several benefits to network man-
agement, but it also has privacy implications:
• The knowledge of the apps used by the clients of a network
can help the administrators to tune the network equipments
and parameters in order to deliver the best achievable
Quality of Service (QoS).
• In an enterprise network where some particular apps is not
allowed to be used (e.g., Facebook, Twitter), app detection
can help the administrators enforce such policy by blocking
traffic belonging to the forbidden apps.
• It is possible to target a high profile user and discover
whether she uses privacy-sensitive (e.g., health, dating) apps.
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TARGETED MOBILE PLATFORMS AND NUMBER OF CONSIDERED APPS IN
THE SURVEYED WORKS THAT DEAL WITH APP IDENTIFICATION.
Year Paper Number of Targeted AppsAndroid iOS Symbian
2011 Lee et al. [16] 50 50 None
2013 Qazi et al. [28] 40 None NoneRao et al. [29] 832 209 None
2015
Le et al. [5] 70 None None
Wang et al. [42] None 13 None
Yao et al. [43] 651,000 68,000 10,000
2016 Alan et al. [6] 1,595 None NoneMongkolluksamee et al. [47] 5 None None
2017 Chen et al. [56] 5,000 None NoneTaylor et al. [61] 110 None None
• Knowing the set of apps installed on a mobile device can
reveal sensitive information about the user such as relation-
ship status, spoken languages, country, and religion [63].
In Table IV, we report the surveyed works that deal with
app identification [16], [28], [29], [5], [42], [43], [6], [47],
[56], [61]. The number of apps selected for profiling and
fingerprinting varies from less than ten to many thousands.
Despite the core topic of the work by Lee et al. in [16] is a
comparison between smartphone traffic and traditional Internet
traffic, the authors also perform app identification targeting the
Android and iOS platforms. Indeed, they select the top 50 apps
of both Apple App Store and Google Play Store, generate their
payload signatures, and use such signatures to recognize the
traffic generated by such apps in network traces. Unfortunately,
this approach is based on payload signatures, thus it cannot
deal with the apps that encrypt their network traffic.
Qazi et al. in [28] present the Atlas framework, which
incorporates application identification into Software-Defined
Networking (SDN). Prototyped on HP Labs wireless network,
the identification performance of Atlas is tested on the top
40 popular Android apps from Google Play Store. Since it
requires to inspect transport-layer information, Atlas cannot
process network traffic protected by IPsec.
Rao et al. in [29] present Meddle, a cross-platform system
for collecting and analyzing the network traffic of mobile
devices. The idea is to leverage VPN tunnels (which are
natively supported by modern mobile OSes) to redirect the
network traffic of the target mobile devices to the Meddle
proxy server, where software middleboxes are responsible
for traffic processing and analysis. Thanks to this man-in-
the-middle approach, Meddle can inspect the network traffic
protected by SSL/TLS, but it cannot work with data trans-
missions encrypted via IPsec. The authors employ Meddle for
app identification (and also PII leakage detection, see Section
III-D for details) based on fields of HTTP messages (i.e., Host
and User-Agent).
Le et al. in [5] propose AntMonitor, a system for collecting
and analyzing network traffic from Android devices. Among
other types of analysis, AntMonitor can perform app identi-
fication. The authors select 70 Android apps to evaluate the
performance of their solution. Among the considered features,
there are the flags of TCP segments, which are hidden if IPsec
is employed, thus the proposed framework does not work if
network-layer encryption is in place.
The app identification framework proposed by Wang et al.
in [42] is based on extracting side-channel information from
Wi-Fi traffic belonging to a target mobile device. The authors
depict a passive adversary as follows: (i) she is able to sniff the
traffic on the same WLAN channel as the access point to which
the target device is connected; (ii) leveraging the MAC address
of the target device, she can elicit its traffic from the collected
network traces; and (iii) she cannot break the encryption
scheme of the sniffed traffic (i.e., the app identification can
also target secure WLANs). To evaluate their solution, the
authors choose the iOS platform, considering thirteen popular
apps from a wide range of different app categories.
Yao et al. in [43] present SAMPLES (Self Adaptive Mining
of Persistent LExical Snippets), an app identification frame-
work that leverages the occurrences of app identifiers within
HTTP headers (thus it cannot handle network traffic protected
by IPsec or SSL/TLS). SAMPLES models such occurrences
into generalized conjunctive rules, which are used to identify
the app that generated a given network flow. To evaluate their
system, the authors consider over 700,000 apps from Google
Play Store, Apple App Store, and Nokia OVI Store (details
are given in Table IV).
Alan and Kaur in [6] investigate the feasibility of identifying
Android apps from their launch-time network traffic by only
leveraging the information available in TCP/IP headers. The
authors collect the launch-time traffic of 1,595 apps. This
work proposes three different methods that can handle network
traffic encrypted via SSL/TLS, but only two of them can also
deal with IPsec encryption.
Mongkolluksamee et al. in [47] (which is an extended
version of a previous work by the same authors [64]) apply
machine learning to build an app identification system for
Android apps. The authors leverage graphlet- and histogram-
based features, and employ a random forest classifier (more
details in Section VI-B2). However, this analysis requires to
access TCP and UDP headers, which is infeasible for apps that
employ IPsec to encrypt their network traffic. It is worth to
notice that despite this work focuses on 3G traffic, the actual
capturing of the network traffic is performed within a mobile
device via tcpdump (more details in Section IV-B).
Chen et al. in [56] present an innovative method to identify
the invariant tokens (e.g., URLs, key-value pairs, developer
IDs) that are present in the network traffic of a specific
app; such tokens can then be exploited to carry out app
identification via deep packet inspection (which is applicable
to unencrypted traffic only). The described framework requires
to perform an advanced static analysis on the targeted app in
order to find the parts of code that trigger network activities;
compared to dynamic analysis and UI fuzzing, this method
permits to cover almost all (98.54%) of the app’s network
activities in a very short period of time (less than twenty
seconds). The authors focus on the Android platform, and
evaluate their solution on 2,500 apps from Google Play
Store and other third-party Android marketplaces, and 2,500
malicious apps from VirusTotal.
Taylor et al. in [61] (which is an extension of a previous
work by the same authors [65]) propose AppScanner, an app
identification system based on machine learning (more details
9in Section VI-B2). The authors profile 110 popular Android
apps crawled from Google Play Store and re-identify them in
real-time. Moreover, the authors study how the classification
performance is affected by varying the duration of the network
traffic capturing, the mobile device that generates the collected
data, and the version of the fingerprinted apps. AppScanner
leverages the information within IP and TCP headers, thus be-
ing able to process the network traffic encrypted via SSL/TLS,
but not the one protected by IPsec.
C. Usage Study
The habits of mobile users have significantly changed with
the evolution of cellphones toward smartphones and tablets.
First of all, the adoption of the touchscreen display has
revolutionized the human-device interaction. Moreover, the
development of mobile operating systems supporting multi-
tasking and third-party apps has enhanced the capabilities of
mobile devices well beyond the requirements for communica-
tion activities. In this scenario, many researchers investigate
how mobile users interact with their mobile devices. This to
improve the usability of mobile OSes and apps, as well as to
properly set up networks serving mobile devices. For instance,
the knowledge of places where mobile devices are mostly used
can drive the deployment of free Wi-Fi hotspots to reduce the
traffic load on cellular networks.
We define as usage study the analysis of the network traffic
of mobile devices that aims at inferring the usage habits of
mobile users. The works we review in this section leverage
network-side measurements [9], [12], [14], [15], [16], [62],
as well as data collected within mobile devices [10], [20],
[38], [40]. In Table V, we show the three analysis perspectives
adopted by the surveyed works that investigate the usage habits
of mobile users:
• The network. As an example, observing the time in which
users are active during the day (i.e., sending and receiving
data), duration of activity, amount of traffic generated, and
most frequently used network interfaces (i.e., Wi-Fi or
cellular).
• The apps and/or mobile services. For instance, analyzing
which are the most frequently used apps/services, and which
is the traffic volume of a specific app.
• The geographical positions and mobility patterns. As an
example, studying the locations where mobile devices are
most frequently used, and where they generate most of their
traffic.
In what follows, we summarize their findings reported by
the works in usage study:
• The most frequently used apps are the ones related
to multimedia content (e.g., YouTube, Spotify) and web
browsers [10], [12], [15], [16], [20], [38]. Nonetheless,
social network and instant messaging apps are also pop-
ular [38].
• The predominance of cellular over Wi-Fi network traffic
observed for mobile devices by Ham et al. in [20] in
2012 is gradually disappearing. As reported in [38], in
2015 more than half of mobile traffic is carried over Wi-
TABLE V
THE SURVEYED WORKS THAT DEAL WITH USAGE STUDY.
Apps/ Geography/
Year Paper Network Services Mobility
2010
Afanasyev et al. [9] 4 4 4
Falaki et al. [10] 4
Maier et al. [12] 4
2011
Finamore et al. [14] 4
Gember et al. [15] 4
Lee et al. [16] 4 4
2012 Ham et al. [20] 4 4
2015 Fukuda et al. [38] 4Soikkeli et al. [40] 4 4
2017 Wei et al. [62] 4
Fi. In particular, mobile users prefer switching to Wi-Fi
connectivity whenever a Wi-Fi access point is available [38].
• The usage of mobile devices is low at nighttime and high
in daytime [9], [16], [20], [40].
• Cellular traffic peaks during commute times, while Wi-Fi
traffic peaks in the evening [38]. Cellular traffic is lighter
on weekends than weekdays, while Wi-Fi traffic follows the
opposite trend [38].
• Mobile users tend to generate more network traffic when
they are out of home, and when their devices have high
battery level [40].
• The volume of traffic generated by the mobile users of a Wi-
Fi network varies greatly, from less than 100 MB to several
GBs, according to users’ habits and needs [62].
• According to Finamore et al. in [14], YouTube mobile users:
(i) similarly to non-mobile users, they prefer short videos
(40% of the watched videos are shorter than three minutes,
and only 5% are longer than ten minutes); (ii) similarly to
non-mobile users, they rarely change video resolution and,
whenever they do that, it is to switch to a higher resolution
(although full screen mode is not frequently used); and
(iii) more frequently than non-mobile users, they early stop
watching the video (within the first fifth of its duration for
60% of the videos).
D. PII Leakage Detection
As we introduced in Section I, a mobile device is a source
of sensitive information about its owner (e.g., phone number,
contacts, photos, videos, GPS position). In addition to that,
apps often require to access such information to deliver their
services. As an example, an instant messaging app (e.g.,
WhatsApp, Telegram, WeChat) requires to access the contacts
saved in the device’s address book. As another example, a
social network app (e.g., Facebook, Instagram) requires to
inspect the device’s memory to find photos.
To disclose sensitive information to a remote host, an app
must be authorized to: (i) access some kind of sensitive
information (e.g., the GPS position); and (ii) connect to the
Internet. The disclosure of such information can be either
allowed or illicit, depending on three factors: (i) the level of
sensitivity of the disclosed information; (ii) the reason why
the app transmits such information to a remote host; and (ii)
whether the user is aware of this transmission of sensitive data.
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In this section, we focus on Personal Identifiable Informa-
tion (PII), which is information that can be used to identify,
locate, or contact an individual. In the domain of mobile
devices, we can identify four types of PII:
• Information related to mobile devices, such as IMEI (In-
ternational Mobile Equipment Identity, a unique identifier
associated to each mobile device), Android Device ID
(an identifier randomly generated on the first boot of any
Android device), and MAC address (a unique identifier
assigned to each network interface).
• Information related to SIM cards, such as IMSI (Interna-
tional Mobile Subscriber Identity, a unique identifier as-
signed to each subscriber of a cellular service), and SIM
Serial ID (the identifier assigned to each SIM card).
• Information related to users, such as name, gender, date of
birth, address, phone number, and email.
• Information about user’s location, such as GPS position and
ZIP code.
We define as PII leakage detection the analysis of the
network traffic of a mobile device in order to detect the leakage
of a user’s PII. Once a PII leakage is detected, it is possible to
apply suitable countermeasures, such as blocking the network
flows carrying the PII, or substituting the sensitive information
with bogus data. The latter approach is a good solution for
mobile users who want to protect their privacy while being
able to enjoy the functionalities of the apps.
In Table VI, we present the surveyed works that deal with
PII leakage detection [23], [27], [29], [5], [41], [50], [54],
[57], [58]. For each work, we summarize the targeted mobile
platforms, and whether the PII leaks are simply detected or
also prevented.
Stevens at al. in [23] present a comprehensive study on
thirteen popular ad providers for Android. In particular, part
of this study focuses on the analysis of ad traffic in order to
detect the transmission of the user’s PII. The authors observe
that at the time of writing only one of the considered ad
providers leverage encryption to protect its network traffic. For
this reason, they choose to perform a deep packet inspection
to identify the leakage of the user’s private information. The
results show that several types of PII (e.g., age, gender, GPS
position) are leaked in clear by ad libraries. Moreover, the
authors highlight that although none of the considered ad
providers is able to build a complete user profile, the UDIDs
in ad-related traffic can be exploited by an external adversary
to correlate sensitive information from different ad providers
and build a complete user profile.
Kuzuno and Tonami in [27] investigate the leakage of
sensitive information by the advertisement libraries embedded
into free Android apps. They focus on both original and hashed
identifiers unique to mobile devices (i.e., IMEI and Android
ID) and SIM cards (i.e., IMSI and SIM Serial ID), as well
as on the name of the cellular operator (CARRIER). To carry
out their analysis, the authors develop two components: (i) a
server application; and (ii) a mobile app that can be installed
on an Android device. The server application takes as input
the network traffic of a set of apps that leak sensitive infor-
mation, and applies a clustering method (see Section VI-B3
for details) to generate traffic signatures. The mobile app
leverages such signatures to identify the sensitive information
leaked by the other apps installed on the device. To evaluate
their solution, the authors employ the network traffic of 1,188
free Android apps and achieve the following results: 94% of
HTTP messages containing sensitive information are correctly
detected, with 5% false negatives (i.e., undetected HTTP
messages carrying sensitive information), and less than 3%
false positives (i.e., HTTP messages without sensitive infor-
mation, incorrectly identified as sensitive). Since the signature
generation phase requires to inspect HTTP messages looking
for sensitive information, the system cannot work on encrypted
traffic (i.e., neither SSL/TLS nor IPsec).
Rao et al. in [29] and Ren et al. in [50] present ReCon, a
cross-platform system that allows mobile users to control the
PII leaked in the network traffic of their devices. ReCon is
based on Meddle (we described it in Section III-B), therefore
it can inspect mobile traffic even if it is encrypted at transport
layer, but cannot cope with data transmissions protected by
IPsec. Moreover, ReCon offers a web interface through which
the user can visualize in real time which PII is leaked, and
optionally modify such PII or block the connection carrying
it. In [29], Rao et al. target Android and iOS OSes, and
the PII leakage detection mechanism is based on a domain
blacklist. In [50], Ren et al. also include Windows Phone
among the considered OSes, and PII leaks are detected using
properly trained machine learning classifiers (more details in
Section VI-B3). The works in [29], [50] expose an extensive
leakage of sensitive information belonging to all the types
of PII we listed above, as well as the transmission of user-
names and passwords in both plain-text (HTTP) and encrypted
(HTTPS) traffic.
Le et al. in [5] present AntMonitor, a system for collecting
and analyzing network traffic from Android devices (we
already mentioned it in Section III-B). Among other types
of analysis, AntMonitor can perform PII leakage detection.
The authors capture the network traffic of nine Android users
for a period of five weeks, then inspect the collected dataset
searching the following PII: IMEI, Android Device ID, phone
number, email address, and device location. Overall, 44% and
66% of the analyzed apps leak IMEI and Android Device ID,
respectively, while PII related to the user is rarely disclosed to
remote hosts. It is worth to notice that the proposed analysis
requires to inspect application-layer data, which is infeasible
in case of traffic encryption, neither at network (IPsec) nor
transport layer (SSL/TLS).
Song and Hengartner in [41] develop PrivacyGuard, an
open-source Android app that leverages the VPNService
class of the Android API for eavesdropping the network traffic
of the apps installed on the device. The authors employ
PrivacyGuard to investigate the leakage of PII related to
mobile users (e.g., phone number) and devices (e.g., IMEI) by
Android apps. In an evaluation conducted using 53 Android
apps, PrivacyGuard detects more PII leaks than TaintDroid
[66]. The proposed app can optionally replace the leaked
information with bogus data. Moreover, it can inspect trans-
mission protected by SSL/TLS (through a man-in-the-middle
approach), but cannot deal with traffic encrypted via IPsec.
11
TABLE VI
WORKS THAT DEAL WITH PII LEAKAGE DETECTION.
Year Paper Targeted Mobile Platform Action on PII LeaksAndroid iOS Windows Phone Detection Prevention
2012 Stevens et al. [23] 4 4
2013 Kuzuno et al. [27] 4 4Rao et al. [29] 4 4 4 4
2015 Le et al. [5] 4 4Song et al. [41] 4 4 4
2016 Ren et al. [50] 4 4 4 4 4Vanrykel et al. [54] 4 4
2017 Cheng et al. [57] 4 4Continella et al. [58] 4 4
Vanrykel et al. in [54] investigate the leakage of sensitive
identifiers in the unencrypted network traffic of Android apps.
The authors develop a framework that automatically executes
apps, collects their network traffic, inspects the HTTP data,
and detects the identifiers that are transmitted in clear. The
analysis of 1,260 Android apps (from 42 app categories)
shows that: (i) the Android ID and Google Advertising ID are
the most frequently leaked identifiers, while the SIM serial
number, the IMSI, the device serial number, and the email
of the registered Google account are less common in apps’
network traffic; (ii) there is an extensive leakage of app-
specific identifiers; and (iii) certain apps leak the user’s phone
number, email address, or position.
Cheng et al. in [57] present a framework for the detection
of PII leaks by Android apps. Such framework leverages the
information available in IP and TCP headers; for this reason,
it works even if the apps employ SSL/TLS to encrypt their
network transmissions, and it can be blocked only using IPsec.
Overall, the idea is to model the network traffic related to a
user-app interaction into a sequence of packet sizes, then con-
vert such sequences into feature vectors to be used for training
and evaluating a machine learning classifier. The authors
consider seven Android apps (i.e., BaidoYun, Evernote, QQ,
QQMail, TouTiao, WeChat, and Weibo), plus a self-developed
Android malware, called Moledroid, that implements several
techniques employed by malicious apps to leak PII.
Continella et al. in [58] develop Agrigento, an open-source
framework for the analysis of Android apps in order to detect
PII leakage. Agrigento is based on differential analysis, and
its workflow consists of two phases. In the first phase, the
app under scrutiny is executed several times on a physical
device to collect: (i) its network traffic; and (ii) additional
system- and app-level information that is contextual to the
execution (e.g., randomly-generated identifiers, timestamps).
Subsequently, the collected information is aggregated to model
the network behavior of the app. In the second phase, a specific
PII within the operating system of the mobile device is set to a
different value. The app is then executed once again to collect
its network traffic and the contextual information. Finally, a
PII leak is reported if the collected data does not conform to
the model learned before. Evaluated on 1,004 Android apps,
Agrigento detects more privacy leaks than currently available
state-of-the-art solutions (e.g., ReCon [50]), while limiting the
number of false positives. The proposed framework requires
to inspect HTTP messages and leverages a man-in-the-middle
approach to deal with HTTPS traffic. However, Agrigento does
not work on network traffic encrypted via IPsec.
E. Malware Detection
As happened for personal computers, the success and
widespread adoption of mobile devices have attracted the
interest of malware developers. Mobile devices, and partic-
ularly smartphones, are an ideal target for attackers since: (i)
they are ubiquitous, i.e., the population of potential targets is
large; (ii) they host sensitive information about their owners
(e.g., identity, contacts, GPS position); and (iii) they have
networking capabilities and they are usually connected to the
Internet.
We define as malware detection the attempt to understand
whether a mobile app is malicious through the analysis of the
network traffic it generates. In this section, we present the state
of the art techniques for such kind of traffic analysis. We point
out that we do not report the works that study the properties
of the network traffic generated by malicious apps, because in
such case the analysis is more related to traffic characterization
(see Section III-A). From the surveyed works, we elicit three
kinds of actor that actually perform malware detection task:
(i) an app marketplace [24]; (ii) a security company [25], [44],
[48], [8], [55]; or (iii) a mobile user [22], [35].
Shabtai et al. in [22] present an anomaly-based malware
detection app for Android devices. The proposed app monitors
several aspects of the device (e.g, memory, network, power)
and extracts different features, some of which are related
to network traffic (e.g., the number of received packets).
A properly trained machine-learning-based classifier is then
employed to check whether an installed app is malicious. The
proposed solution is evaluated using 40 benign and 4 malicious
Android apps. The authors consider different classifiers (e.g.,
decision tree, Bayesian networks), as well as different metrics
for feature selection (e.g., Fisher score, information gain).
Moreover, the authors investigate how the detection accuracy
is affected when: (i) the testing apps are not used in the training
phase; and (ii) training and testing are performed on different
devices.
Su et al. in [24] propose a framework that allows an Android
marketplace to detect whether an app submitted by a mobile
developer is malicious or benign. The system consists of two
components: (i) servers, where developers can upload their
new apps for verification; and (ii) physical Android devices,
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where apps are actually executed while monitoring their sys-
tem calls and network traffic. The gathered information is
sent to a central server, which classifies each app as safe
or malicious according to the response of two classifiers.
In particular, a classifier bases its decision on system call
statistics, while the other considers network traffic features.
The network traffic classifier is trained with data from 49
malicious apps (from 22 malware families) and 60 benign
apps, and tested with data from 50 malicious apps (from
22 malware families) and 70 benign apps (from eleven app
categories). It is worth to notice that such classifier cannot
process network traffic encrypted via IPsec, since one of the
features it leverages is the average TCP session duration,
which is not computable without accessing TCP headers.
Wei et al. in [25] present a framework for Android malware
detection. Using network traffic generated by malicious An-
droid apps, the system learns the network behavior of Android
malware with regard to the resolution of domain names. Then,
the system is employed to automatically analyze the DNS
traffic produced by a given app and state whether that app is
safe or malicious. The authors evaluate their solution using
malicious apps from a public dataset of Android malware
and benign apps from the official Android marketplace. A
weakness of this framework is that it requires the access to
the DNS traffic of apps, which can be hidden by IPsec or
SSL/TLS encryption.
Shabtai et al. in [35] design an anomaly-based malware
detection app for Android devices. Such app analyzes the
network behavior of the apps installed on the device in order
to identify self-updating malware (i.e., benign apps that after
being installed on the device, they download a malicious
payload from the Internet) and popular apps republished with
additional malicious code. The idea is to model the normal
network behavior of each installed app as a set of traffic
patterns, and subsequently detect any deviation from those
patterns. The system is evaluated on several benign apps, ten
self-updating malicious apps developed by the authors, and the
infected version of five of the chosen benign apps. The system
works even with apps that encrypt their network traffic, since
it needs to know only their amount of transmitted/received
bytes and its percent out of the total device traffic.
The work by Zaman et al. [44] stems from the observation
that malicious apps usually send the user’s sensitive informa-
tion to accomplice remote hosts. The idea is to log all com-
munications with remote hosts for each app installed on the
mobile device. Leveraging a list of known malicious domains,
it is possible to label the apps that contacted them as malware.
This approach requires to inspect the URLs within HTTP
messages, therefore it does not work on encrypted network
traffic. The authors evaluate their solution on DroidKungFu
and AnserverBot samples (i.e., two Android malware) being
able to detect only the former one.
Narudin et al. in [48] investigate whether an anomaly-based
IDS (Intrusion Detection System) can successfully detect
malicious Android apps by relying on traffic analysis. To build
a comprehensive dataset of network traces, the authors run
benign apps on a physical Android device and malicious apps
on dynamic analysis platforms available online. The collected
network traffic is then sent to a central server, where several
machine learning classifiers (e.g., random forest, multi-layer
perceptron) are trained and evaluated. Unfortunately, such
classifiers cannot process encrypted traffic, since they need
to inspect HTTP messages.
Wang et al. in [8] present TrafficAV, an Android malware
detection system based on machine learning. The proposed
framework offers two distinct detection models, which rely
on TCP- and HTTP-related network features, respectively. We
give more details about considered features and classifiers
in Section VI-B4. The authors evaluate their models on the
network traffic of 8,312 benign apps and 5,560 malware
samples. While the HTTP feature-based model cannot work
on traffic encrypted with SSL/TLS since it requires to perform
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), both the proposed models
cannot cope with apps that employ IPsec.
Arora and Peddoju in [55] (which is an extension and
refinement of a previous work by the same authors [67])
also apply machine learning to detect Android malware. They
collect the network traffic of malware samples from eleven
families, extract 22 network-layer features (e.g., average time
interval between received packets, per-flow sent bytes), and
train a naive Bayes classifier. They evaluate their proposal
on the network traffic of malware samples from six families
(different from the ones used for training). Moreover, the
authors present a feature selection algorithm that reduces the
number of features to be used, while limiting the drop in
detection accuracy. The proposed framework is encryption-
agnostic, although the same authors admit that encryption may
be a possible solution to evade detection. We provide more
details about the features and the algorithm to select them in
Section VI-B4.
F. User Action Identification
As we stated in Section III-B, most of the apps can leverage
the Wi-Fi and cellular network interfaces of mobile devices
to send and receive data. Since users perform several actions
while interacting with apps, it is likely that most of such
actions generate data transmissions. The network traffic trace
of a given action typically follows a pattern that depends on
the nature of the user-app interaction of that action. As a
practical example, browsing a user’s profile on Facebook will
likely produce a different traffic pattern compared to posting
a message on Twitter. These patterns can be used to recognize
specific user actions related to a particular app of interest in
generic network traces. Moreover, it is often possible to infer
specific information about a given user action (e.g., the length
of the message sent via an instant messaging app). We refer
to these types of traffic analysis as user action identification.
The possibility to identify actions of mobile users can be
useful in several scenarios:
• It is possible to profile the habits of a mobile user (e.g.,
checking emails in the morning, watching YouTube videos
in the evening). The user’s behavioral profile can be used
to later recognize the presence of that user in a network.
Moreover, profiles of thousands of mobile users can be
aggregated in order to infer some information for marketing
or intelligence purposes.
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TABLE VII
APP CATEGORIES COVERED IN THE SURVEYED WORKS THAT DEAL WITH
USER ACTION IDENTIFICATION.
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2013 Watkins et al. [30] 4 4 4 4
2014 Coull et al. [32] 4
2015 Park et al. [39] 4
2016
Conti et al. [45] 4 4 4
Fu et al. [46] 4
Saltaformaggio et al. [52] 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
• It is possible to perform user de-anonymization. Suppose
a national agency is trying to discover the identity of a
dissident spreading anti-government propaganda on a social
network. It is possible to monitor a suspect and detect when
she posts messages via the social network mobile app. The
inferred posting timestamps can be matched with the time
of the messages on the dissident social profile in order to
understand whether the suspect is actually the dissident.
In Table VII, we show the app categories covered by the
surveyed works that perform user action identification [30],
[32], [39], [45], [46], [52]. As we can notice from Ta-
ble VII, almost all the works target communication apps,
which belong to the most privacy-sensitive app category. This
category includes both instant messaging apps (e.g., iMessage,
KakaoTalk, WhatsApp) and email clients (e.g., Gmail, Yahoo
Mail). Another sensitive category is social (e.g., Facebook,
Twitter, Tumblr), which is targeted in [45], [52]. Apps related
to multimedia contents (e.g., YouTube) are considered in [30],
[52]. Moreover, Saltaformaggio et al. in [52] also focus on
other categories of apps: dating (e.g., Tinder), health (e.g.,
HIV Atlas), maps (e.g., Yelp), news (e.g., CNN News), and
shopping (e.g., Amazon). The works in [30], [45] cover
productivity apps (e.g., Dropbox), and Watkins et al. in [30]
also consider mobile games (e.g., Temple Run 2) and utility
apps (e.g., ZArchiver).
Watkins et al. in [30] develop a framework that exploits the
inter-packet time of responses to ICMP packets (i.e., pings) to
infer the type of action that the target user is performing on her
mobile device. In particular, the authors focus on three types of
user action: (i) CPU intensive; (ii) I/O intensive; and (iii) non-
CPU intensive. First of all, the authors check the feasibility
of their approach for the Android and iOS platforms, showing
that unfortunately their solution does not work on iOS since
such OS does not use CPU throttling. Subsequently, they
evaluate their framework using six Android apps. Since the
proposed solution exploits the timing of packets, it is not
affected by traffic encryption.
Coull and Dyer in [32] target iMessage, Apple’s instant
messaging service, which is available as an app for iOS or
a computer application for OS X. The proposed analysis
leverages the sizes of the packets exchanged between the
target user and Apple’s servers, thus it works despite all
iMessage communications are encrypted. The authors focus
on five user actions: “start typing”, “stop typing”, “send
text”, “send attachment”, and “read receipt”. The authors also
aim to infer the language (among six languages: Chinese,
English, French, German, Russian, and Spanish) and length of
the exchanged messages. The authors make two assumption
necessary by their methods to work correctly: (i) for user
actions identification, they assume to have correctly inferred
that the target mobile device is running iOS; and (ii) for
language and message length inference, they also assume to
have correctly identified an iMessage action.
Park and Kim in [39] target KakaoTalk, an instant messag-
ing service widely used in Korea. They consider eleven actions
that a user can perform on the Android app (e.g., join a chat
room, send a message, add a friend). For each action, the
proposed framework learns its traffic pattern as a sequence of
packets. Such sequence is then used to recognize that specific
action in unseen network traces. The proposed solution works
despite KakaoTalk traffic is encrypted using SSL/TLS, but it
does not work in presence of IPsec encryption.
Conti et al. in [45] present an identification framework
which leverages the information available in IP and TCP
headers (e.g., source and destination IP addresses) and there-
fore it works even if the network traffic is encrypted via
SSL/TLS. However, the proposed approach does not work on
an IPsec scenario, since it relies on (IP address, TCP port)
pairs to separate traffic flows. The authors target seven popular
Android apps (namely Dropbox, Evernote, Facebook, Gmail,
Google+, Tumblr, and Twitter). The authors also compare their
proposal with websites fingerprinting algorithms by Liberatore
and Levine [68] and Herrmann et al. in [69], outperforming
them.
Fu et al. in [46] propose CUMMA, a framework for user
action identification that targets messaging apps. The authors
focus their analysis on the Android platform, and consider the
WeChat and WhatsApp apps. For each targeted app, several
user actions are chosen for identification, such as sending a
text message or sharing the GPS position. Since the network
traffic of messaging apps is usually encrypted to protect the
privacy of their users, CUMMA is designed to overcome such
limitation by exploiting only the size and timing of the packets
exchanged between the app and the servers of the service
provider. The proposed framework leverages machine learning
by employing a classifier that is trained and evaluated on the
feature vectors extracted from the captured information. The
authors also develop a clustering method based on hidden
Markov model to deal with the fact that the same network
flow can likely contain the network data related to multiple
user actions (see Section VI-B5).
Saltaformaggio et al. in [52] present NetScope, a user
action identification system that can be deployed at Wi-Fi
access points or other network equipments. Since it leverages
IP headers/metadata, NetScope can be employed even if the
network traffic is protected by IPsec. The authors evaluate their
solution by considering 35 user actions from 22 apps across
two platforms (i.e., Android and iOS) and eight app categories.
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TABLE VIII
TARGETED MOBILE OSES IN THE SURVEYED WORKS THAT DEAL WITH
OPERATING SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION.
Windows
Year Paper Android iOS Phone Symbian
2014 Chen et al. [31] 4 4Coull et al. [32] 4
2016 Ruffing et al. [51] 4 4 4 4
2017 Malik et al. [60] 4 4 4
G. Operating System Identification
We define as operating system identification the attempt
to discover the operating system of a mobile device by
analyzing its network traffic. This type of analysis has several
applications:
• An adversary can identify the operating system of a target
mobile device, and tailor her subsequent attack to that OS
(e.g., by choosing a proper security exploit). In such case,
the operating system identification is a preparatory task for
more advanced and focused attacks. Moreover, the overall
attack strategy can be more effective if the adversary is able
to infer not only the operating system of the target mobile
device, but also the version of that OS.
• It is possible to expose the adoption of mobile operating
systems among a crowd of people. This can be a starting
point for marketing, as well as sociological studies (we
consider the latter in Section III-K).
In this section, we survey four works [31], [32], [51], [60].
Table VIII reports the mobile operating systems they consider.
Chen et al. in [31] develop a probabilistic classifier that
leverages the information available in IP and TCP headers.
Therefore, their method works unless IPsec is employed to
hide the content of IP packets. Such classifier is evaluated
using network traces captured at a Wi-Fi access point to which
Android and iOS mobile devices, as well as Windows laptops
are connected.
Coull and Dyer in [32] target iMessage, Apple’s instant
messaging service. They leverage the sizes of the encrypted
packets exchanged between the target user and Apple’s servers,
in order to determine whether she is using iMessage on iOS
or OS X. The proposed classifier needs to observe only five
packets to successfully identify the OS.
The work by Ruffing et al. [51] stems from the observation
that the timing of the network traffic generated by a mobile
device depends on its operating system. The idea is to analyze
the frequency spectrum of packet timing in order to identify
the frequency components that are related to OS features,
and filter out the ones that bring noise. Since this approach
does not require to inspect the content of packets, it can
be successfully applied even if encryption is in place. The
authors evaluate their solution using network traffic captured
from smartphones running the following operating systems:
Android, iOS, Windows Phone, and Symbian. The authors
also evaluate whether their approach is suitable to discriminate
different versions of the same OS, and they choose Android
and iOS for such analysis.
Malik et al. in [60] present a framework that exploits the
inter-packet time of packets coming from a target mobile
device in order to infer its operating system. In particular,
the authors focus on two types of packet: (i) the response
to an ICMP packet sent to the target mobile device (active
measurement); and (ii) an IP packet related to a video stream
involving the target mobile device (passive measurement). In
both cases, the proposed solution effectively discriminates
among three mobile operating systems, namely Android, iOS,
and Windows Phone. Moreover, such approach is not hindered
by traffic encryption, since it exploits the timing of packets.
However, we must point out that the authors’ testbed includes
only three devices, one for each of the considered mobile
operating systems. Therefore, it is not clear whether the mobile
device model and the OS version may affect the accuracy in
identifying the OS.
H. Position estimation
The set of places frequently visited by a person tells a lot
about her social status, interests, and habits. Such informa-
tion can be exploited for commercial purposes (e.g., targeted
advertisement), as well as intelligence activities (e.g., police
investigations). Since most of people own a mobile device and
keep it with them all day long, locating the smartphone/tablet
of a target user becomes a simple yet effective way to know her
position. Multiple position detections can be then aggregated
to build a profile of the subject or reconstruct its movements.
The movements of several mobile users can be aggregated as
well, for example to aid traffic prediction along urban streets.
We define as position estimation the inference of the posi-
tion and/or trajectory (i.e., movements) of a mobile device in a
geographical area, by analyzing the network traffic that device
generates. In this section, we survey the works that propose
this type of traffic analysis. We point out that we do not
consider the works in which: (i) the mobile traffic is analyzed
to detect the leakage of GPS coordinates (we consider this kind
of works in Section III-D); and (ii) the analysis performed on
the network traffic is device-agnostic, i.e., it does not take into
account the fact that the target devices are smartphones/tablets
(this kind of works is excluded since it is too generic).
Husted and Myers in [11] investigate whether a malnet
(i.e., a colluding network of malicious Wi-Fi devices) can
successfully determine the location of a mobile device. Each
malicious node looks for probe requests carrying the MAC ad-
dress of the target mobile device, and uploads its findings to a
central server where the data coming from all nodes is used for
trilateration. Through a software simulation of a metropolitan
population of users equipped with 802.11g mobile devices,
the authors show that 10% of tracking population is sufficient
to track the position of the remaining users. Besides, the
tracking benefits from extending the broadcasting range of
the mobile devices. This suggests that the adoption of newer
802.11 standards can make it feasible to build a geolocating
malnet.
Musa and Eriksson in [21] present a system for passively
tracking mobile devices by leveraging the Wi-Fi probe requests
they periodically transmit. The idea is to employ a number of
Wi-Fi monitors, which look for probe requests from mobile
devices and report each detection to a central server, where the
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detections of the same mobile device are turned into a spatio-
temporal trajectory. To evaluate their system, the authors set up
three deployments and leverage GPS ground truth to measure
the accuracy of the inferred trajectories. The mean error is
under 70 meters when the distance among the monitors is
over 400 meters.
I. User Fingerprinting
Mobile users interact actively with their devices, leveraging
the nearly ubiquitous Internet connectivity and the capabilities
of the apps available in the marketplaces. To each mobile
user, it is possible to associate a set of preferred (i.e., most
frequently used) apps and, for each of these apps, a set
of preferred actions (i.e., most frequently executed). Since
most of the mobile apps are able to connect to the Internet,
and many user actions within them trigger data transmission
through the network, it becomes clear that the network traffic
generated by a user is likely to present a fairly constant pattern
across different devices, as well as across different networks.
We define as user fingerprinting the attempt to exploit such
pattern in order to recognize the network traffic belonging to
a specific mobile user. This type of analysis can be applied to:
• Recognize the presence of a specific mobile user within a
network. Once the network is identified, it is then possible
to approximate the geographical position of that user with
the location of the Wi-Fi hotspot or cellular station to which
her mobile device is connected.
• Partition the network traces of a mobile traffic dataset by
user. Once the transmissions related to a specific mobile
user have been separated and grouped together, it is then
possible to apply other types of traffic analysis targeting
that user.
In this section, we review the works that deal with mobile user
fingerprinting.
Verde et al. in [36] present a system being able to accurately
infer when a target user is connected to a given network and
her IP address, even though she is hidden behind NAT among
thousands of other users. To achieve this objective, a machine
learning classifier is trained with the NetFlow records of the
target user’s traffic, and then employed to analyze the NetFlow
records of a given network in order to detect the presence
of the target user within it (more details on the classifier
are provided in Section VI-B8). The system is evaluated as
follows:
• Cross-validation is applied to the NetFlow records of the
traffic generated by 26 different mobile users connecting to
the Internet through the same Wi-Fi access point.
• The authors enroll five mobile users and ask them to
connect their devices to a Wi-Fi access point to then try to
detect the presence of such users within a real-world large
metropolitan Wi-Fi network.
It is worth to notice that the proposed solution is encryption-
agnostic, since NetFlow records can be extracted even from
encrypted traffic.
Vanrykel et al. in [54] investigate how mobile unencrypted
traffic can be exploited for user surveillance. The authors
develop a framework to automatically execute apps, collect
their network traffic, inspect the HTTP data, and identify the
sensitive identifiers that are transmitted in clear. Moreover,
the authors present a graph building technique that exploits
such identifiers to extract the network traces generated by
a specific mobile user from a traffic dataset (more details
in Section VI-C2). The authors analyze 1,260 Android apps
(from 42 app categories) showing that their proposed solution
can link 57% of a mobile user’s unencrypted network traffic.
In addition, the authors observe the limited effectiveness of ad-
blocking apps in preventing the leakage of sensitive identifiers.
J. Ad Fraud Detection
Mobile apps can be partitioned into two macro categories:
paid and free apps. To cover the cost of developing and main-
taining a free app, developers usually rely on advertisement,
which applies the following business model:
• The ad provider yields a library that can be embedded in
the app. Such library fetches ad contents and displays them
on the app’s user interface.
• The ad provider pays according to the amount of times the
ads are displayed to the user (impressions) and/or clicked
by the user (clicks).
We define as ad fraud detection the analysis of network
traffic in order to uncover apps that trick the business model
described above and let their developers illicitly earn money.
Unfortunately, despite the economic impact that such research
brings in the market of mobile advertisements, only one work
has been published on this topic.
Crussell et al. in [33] focus on the Android platform. They
identify two fraudulent app behaviors:
• To request ads while the app is running in background. This
generates impressions without actually displaying ads to the
user.
• To click on ads without any user interaction, which is
achievable in the following ways: (i) the app can trick the
ad library by simulating a user click on the ad with a touch
event; and (ii) the app extracts the click URL from the ad
request (i.e., the web page that will be opened when the
user clicks on the ad), then makes an HTTP request to the
click URL to simulate a user click.
The authors propose MAdFraud, a tool being able to auto-
matically run Android apps in emulators and analyze their
application-layer traffic in order to expose ad fraud. The
system is employed to analyze 130,339 Android apps crawled
from nineteen different marketplaces, and 35,087 Android
apps that probably contain malware (provided by an unspeci-
fied security company). The authors report that 30% of apps
generate fake impressions (i.e., they request to display an ad
while running in the background), while 27 apps generate fake
clicks (i.e., they contact a click URL without any user inter-
action). Unfortunately, MAdFraud cannot process encrypted
traffic, since it relies on the HTTP and DNS data generated
by apps. However, the authors’ analysis covers most of the
available ad libraries. This means that such libraries do not
usually employ any form of encryption for their data transfers
(i.e., they simply rely on plain HTTP).
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K. Sociological Inference
A property of a mobile device (e.g., the list of installed
apps, the Wi-Fi networks to which the device associated)
characterizes its owner. Sociologists can leverage this kind
of information to study a population of mobile users. In
this section, we review the works that deal with sociological
inference, which we define as the analysis of the network
traffic generated by mobile devices in order to infer some kind
of sociological information about their users.
Barbera et al. in [26] investigate whether sociological infor-
mation about a large crowd can be inferred by inspecting the
Wi-Fi probe requests generated by the mobile devices of those
people. First of all, the authors: (i) devise a methodology to
convert a dataset of Wi-Fi probe requests into a social graph
representing the owners of the monitored mobile devices; and
(ii) develop an automatic procedure to infer the language
of a given SSID. Subsequently, they target gatherings of
people at urban, national, and international scale, as well
as a mall, a train station, and a campus. As a result of
their analysis, the authors report some findings: (i) the social
graph of all the targeted events has social-network properties;
(ii) the distributions of languages and mobile device vendors
match the nature of the monitored crowds; and (iii) socially
interconnected people tend to adopt mobile devices of the
same vendor, and appear in the same time slot.
L. Tethering Detection
The ability to connect to cellular networks lets mobile de-
vices have nearly ubiquitous Internet connectivity. Moreover,
mobile devices are able to share such connectivity with other
devices that cannot leverage cellular networks (e.g., laptops).
This practice is commonly referred to as tethering, and can
be carried out in many ways, such as via a USB cable, via
Bluetooth, or establishing a WLAN (hotspot) for which the
mobile device acts as a router.
In this section, we report the works that deal with tethering
detection, which we define as the analysis of the network
traffic generated by a mobile device in order to discover
whether it is sharing its Internet connection with other devices.
This type of analysis can be valuable for a cellular network
provider, since tethering can significantly increase the amount
of traffic its network infrastructure has to sustain. An effective
detection method would let the cellular ISP prevent users from
sharing their mobile Internet connection, or require them to
pay an extra fee.
Chen et al. in [31] develop a probabilistic classifier being
able to detect tethering by leveraging several network features
(e.g., the number of distinct TTLs in the packets coming from
the same IP address). To evaluate their solution, the authors use
publicly available Wi-Fi traces collected at two conferences,
as well as a dataset of Wi-Fi traffic from a campus network.
The authors simulate tethering by randomly mix packets from
different IP addresses, then modifying source IP addresses
accordingly. Since the proposed solution requires to inspect the
content of TCP headers, it cannot work whether the captured
network traffic is protected by IPsec.
M. Website Fingerprinting
The Internet has a central role in people’s everyday life,
and surfing the Web has become a common task that can
be performed from desktop computers, as well as in mobility
using laptops and smartphones/tablets, thanks to the increasing
deployment of cellular and Wi-Fi networks. From a privacy
point of view, the set of websites frequently visited by a user
is a sensitive information, since it can disclose her interests,
social habits, religious belief, sexual preference, and political
orientation.
In the field of traffic analysis, website fingerprinting gener-
ally indicates the attempt to infer the website or even webpage
visited by a user surfing the Internet with her mobile device,
by analyzing the network traffic generated by the mobile web
browser. This type of analysis has been extensively treated in
the domain of personal computers, where machine learning
techniques have been proved to be very effective [68], [69],
[70]. Since we focus on mobile devices, in this section we
survey the works that target users navigating through the web
browser of their mobile devices.
Spreitzer et al. in [53] develop an Android app being able
to capture the data-usage statistics of the browser app, and
leverage them to fingerprint the mobile webpages visited by
the user of the mobile device on which that app is installed.
This solution is not affected by encryption, since it only
requires to know the amount of data transmitted and received
by the browser app (which is easily obtainable in Android).
The proposed app is evaluated on a set of 500 possible
pages that the user can visit. The authors also evaluate their
fingerprinting app when the network traffic is protected by
Tor (in particular, by using the Orbot proxy and the Orweb
browser).
IV. POINTS OF CAPTURING FOR TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
TARGETING MOBILE DEVICES
Another meaningful categorization of the work is based
on the point where the network traces are captured in order
to build the traffic dataset(s). In Table IX, we report the
point(s) of capturing for each surveyed work. As shown in
Figure 4, the most common points of capturing are wired
network equipments (twenty two works), followed by mo-
bile devices themselves (twenty works), Wi-Fi access points
(twelve works), and mobile devices emulators and Wi-Fi
monitors (five works each). In one work, the mobile traffic
is simulated via software. As shown in Table IX, four works
leverage two different types of point of capturing, and one
work even three. In the following sections, we provide a
definition for and discuss each of the points of capturing we
encountered in the surveyed work. For each point of capturing,
we also point out pro, cons, and relevant aspects that have to
be taken into account, as a guideline to properly design a
network traffic collection environment for mobile devices.
A. Wired Network Equipments
In this section, we review the works in which the mobile
traffic is captured at one or more wired network equipments.
Such equipments can be deployed into two types of network:
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TABLE IX
THE SURVEYED WORKS BY WHERE THE MOBILE TRAFFIC IS CAPTURED.
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2010
Afanasyev et al. [9] 4 4
Falaki et al. [10] 4
Husted et al. [11] 4
Maier et al. [12] 4
Shepard et al. [13] 4
2011
Finamore et al. [14] 4
Gember et al. [15] 4
Lee et al. [16] 4
Rao et al. [17] 4
2012
Baghel et al. [18] 4
Chen et al. [19] 4
Ham et al. [20] 4
Musa et al. [21] 4
Shabtai et al. [22] 4
Stevens et al. [23] 4
Su et al. [24] 4
Wei et al. [25] 4
Wei et al. [4] 4
2013
Barbera et al. [26] 4
Kuzuno et al. [27] 4
Qazi et al. [28] 4 4
Rao et al. [29] 4
Watkins et al. [30] 4
2014
Chen et al. [31] 4 4 4
Coull et al. [32] 4
Crussell et al. [33] 4
Lindorfer et al. [34] 4
Shabtai et al. [35] 4
Verde et al. [36] 4
2015
Chen et al. [37] 4
Fukuda et al. [38] 4
Le et al. [5] 4
Park et al. [39] 4
Soikkeli et al. [40] 4
Song et al. [41] 4
Wang et al. [42] 4
Yao et al. [43] 4 4
Zaman et al. [44] 4
2016
Alan et al. [6] 4
Conti et al. [45] 4
Fu et al. [46] 4
Mongkolluksamee et al. [47] 4
Narudin et al. [48] 4 4
Nayam et al. [49] 4
Ren et al. [50] 4
Ruffing et al. [51] 4
Saltaformaggio et al. [52] 4
Spreitzer et al. [53] 4
Tadrous et al. [7] 4
Vanrykel et al. [54] 4
Wang et al. [8] 4
2017
Arora et al. [55] 4
Chen et al. [56] 4
Cheng et al. [57] 4
Continella et al. [58] 4
Espada et al. [59] 4
Malik et al. [60] 4
Taylor et al. [61] 4
Wei et al. [62] 4
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Fig. 4. Number of published works contributing traffic analysis methods
targeting mobile devices, sorted by point of capturing.
• Small-scale networks, serving a reduced number of mobile
users (from one single mobile device to a few tens). Re-
searchers often deploy such networks to collect the traffic
they need in a controlled environment. The equipments
associated to this type of network are small Internet gate-
ways [36], VPN servers [29], [50], [54], and traditional
desktop computers that log all the traffic traversing the
wired link between the APs to which the mobile devices
are associated and the Internet [17], [18], [25], [37], [39],
[45], [49], [8], [57], [58], [61]. The user population typically
consists only of the targeted mobile devices (i.e., there is
no need to filter out non-mobile traffic from the captured
traces).
• Large-scale networks, serving thousands of users. In such
case, the considered network equipments are edge routers
(i.e., routers that connect customers to their ISP’s back-
bone) [12], top-level routers [16], [19], [36], Internet gate-
ways [9], [31], [62], switches [31], or generic points of
presence within national ISPs and campus networks [14].
The user population typically includes also non-mobile users
(e.g., laptop users), and the network traffic they generate
must be removed from the captured traces.
In Table X, we present the works in which the collected
mobile traffic comes from one or more wired network equip-
ments serving a small number of mobile devices. For each
work, we report the network equipments at which the mobile
traffic is logged, the targets of the analysis, additional details
about the capturing process, and the information leveraged for
the analysis. We use the term forwarding server to indicate a
device that logs all the traffic traversing the wired link between
the APs to which the monitored mobile devices are connected
and the Internet.
In Table XI, we present the works in which the mobile traffic
is extracted from traces captured at one or more wired network
equipments serving large-scale networks with thousands of
users. In the following, we provide additional information
about the mobile data extraction process for each work.
Afanasyev et al. in [9] leverage the Organizationally Unique
Identifier (OUI) of the MAC address to discriminate between
mobile and non-mobile devices. This approach has the dis-
advantage that an OUI can be associated to devices of both
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TABLE X
THE SURVEYED WORKS IN WHICH THE MOBILE TRAFFIC IS EXTRACTED FROM TRACES CAPTURED AT ONE OR MORE WIRED NETWORK EQUIPMENTS
SERVING A SMALL NUMBER OF MOBILE DEVICES.
Year Paper Network Equipment(s) Target(s) Capturing Details LeveragedInformation
2011 Rao et al. [17] Forwarding server
Android and iOS
clients for Netflix and
YouTube
180 seconds for each video
playback HTTP messages
2012 Baghel et al. [18] Forwarding server
Facebook Android app 90 minutes, no user interaction Layer-2+ dataSkype Android app Five hours, no user interaction
Wei et al. [25] Forwarding server
102 malicious Android
apps from a public An-
droid malware dataset,
and popular Android
apps from Google Play
Store
No details DNS data
2013 Rao et al. [29] VPN server
The top-100 free An-
droid apps in Google
Play Store, and 209 free
iOS apps from Apple
App Store
Up to ten minutes of manual
interaction Layer-3+ data
732 free Android apps
from a third-party An-
droid marketplace
Android Debug Bridge (ADB)
scripting and Monkey are lever-
aged to execute 100,000 ac-
tions for each app
2014 Verde et al. [36] Gateway router 26 mobile devices One month of monitoring NetFlow records
2015 Chen et al. [37] Forwarding server
5560 malicious
Android apps (from
177 malware families)
Each app is stimulated for five
minutes using Monkeyrunner Layer-2+ data
Park et al. [39] Forwarding server
Eleven user actions
from KakaoTalk
Android app
Each user action is automati-
cally executed 100 times
IP headers, TCP head-
ers
2016
Conti et al. [45] Forwarding server 58 user actions fromseven Android apps
Android Debug Bridge (ADB)
scripting is leveraged to execute
220 sequences of actions for
each app
IP headers, TCP head-
ers
Nayam et al. [49] Forwarding server
63 Android and 35 iOS
free apps, all belonging
to the “Health & Fit-
ness” category
Three 30-minutes-long runs per
app, driven using automated
scripts (Appium for Android
and Silk Mobile for iOS)
HTTP messages
Ren et al. [50] VPN server
The top-100 free apps
from Google Play
Store (Android), Apple
App Store (iOS), and
Windows Phone Store
(Windows Phone)
Five minutes of manual interac-
tion Layer-3+ data
850 of the top 1,000
free apps from a third-
party Android market-
place
Android Debug Bridge (ADB)
scripting and Monkey are lever-
aged to execute 10,000 actions
for each app
Vanrykel et al. [54] Two VPN servers 1,260 Android appsfrom Google Play Store
User interactions are simulated
using The Monkey HTTP messages
Wang et al. [8] Forwarding server
8,312 benign Android
apps from Google Play
Store, and 5,560 mali-
cious Android apps
Each app is stimulated using
Monkeyrunner
TCP- and HTTP-related
data
2017
Cheng et al. [57] Forwarding server
Seven Android apps,
plus a self-developed
PII-leaking Android
app
Manual interaction IP headers, TCP head-ers
Continella et al. [58] Forwarding server 1,004 Android appsfrom Google Play Store
Each app is stimulated for ten
minutes using Monkey HTTP messages
Taylor et al. [61] Forwarding server
110 of the top-200 An-
droid apps from Google
Play Store
Android Debug Bridge (ADB)
scripting is leveraged to simu-
late user-app interactions
IP headers, TCP head-
ers
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types (e.g., several OUIs belonging to Apple are associated to
iPhones and MacBooks as well). Maier et al. in [12] and Chen
et al. in [19] inspect the User-Agent field of HTTP messages,
which can be misleading and it is not present in non-HTTP
mobile traffic. In such case, the authors in [12] inspect the
Time-To-Live (TTL) field of IP packets. Finamore et al. in [14]
leverage the peculiar characteristics of YouTube traffic from
mobile devices, while Lee et al. in [16] inspect the packet
headers, looking for information related to mobile operating
systems (without clarifying the nature of such information).
Chen et al. in [31] do not elicit mobile traffic from the
gathered network traces because they simply merge such data
with traffic from other sources (see Section IV-E for details),
then simulate tethering by modifying the source IP address
of packets. Verde et al. in [36] do not need to extract the
traffic of mobile devices from the collected network data
because identifying such traffic is just the goal of their user
fingerprinting method. Wei et al. in [62] inspect the IP address
to check whether it belongs to the IP address pool of the target
WLAN, then leverage the DHCP logs from the DHCP server
of the network to map the IP address to a MAC address, and
finally inspect the Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI) of
the MAC address.
B. Mobile Devices (Real)
The most direct way to collect mobile traffic is to place the
point of capturing within the mobile devices, leveraging their
modern operating systems to run a full-fledged logging app
that is able to gather the required information. This approach
has several implications:
• The covered set of mobile devices tends to be small com-
pared to network-side measurements, since the logging app
has to be installed on the mobile device of each volunteer.
• The strongest advantage of this point of capturing is that the
traffic is logged directly on the mobile device, therefore we
are sure that everything is captured belongs to that mobile
device. In case of network-side logging, instead, the mobile
traffic needs to be separated from the transmissions gener-
ated by other kinds of device, such as laptops and desktop
computers. This process is error-prone, since some network
information could be potentially misclassified. Moreover, it
lacks completeness, because traffic that is not classified for
some reason will be discarded even if it belongs to a mobile
device.
• The logging app must have the proper permissions to capture
traffic on the mobile device.
• The logging app must be lightweight. This means that it
has to: (i) impose a negligible computational burden on the
mobile device’s CPU; (ii) occupy as few memory as possible
to store traffic logs (this problem is easy resolvable if the
logging app is allowed to periodically upload the logs to a
remote server); and (iii) cause minor battery consumption,
which is a major concern for mobile users.
• It is possible to focus on the traffic generated by specific
mobile apps, or the one transiting through a specific network
interface (i.e., Wi-Fi or cellular).
In Table XII, we present the works in which the mobile
traffic is captured within one or more mobile devices. For each
work, we show the targeted mobile platforms, the number of
mobile devices employed, the tool used to capture the network
traffic, and the information leveraged for the analysis.
Android is the most targeted mobile platform, mainly be-
cause its open nature makes it easy to develop a traffic logger
from scratch, or simply port one of the available desktop
solutions. Nevertheless, Fukuda et al. in [38] and Shepard et al.
in [13] show that effective traffic loggers can be successfully
deployed also on iOS devices. Packet sniffing tools such as
Shark for Root and the networking module of DELTA logging
tool [71] are based on tcpdump, while tPacketCapturePro
leverages the VPNService class of the Android libraries.
This class is also used in the custom logging apps by Le et
al. in [5], and Song and Hengartner in [41].
The number of targeted devices is a meaningful information,
especially for works which carry out mobile traffic character-
ization [10], [13], [4], [38], [59], or study the usage habits of
mobile users [10], [20], [38], [40]. With regard to such works,
we observe that only Fukuda et al. in [38] leverage a suitable
population (over 1500 mobile devices), while the others count
from a few tens to slightly more than a hundred of mobile
devices. We point out that the problem is less relevant for the
works in [4], [59], since the focus of the analysis is on the
apps, rather than mobile devices.
C. Wi-Fi Access Points
As reported in [38], mobile users are increasingly offloading
their traffic demands to Wi-Fi networks. This practice has
become very common at home, where Wi-Fi modems are
employed to make the wired Internet connection of the house
available to laptops and mobile devices. Moreover, free Wi-Fi
networks are often deployed in shops and public places (e.g.,
parks, malls, train stations), as well as at social events (e.g.,
meetings, conferences, concerts).
A Wi-Fi network typically consists of two types of hardware
equipments: (i) access points (APs), which leverage the 802.11
standard to provide network connectivity to the associated
wireless devices; and (ii) gateways, which forward the network
traffic coming from the APs to the Internet (or to a higher-
level gateway, in case of a hierarchical network infrastructure),
and vice versa. It is worth to notice that these two categories
are not mutually exclusive, since a hardware equipment can
act as both access point and gateway (e.g., Wi-Fi modems). In
this section, we survey the works that apply analysis methods
to mobile traffic captured at one or more Wi-Fi access points
(we dealt with traffic capturing at gateways in Section IV-A).
From an analysis point of view, we make the following
observations:
• Compared with cellular networks, Wi-Fi networks cover a
smaller geographical area, as well as much less users. For
this reason, the mobile traffic captured at the APs of a
Wi-Fi network is representative of a more restricted user
population (e.g., the customers of a shop, the students of a
campus), enabling fine-grained analysis.
• Since Wi-Fi networks are typically free of charge, mo-
bile users can carry out intensive network activities (e.g.,
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TABLE XII
THE SURVEYED WORKS IN WHICH THE MOBILE TRAFFIC IS CAPTURED WITHIN ONE OR MORE REAL MOBILE DEVICES.
Year Paper Mobile Platform(s) Number of Devices Capturing Tool Leveraged Information
2010 Falaki et al. [10]
Android 33 Custom logging app Per-app Tx/Rx bytes
2 tcpdump Layer-2+ data
Windows Mobile 8 Netlog
Shepard et al. [13] iOS 25 Custom logging app Per-interface Tx/Rx bytes, IPheaders/packets
2012
Ham et al. [20] Android 10 Custom logging app Per-process/Per-interface Tx/Rxbytes/packets
Shabtai et al. [22] Android 2 Custom logging app Per-app cellular/Wi-Fi Tx/Rxbytes/packets
Su et al. [24] Android Unspecified tcpdump Layer-2+ data
Wei et al. [4] Android 2 tcpdump Layer-2+ data
2013 Kuzuno et al. [27] Android 1 tcpdump Layer-2+ dataQazi et al. [28] Android 5 netstat netstat logs
2014 Coull et al. [32] iOS Unspecified
Unspecified (on a Mac, by using
the iOS Remote Virtual Inter-
face)
Packet sizes within iMessage’s
APNS connection
Shabtai et al. [35] Android 1 Custom logging app Per-app Tx/Rx bytes and per-cent out of total Tx/Rx bytes
2015
Fukuda et al. [38] Android Over 800 Custom logging app Per-app/Per-interface Tx/Rxbytes/packetsiOS Over 700
Le et al. [5] Android 9 Custom logging app Per-app IP headers/packets
Soikkeli et al. [40] Unspecified 120 Custom logging app Tx/Rx bytes
Song et al. [41] Android 1 Custom logging app IP packets
Zaman et al. [44] Android 1 Shark for Root Layer-2+ datanetstat netstat logs
2016
Mongkolluksamee et al. [47] Android 1 tcpdump Layer-2+ data
Narudin et al. [48] Android 1 tPacketCapturePro Per-app layer-2+ data
Spreitzer et al. [53] Android Unspecified Custom logging app Tx/Rx TCP bytes of thebrowser app
2017 Arora et al. [55] Android 1 Unspecified IP packetsEspada et al. [59] Android 1 tcpdump Layer-2+ data
watching videos from a streaming platform). Such kind of
activities are hard to observe in cellular networks due to the
fees applied to Internet traffic by network providers.
• Wi-Fi networks usually serve not only mobile devices, but
also other kinds of device, such as desktop computers and
laptops. Therefore, if the analysis targets mobile devices,
the network traffic belonging to non-mobile devices must
be properly filtered out from the collected network traces.
• If the monitored Wi-Fi network employs several access
points, the information gathered at each AP must be properly
combined with the one from the other APs, in order to
produce a comprehensive network trace. This process can be
tricky whenever the APs (or the traffic sniffers deployed at
the APs) are not perfectly synchronized, causing timestamps
from different sources to be staggered.
In Table XIII, we present the surveyed works in which
the mobile traffic is captured at one or more Wi-Fi access
points. We can identify two distinct experimental settings: in
the former, the authors monitor few access points, deployed
in a controlled environment to provide Internet connectivity to
a small number of mobile devices [23], [28], [30], [31], [43],
[6], [46], [52], [7], [60]; in the latter, several APs of a real Wi-
Fi network serving a large number of users are monitored [9],
[15].
In the case of multiple APs in a real deployment, it is
fundamental to separate the network traffic related to mobile
devices from the one related to other types of device (e.g.,
laptops). Afanasyev et al. in [9] leverage encryption-agnostic
data-link- and network-layer information from the RADIUS
logs collected by the over 500 APs of the Google Wi-Fi net-
work in Mountain View (California, USA), and discriminate
among desktop computers, laptops, and mobile devices by
relying on the Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI) of the
MAC address. Gember et al. in [15] carry out a comparison
between mobile and non-mobile devices with regard to net-
work traffic properties and habits of users. To discriminate
between the two types of device, they apply the following
methodology: (i) for a device generating HTTP traffic, the
User-Agent field of the HTTP messages is compared with a
list of strings clearly related to mobile devices, in order to
determine whether the device is a mobile one (match) or not
(mismatch); (ii) for a device that does not generate HTTP
traffic, the Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI) of its
MAC address is inspected to determine whether it is a mobile
or non-mobile device.
D. Mobile Devices (Emulated)
As for their desktop counterparts, apps must be properly
tested not only throughout their development process, but
also before their final submission to a marketplace. The
simplest testing methodology consists of installing the mobile
app on one or more physical mobile devices. However, this
approach has two shortcomings: (i) the number of different
test configurations (each consisting of a hardware device and
a version of a compatible mobile operating system) is limited,
while the number of configurations available on the market is
large; and (ii) the difficulty in automating the tests within the
mobile devices, due to lack of tools and resource constraints.
An alternative solution is to install the app to be tested in
a mobile device emulator, which is a virtual machine that is
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TABLE XIII
THE SURVEYED WORKS IN WHICH THE MOBILE TRAFFIC IS CAPTURED AT ONE OR MORE WI-FI ACCESS POINTS.
Scale of the Targeted Wi-Fi Network(s) Year Paper Leveraged Information
Few APs in controlled environment
2012 Stevens et al. [23] HTTP messages
2013 Qazi et al. [28] Network- and transport-layer informationWatkins et al. [30] Inter-packet time of ICMP responses
2014 Chen et al. [31] IP headers, TCP headers
2015 Yao et al. [43] HTTP messages
2016
Alan et al. [6] IP headers, TCP headers
Fu et al. [46] Size and timing of IP packets
Saltaformaggio et al. [52] IP headers
Tadrous et al. [7] 802.11 frames
2017 Malik et al. [60] Inter-packet time of ICMP responses or IP packets related tovideo streaming
Multiple APs in real deployment 2010 Afanasyev et al. [9] Data-link- and network-layer information from RADIUS logs2011 Gember et al. [15] Layer 2+ data
TABLE XIV
THE SURVEYED WORKS IN WHICH THE MOBILE TRAFFIC IS CAPTURED AT
ONE OR MORE MACHINES RUNNING MOBILE DEVICE EMULATORS.
Number of Apps Run in
Year Paper Mobile Device Emulator(s)Android iOS Symbian
2014 Crussell et al. [33] 165,426 None NoneLindorfer et al. [34] Over 1M None None
2015 Yao et al. [43] 651,000 68,000 10,000
2016 Narudin et al. [48] 1,030 None None
2017 Chen et al. [56] 5,000 None None
able to simulate the components and operations of a mobile
operating system. This approach has several implications:
• The Software Development Kit (SDK) of a mobile platform
typically provides a mobile device emulator for testing
purposes. Therefore, the developers can cut the expense for
physical mobile devices and simply buy a machine to run
the emulator (or, even better, run the emulator directly on the
machine where the code is written, without any additional
expenditure).
• If properly endowed with computational power and memory,
the testing machine can run multiple mobile device emu-
lators in parallel, speeding up the overall testing process
or letting the developers increment the set of tests to be
executed on the app.
• A mobile device emulator can be quite easily controlled
from the outside, helping test automation and thus reducing
human intervention.
• There are important limitations on which components and
operations of a mobile operating system can be emulated.
Such limitations reduce the types of test that can be actually
executed on a given app.
Since a machine running a mobile device emulator is re-
sponsible for forwarding the network traffic from the emulator
to the Internet and vice versa, it constitutes an ideal point
of capturing for mobile traffic. This approach is particularly
useful if the focus of the analysis is on the network traffic of
a specific mobile app. In Table XIV, we present the targeted
mobile platforms and number of considered apps for the
surveyed works in which the mobile traffic is captured at one
or more machines running mobile device emulators.
Crussell et al. in [33] carry out ad fraud detection on two
sets of Android apps: (i) 130,339 apps crawled from nineteen
different marketplaces; and (ii) 35,087 apps that probably are
malware (provided by an unspecified security company). The
authors apply the following modus operandi for capturing the
network traffic of a given app: (i) the app is installed on a
newly created Android emulator image; (ii) a logger starts
to capture the emulator’s network traffic; and (iii) the app is
first run in the foreground for 60 seconds, then it runs in the
background for another 60 seconds.
Lindorfer et al. in [34] present ANDRUBIS, a publicly
available system for the analysis of Android apps. For each
submitted app, ANDRUBIS applies both static and dynamic
analysis techniques in order to study how the app behaves.
Moreover, during the 240 seconds of the dynamic analysis, the
network traffic generated by the app running in the sandbox
is captured for a later analysis focused on high-level protocols
(e.g., DNS, HTTP, IRC).
Yao et al. in [43] carry out app identification on three mobile
platforms, namely Android, iOS, and Symbian. To capture
network traffic from the selected apps, the authors run them
in mobile device emulators and trigger their network behavior
using UI automation tools (the framework also supports the
capturing at a Wi-Fi access point, see Section IV-C).
Narudin et al. in [48] leverage machine learning to build
a classifier being able to detect malware on the Android
platform. They consider two sets of Android apps: (i) the
top twenty free (benign) apps available in the Google Play
Store; and (ii) 1,000 malicious apps from 49 malware families,
provided by the Android Malware Genome Project, as well
as 30 new (in 2013) malicious apps from fourteen malware
families, collected by the authors. To capture the traffic of
the malicious apps, two online dynamic analysis platforms,
namely Anubis and SandDroid, are leveraged (the traffic of
the benign apps is logged on a real device, see Section IV-B).
Chen et al. in [56] carry out app identification targeting the
Android platform, and evaluate their solution on 2,500 apps
from Google Play Store and seven other third-party Android
marketplaces, and 2,500 malicious apps from VirusTotal. The
considered apps are run in emulators for five minutes, and
stimulated via an automatic UI exploration tool; such tool
first randomly explore the possible interactions with the app,
23
then heuristically generates new interactions from the ones that
have been already explored.
E. Wi-Fi Monitors
We define as Wi-Fi monitor a hardware equipment that is
able to scan the Wi-Fi radio bands (i.e., 2.4 and 5 GHz)
in order to capture the transiting IEEE 802.11 frames. The
most common configuration consists of a traditional Wi-Fi
device (e.g., a Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) card
in a desktop computer) set in monitor mode, i.e., the device
passively listens the nearby Wi-Fi transmissions. To effectively
eavesdrop the network traffic of a Wi-Fi device, the monitor
must be within the target’s range of transmission. Such range
depends on many factors, including the selected radio band,
the power of the Wi-Fi module, and the surrounding buildings.
Wi-Fi monitors can be easily deployed at a low cost, and let
oversee a good number of Wi-Fi devices. However, there are
a few issues that have to be addressed in order to effectively
use Wi-Fi monitors for eavesdropping:
• In case more than one monitor is deployed, an IEEE 802.11
frame can be eavesdropped by multiple distinct monitors if
they are too close to each other. When traffic traces provided
by different monitors are merged, the duplicate captures
must be properly deleted.
• The timestamp of each eavesdropped IEEE 802.11 frame
depends on the internal clock of the Wi-Fi monitor that
captured it. Since the network data collected by distinct
monitors are merged to build a comprehensive dataset, it
is crucial to consider internal clock differences between
monitors (unless they are synchronized in some way).
In Table XV, we provide information about the capturing
process carried out in the works that employ one or more Wi-
Fi monitors to collect the network traffic of mobile devices. A
typical concern related to the mobile traffic analysis is to filter
out from the captured network traces the traffic generated by
non-mobile devices. In [21] and [26] the traffic capturing takes
place in a location and time such that the collected traffic only
belongs to mobile devices. In [42] and [51] the network data
generated by non-mobile devices is filtered out since the MAC
address of each targeted mobile device is known.
F. Network Simulators
Among the surveyed works, one in particular does not
capture the mobile traffic from real or emulated mobile de-
vices, but instead generate it via a software simulator. This
approach can be useful to study particular deployments of
mobile devices that are not observable in a real-world scenario
due to technical difficulties, economical constraints, or limits
imposed by law. If the simulation is realistic, the resulting
network traces will be really close to the ones that are collected
on real or emulated mobile devices.
Network traffic simulation typically works as follows:
1) The information about the simulated environment (e.g.,
geographical extension, buildings, streets) is provided to
the system.
2) The information about the actors (e.g., mobile devices,
laptops, access points) is provided to the system. For each
actor, such information includes its technical specifications,
its position within the simulated environment, and its
network behavior. If the actor is used by a human user,
her sociological characteristics and behavioral patterns are
also provided.
3) The points of capturing are positioned within the simulated
environment.
4) The network transmissions of the actors are simulated
according to realistic physical laws and social dynamics.
Husted and Myers in [11] develop a 3D simulation of a large
population of mobile devices deployed in a dense metropolis
where no other Wi-Fi devices (e.g., access points) are present.
A fraction of the mobile devices act as trackers (i.e., they
are the points of capturing) and scan the air in order to
capture Wi-Fi probe requests transmitted by the rest of the
population (i.e., the trackees). The system properly simulates
the propagation of probe requests (which are transmitted in
clear) in the environment, and takes into account the diurnal
behavior of mobile users (e.g., go to work in the morning,
come home in the evening). The resulting network traffic
dataset is leveraged for position estimation (more details in
Section III-H).
V. TARGETED MOBILE PLATFORMS IN TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
The network traffic of a mobile device depends on its operat-
ing system. Since each mobile OS has its own implementation
of the network protocol stack, it generates data transmissions
with peculiar network properties. Exploiting such properties
is fundamental to devise effective methods for the analysis of
mobile traffic. For example, the TCP window size scale option
(i.e., the value that is negotiated during the TCP three-way
handshake to increase the TCP receiver window size beyond
65,535 bytes) is always 16 for iOS, while it can be either 2, 4,
or 64 for Android. Chen et al. in [31] exploit this distinction
(together with other differences with regard to network traffic)
to successfully recognize whether a target mobile device is
running one of those OSes.
In this section, we present the surveyed works according to
the mobile platforms they target. As shown in Figure 5, only
thirteen works propose analyses that are platform-independent,
i.e., they do not take into account the platform which the
targeted mobile devices belong to (it is worth to notice that
two of them, namely Lee et al. in [16] and Chen et al. in [31],
also present other types of analysis that are instead tailored to
specific mobile platforms). Among the other works, Android
is the most targeted mobile platform (45 works), followed
by iOS (fifteen works), Windows Mobile/Phone (four works),
and Symbian (two works). As shown in Table XVI, nine
works target two mobile platforms, three works target three
platforms, and one work even four. We present the targeted
mobile platforms, sorted by the the number of works involved:
Android in Section V-A, iOS in Section V-B, Windows Mo-
bile/Phone in Section V-C, and Symbian in Section V-D. Each
of the above-mentioned sections is organized in three parts: the
first part provides an overview of the system architecture; the
second part describes the apps specific for that platform; and
the third part reviews the works that carry out traffic analysis
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TABLE XV
THE SURVEYED WORKS IN WHICH THE MOBILE TRAFFIC IS CAPTURED USING ONE OR MORE WI-FI MONITORS.
Year Paper
Number
of Wi-Fi
Monitors
Capturing Duration Targeted Population Leveraged Information
2012 Musa et al. [21]
5 9 months People along the streets near an universitycampus 802.11 probe requests
6 12 hours People along fairly busy roads of a city
7 12 hours People along an arterial road of a city
2013 Barbera et al. [26]
5
From 40 minutes to 7
hours
People at two political meetings, two Pope’s
masses, a big mall, and a train station 802.11 probe requests
1 6 weeks People at an university campus
1 Unspecified People at streets and aggregation places of acity
2014 Chen et al. [31] 9 2 days People at OSDI 2006 Size and header of IP packets
8 5 days People at SIGCOMM 2008
2015 Wang et al. [42] 1 Unspecified One iOS device Size and timing of (possibly en-crypted) 802.11 frames
2016 Ruffing et al. [51] 1 3 months Two Android devices, two iOS devices, aWindows Phone device, and a Symbian device
Timing of (possibly encrypted)
802.11 frames
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Fig. 5. Number of published works contributing traffic analysis methods
targeting mobile devices, sorted by mobile platform.
targeting that platform. Finally, we discuss the works that do
not belong to any specific mobile platform in Section V-E.
A. Android
Android is an open-source mobile operating system de-
veloped by Google. Android is also promoted by the Open
Handset Alliance (OHA), a consortium of 84 firms (including
Google, as well as several important actors of the mobile
market, like HTC, Samsung, and LG) which is devoted to the
development of open standards for mobile devices. Android
was unveiled at the end of 2007, and the first batch of
commercial Android devices appeared a year later. Many
mobile device manufacturers soon started deploying Android
on their flagship products, and the popularity of the operating
system rapidly increased. Nowadays, Android is the dominant
mobile operating system, with a market share of 68.4% in
June 2016, according to the statistics reported in [72].
1) System Architecture: As shown in Figure 6a, the archi-
tecture of the Android operating system consists of a stack of
four abstraction layers:
1) At the first layer, a Linux kernel provides system services
(e.g., memory, power, and process management), preemp-
tive multitasking, a network stack, and drivers for hardware
devices (e.g., display, camera).
2) The second layer contains the Android Runtime (ART),
which is the application runtime environment. Before An-
droid 5.0 (Lollipop), the execution of Android apps is
managed by the Dalvik virtual machine process. Android
apps and services are typically written in Java and executed
in a Dalvik Virtual Machine after being converted from
Java Virtual Machine to Dalvik bytecode. ART adopts a
different approach: the Dalvik bytecode is translated into
native instructions to be later executed on the runtime
environment of the device. This solution increases effi-
ciency and reduces power consumption. This layer also
includes native libraries that provide several functionalities
(e.g., 2D/3D graphics, encryption, SQLite database man-
agement).
3) The third layer is the application framework, i.e., the
environment that runs and manages Android apps. Among
the available services that compose such environment, (i)
the Activity Manager manages app lifecycle and activity
stack; (ii) the Content Providers allow apps to share data
with other apps; (iii) the Telephony Manager interfaces
with telephony services available on the device; (iv) the
Notifications Manager prompts the user with notification
or alerts raised by apps; and (v) the Location Manager
provides the apps with periodic updates regarding the
location of the device.
4) The fourth layer is constituted by the apps, which can be
native (e.g., web browser, email client) or provided by a
third party.
2) Apps: Android apps run in a sandbox and their access
to each system’s resource is regulated by a specific permission
that has to be given by the user. Before Android 6.0 (Marsh-
mallow), an app’s required permissions are presented to the
user at the beginning of the installation process. The user must
grant all the required permissions in order to install the app
on her device. From Android 6.0 on, permissions are managed
individually, and users can grant or revoke each permission
according to their usability and security needs.
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Fig. 6. System architectures of mobile operating systems.
TABLE XVI
TARGETED MOBILE PLATFORMS IN THE SURVEYED WORKS.
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2010 Falaki et al. [10] 4 4Shepard et al. [13] 4
2011 Lee et al. [16] 4 4Rao et al. [17] 4 4
2012
Baghel et al. [18] 4
Ham et al. [20] 4
Shabtai et al. [22] 4
Stevens et al. [23] 4
Su et al. [24] 4
Wei et al. [25] 4
Wei et al. [4] 4
2013
Kuzuno et al. [27] 4
Qazi et al. [28] 4
Rao et al. [29] 4 4
Watkins et al. [30] 4
2014
Chen et al. [31] 4 4
Coull et al. [32] 4
Crussell et al. [33] 4
Lindorfer et al. [34] 4
Shabtai et al. [35] 4
2015
Chen et al. [37] 4
Fukuda et al. [38] 4 4
Le et al. [5] 4
Park et al. [39] 4
Song et al. [41] 4
Wang et al. [42] 4
Yao et al. [43] 4 4 4
Zaman et al. [44] 4
2016
Alan et al. [6] 4
Conti et al. [45] 4
Fu et al. [46] 4
Mongkolluksamee et al. [47] 4
Narudin et al. [48] 4
Nayam et al. [49] 4 4
Ren et al. [50] 4 4 4
Ruffing et al. [51] 4 4 4 4
Saltaformaggio et al. [52] 4 4
Spreitzer et al. [53] 4
Tadrous et al. [7] 4 4
Vanrykel et al. [54] 4
Wang et al. [8] 4
2017
Arora et al. [55] 4
Chen et al. [56] 4
Cheng et al. [57] 4
Continella et al. [58] 4
Espada et al. [59] 4
Malik et al. [60] 4 4 4
Taylor et al. [61] 4
A third-party Android app is shipped in an APK (Appli-
cation Package Kit) file, which can be downloaded from the
developer’s website and manually installed on the device. To
simplify the process, Android users typically rely on the app
stores, or app marketplaces, which are programs that allow
them to browse the available apps, as well as to install, up-
date, and remove them. Google Play Store (formerly Android
Market) is the primary app store installed on Android devices,
and hosts over 2,500,000 apps [73] distributed by both Google
itself and third-party developers under Google’s license and
compatibility requirements. However, the openness of Android
has allowed the birth of a number of other third-party app
marketplaces (e.g., GetJar, F-Droid, the app store by Amazon),
which release apps under policies different from Google’s one.
3) Traffic Analysis: Since mobile apps are a key compo-
nent of the success of the Android operating system, it is
not surprising that most of the surveyed works focus their
analysis on the network traffic generated by Android apps.
The achieved results show that it is possible to successfully
fingerprint an Android app (or type of app) [16], [28], [29],
[5], [43], [6], [47], [56], [61], as well as an action performed
by a mobile user on her Android device [30], [39], [45], [46],
[52]. In [29], [5], [41], [50], [54], [57], [58], it is reported
that Android apps extensively leak the PII of mobile users,
and the works in [23], [27] highlight that an important role
in this phenomenon is played by the embedded ad libraries.
Regarding mobile advertisement, Crussell et al. in [33] prove
that many Android apps trick the advertisement business
model in order to let their developers illicitly earn money.
In [54], the authors exploit the sensitive identifiers that are
present in mobile traffic to fingerprint Android users. In [53],
the network statistics of Android’s default web browser are
leveraged for website fingerprinting. Finally, several works aim
at detecting malicious Android apps: in [25], [44], [48], [8],
[55], automated detection frameworks that can be employed
by marketplaces and security companies are presented; instead,
the authors in [22], [35] present apps that can enable malware
detection directly within the mobile devices of the end users.
In light of its market share, we argue that Android is
the reference operating system for many mobile users, and
Android devices are responsible for an important fraction of
the worldwide mobile Internet traffic. For this reason, it is not
surprising that many works aim at studying the properties of
the network traffic generated by Android devices [10], [17],
[18], [4], [34], [37], [38], [49], [7], [59], as well as the usage
habits of Android users [10], [20], [38]. Moreover, Android
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plays an important role in the works that deal with mobile OS
identification [31], [51], [60].
B. iOS
iOS is a proprietary mobile operating system developed by
Apple. Such OS is exclusively deployed in Apple’s mobile
devices. iOS was officially released with the name iPhone
OS in 2007. Later, this mobile OS was extended to support
other Apple’s mobile devices: iPod Touch (Apple’s multimedia
player) in 2007 and iPad (Apple’s tablet) in 2010. According to
the statistics reported in [72], iOS is the second most popular
mobile operating system, with a market share of 20.32% in
June 2016.
1) System Architecture: As shown in Figure 6b, the archi-
tecture of the iOS operating system consists of a stack of
four abstraction layers, each providing different services and
technologies:
• The Core OS layer contains: (i) the kernel; (ii) the device
drivers; (iii) the interfaces to access the low-level features
of the operating system (e.g., file system, memory, con-
currency, networking); and (iv) the interfaces to access the
frameworks that provide several core functionalities (e.g.,
support for external hardware, Bluetooth, authentication,
cryptography, support for VPN tunnels).
• The Core Services layer includes the mandatory system
services for running apps. These services provide core
functionalities (e.g., account management, location services,
cellular network services), as well as high-level features
(e.g., P2P, data protection, file sharing, SQLite, XML).
• The Media layer contains technologies leveraged by devel-
opers to implement multimedia content in their apps (i.e.,
audio, video, and graphic).
• The Cocoa Touch layer provides the key frameworks which
define the appearance of apps and grant the access to high-
level system services (e.g., push notifications, touch-based
input, multi-tasking).
2) Apps: Apple distributes the iOS Software Development
Kit (SDK), which contains the tools needed to develop, test,
and deploy native iOS apps. Apps are written in Objective-
C or Swift, and leverage the iOS system frameworks. Such
frameworks provide the interfaces that developers need to
write software for the iOS platform. Apps are physically
installed on the devices, and run directly on their operating
system.
Third-party iOS apps are available to users in the App Store,
Apple’s digital distribution platform, which was launched in
2008. The apps are developed with the iOS SDK and released
after Apple’s approval. The review process aims at assessing
that the distributed apps fulfill precise usability and security
requirements. According to the statistics reported in [74], the
App Store hosts about two million apps, available for various
iOS devices (e.g., iPhone, iPad). It is worth to notice that
there exist also unofficial marketplaces that distribute iOS apps
(e.g., Cydia), but they all require a jailbroken iOS device. In
a jailbroken iOS device, software vulnerabilities have been
exploited to remove the restrictions imposed by Apple on iOS.
This practice is required to allow the download and installation
of apps, extensions, and themes that are unavailable through
the official Apple App Store.
3) Traffic Analysis: Mobile apps are a fundamental building
block of the iOS user experience. For this reason, several solu-
tions have been proposed to effectively fingerprint them [16],
[29], [42], [43], as well as to detect the interactions between an
iOS user and a specific app installed on her mobile device [32],
[52]. The authors in [29], [50] investigate the disclosure of
sensitive information by iOS apps, discovering that many of
them leak the PII of the user. Regarding OS identification,
Coull et al. in [32] discriminates between iOS and OS X,
while the frameworks presented in [31], [51], [60] consider
iOS among the targeted mobile operating systems. Finally, a
few works study the properties of the network traffic generated
by iOS devices [13], [17], [38], [49], [7], and the usage habits
of iOS users [38].
C. Windows Mobile/Phone
In the early 1990s, Microsoft began to develop a new
operating system for minimalist computers and embedded
systems. This OS, later called Windows CE and officially
released in 1996, was the basis for the operating systems
that make Microsoft enter into the mobile market at the
beginning of 2000s. The first batch of mobile devices running
a Microsoft’s OS were Windows Mobile smartphones. They
became available in 2003 and targeted business users at first.
The lifecycle of Windows Mobile lasted for approximately
seven years, ending in 2010 with the release of its successor,
Windows Phone, which had a new user interface and aimed
at the consumer market. The last iteration of this OS was
Windows Phone 8.1, released in 2014 and succeeded by
Windows 10 Mobile at the end of 2015. Overall, Microsoft’s
mobile OSes struggle to acquire a relevant market share and
seem not to threaten the duopoly by Android and iOS (a trend
confirmed by the fact that, according to the statistics reported
in [72], only 1.94% of mobile devices were Windows Phone
ones in June 2016).
1) System Architectures: As shown in Figure 6c, the ar-
chitecture of the Windows Mobile operating system follows a
stack model, consisting of three abstraction layers:
• The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) layer is po-
sitioned at the bottom of the stack. This layer directly
communicates with the underlying hardware components
(e.g., microprocessor, RAM, ROM, digital signal processors,
input/output modules).
• The Operating System (OS) layer includes the kernel, the
core DLLs, the object store (which offers file system, reg-
istry, and database persistent storage), multimedia technolo-
gies, the device manager, communication and networking
services, and the Graphic Windowing and Events Subsystem
(GWES). The later one provides an interface between the
OS, the app, and the user.
• The Application layer consists of the apps, from either
Microsoft itself or third parties.
As shown in Figure 6c, the architecture of the Windows
Phone operating system is different, although it maintains the
three-levels stack:
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• At the bottom of the stack, the Software Foundation layer
includes: (i) the kernel, which manages security, networking,
and storage; and (ii) the interfaces that mediate the access to
the underlying hardware components (e.g., sensors, camera).
• The intermediate layer is composed by three elements: (i)
the App Model, which is the component providing first-class
access to several functionalities that are important for apps
(e.g., isolation, licensing, software updates, data sharing);
(ii) the UI Model, which manages the user interface of the
operating system; and (iii) the components that enable the
integration with Microsoft’s cloud services.
• The Application layer includes the frameworks available to
developers for building the user interface and logic of their
apps.
2) Apps: Apps for Windows Mobile are developed using
the official Software Development Kit (SDK) released by
Microsoft, and can be written either in C++ (“native” apps) or
C#/Basic (“managed” apps). At the end of 2009, Microsoft set
up a digital distribution platform, called Windows Marketplace
for Mobile, to organize and centralize the release of apps for
the Windows Mobile platform. With the advent of Windows
Phone, Microsoft started to progressively abandon Windows
Mobile, by ending support and closing Windows Marketplace
for Mobile in 2012.
Although the SDK and libraries are different, the apps for
Windows Phone are written with the same languages used for
Windows Mobile apps (i.e., C++, C#, and Basic), plus HTML5
and JavaScript for web-based apps. The official software dis-
tribution platform for Windows Phone, called Windows Phone
Marketplace (and later renamed Windows Phone Store), was
launched by Microsoft at the end of 2010, and subsequently
merged into the Windows Store (i.e., Microsoft’s universal
software marketplace) in 2015.
3) Traffic Analysis: Only a few works we survey target
Microsoft’s mobile OSes. Falaki et al. in [10] deploy a custom
logging app on Windows Mobile devices to capture their
network traffic and study its properties. Ren et al. in [50]
investigate PII leaks through network traffic generated by
devices running several mobile operating systems, including
Windows Phone. Finally, the works in [51], [60] deal with
mobile OS identification, and Windows Phone is among the
operating systems that the proposed frameworks are able to
recognize.
D. Symbian
Symbian is a mobile operating system originally developed
for PDAs in 1998, and subsequently moved into cellphones
and smartphones in the following years. Running exclusively
on ARM processors, Symbian requires an additional middle-
ware to form a complete operating system and to provide
a user interface. During the 2000s, Symbian became the
most popular mobile OS, since many mobile manufacturers,
particularly Nokia, chose it to power their devices. A non-
profit organization, the Symbian Foundation, was created in
2008 to drive the development of the operating system and
promote the adoption of Nokia’s middleware, namely S60.
However, with the advent of Android and iOS, and Nokia
adopting Windows Phone for its devices, the popularity of the
Symbian platform rapidly decreased. The Symbian Foundation
closed in 2010, and the development of the OS ended in that
period. According to the statistics reported in [72], Symbian
is almost disappeared, with a market share of only 2.22% in
June 2016.
1) System Architecture: As shown in Figure 6e, the archi-
tecture of the Symbian operating system consists of a stack of
three abstraction layers:
• The OS layer is the core of a Symbian system, and contains
the kernel, which provides the interfaces to access the
underlying hardware, and several essential services (e.g.,
communications, text and data handling, graphics).
• The Middleware layer provides a software platform which
consists of higher-level generic APIs available to the apps
of the upper layer. These APIs include the native UI
frameworks, as well as frameworks for app lifecycle, higher-
level protocols, and data handling. Different platforms are
not compatible, i.e., apps developed for a platform cannot
run on the others.
• The Apps layer includes apps that interact with the user and
background services that provide functionalities to the apps.
2) Apps: As we already explained in Section V-D1, all
Symbian devices share a common core, on top of which
different software platforms are built to provide an execution
environment for user apps (actually implementing the Middle-
ware layer shown in Figure 6e). Backed by different groups
of mobile device manufacturers, three software platforms were
created for Symbian:
• S60 (Series 60) was the most popular Symbian platform, of-
ficially supported by the Symbian Foundation and deployed
in the products of several mobile device manufacturers,
including Nokia, Samsung, and LG. S60 was able to run
apps developed in Java MIDP, C++, Python, and Adobe
Flash. Third-party developers had to distribute their apps by
either releasing them in the marketplaces (the most impor-
tant stores were run by Nokia and Opera Software), or pre-
installing them in the mobile devices of some manufacturers.
• UIQ (User Interface Quartz) was developed by UIQ Tech-
nology, and supported by Sony Ericsson and Motorola. The
platform was able to run native apps written in C++ using
the Symbian/UIQ Software Development Kit (SDK), as well
as Java apps. The development of UIQ stopped in 2008,
when the Symbian Foundation was established and chose
S60 as its reference Symbian platform.
• MOAP (Mobile Oriented Applications Platform) was the
platform chosen by NTT DoCoMo, a major Japanese cel-
lular operator, for its FOMA (Freedom of Mobile Multi-
media Access) service, which was a W-CDMA-based 3G
telecommunications service. Supported by a few Japanese
companies, like Fujitsu and Sharp, MOAP did not spread
outside of Japan. It was not an open development platform,
i.e., there were no third-party apps.
3) Traffic Analysis: Only two works target the Symbian
operating system. The first work by Ruffing et al. [51] deals
with the identification of the OS of mobile devices, and
Symbian is among the operating systems that the proposed
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framework is able to recognize. The second work by Yao et
al. [43] presents an app identification system which is trained
and evaluate on, among others, 10,000 Symbian apps from the
Nokia OVI Store.
E. Platform-independent Works
We survey several works in which the analysis performed
on the network traffic is generic, which means that it is
not specific for a particular mobile platform. Some of these
works leverage the 802.11 probe requests that are sent by
mobile devices of any platform to discover if an already
known Wi-Fi access point is nearby: in [26], sociological
information is inferred from the probe requests of a population
of mobile users, while in [19], [21] probe requests are ex-
ploited to estimate a mobile device’s geographical position and
movements, respectively. Besides, some works simply group
together mobile devices of different platforms and consider
them as a unique category. In [19], [62], the properties of the
network traffic generated by mobile devices in a campus Wi-Fi
network are studied. In [9], [12], [15], mobile and non-mobile
devices are compared on network traffic properties and users’
usage habits, and the same is done in [14] but limited to the
YouTube service. Finally, Verde et al. in [36] present a user
fingerprinting method that is successfully used to recognize
the presence of some target mobile users within a small test
network and a large Wi-Fi one.
VI. MODELS AND METHODS IN TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
TARGETING MOBILE DEVICES
In the literature, researchers leverage several different mod-
els and methods to carry out the analysis of the network
traffic of mobile devices. The application of such instruments
is strictly correlated with the point of listening (as described in
Section IV), as well as the information extracted from the cap-
tured traffic. Being able to capture packet-level unencrypted
data (e.g., HTTP messages) constitutes the most optimistic
scenario since all the information enclosed in the network
packets (e.g., the URLs that has been contacted) is available
in clear. Under these conditions, it is possible to effectively
apply Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) techniques. Unfortunately,
such types of analysis cannot be carried out if the information
available in the network traffic is affected by the following
factors: (i) the presence of encrypted traffic at different layers
(i.e., IPsec at network layer, SSL/TLS at transport layer); and
(ii) the application of traffic aggregation or sampling (e.g.,
NetFlow, IPFIX). For this reason, network traffic analysts have
to rely on mathematical models and methods to cope with
the lack of available information whenever such difficulties
are in place. According to their goals, researchers can still
apply techniques to analyze the mobile network traffic. For
example, it is possible to rely on statistical-based techniques
to perform traffic characterization. Among those techniques,
machine learning provides several approaches to classify and
cluster network traffic.
In this section, we provide a deeper insight into the models
and methods leveraged in the state of the art to devise
solutions for the analysis of mobile devices’ network traffic.
In particular, we provide an overview of the methodology
followed to perform traffic analysis with machine learning
in Section VI-A, describing each step in the procedure. In
Section VI-B, instead, we deal with application of machine
learning to several types of traffic analysis targeting mobile
devices.
A. Overview and Elements on Machine Learning
Machine learning (ML) is the branch of artificial intelli-
gence that studies algorithms that can be used to learn from
and make predictions on data. Such algorithms are typically
adopted to solve problems for which a traditional algorithmic
solution (i.e., a finite sequence of instructions) is hard, if not
impossible to find.
In this section, we provide an introduction on the basic
concepts of machine-learning-based analysis. This is also
mean to be a guideline that reports the principal steps that
have to be followed to properly train a machine learning model
(summarized in Figure 7). For each step, we define its purpose
and describe the different methods used by the surveyed works.
Network 
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Fig. 7. Procedure for a machine learning analysis.
1) Features extraction from network traffic: As a first step,
the network traffic collected from a capturing point (See
Section IV) has to be transformed into a format that can
be used by a machine learning technique. This step is called
feature extraction and typically takes a network entity as an
input (e.g., packets, flows) and provides a fixed-sized vector
for features that represent the properties of such entity. A good
feature extraction has to enclose in such output vector as much
as possible the information available from the network traffic
collected according to the final target of the analysis. Some
examples of feature extraction methods used in the surveyed
work are:
• Time Series (TS) are sequence of entities ordered by the
time in which they occur [75]. As an example time series, a
flow of packets can be represented as a sequence of packet
sizes. Since time series related to network traffic do not have
a fixed length, an additional transformation is necessary to
obtain a fixed size vector.
• Statistical Feature Extraction (SFE) consists in applying
statistical primitives (e.g., mean, standard deviation) along
the data dimensions. As an example, from a sequence of
packet sizes it is possible to extract a feature vector in which
each element corresponds to a statistical primitive.
• Histograms are used for feature extraction to represent the
distribution of values, by aggregating them into a fixed
number of bins. Each bin corresponds to a range of values
and it counts the occurrences of values within that range.
• Bag-of-Word (BoW) is a model that first identify distin-
guishable entities (i.e., words) and then counts the frequency
of occurrence of each specific entity in the input data. This
model is broadly used in document classification.
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Moreover, in Section VI-C we describe into detail two other
feature extraction and analysis methods that rely on dictionar-
ies and graphs. At the end of the feature extraction, we obtain
a dataset that can be seen as a matrix in which each row
corresponds to an entity (a.k.a., observation) and a column
to a feature (a.k.a., dimension). Optionally, it is possible to
normalize the whole dataset by column to a specific interval
of values (e.g., from 0 to 1).
2) Feature Selection: Given the dataset obtained from the
previous step, it is often necessary to select a subset of features
which are meaningful to describe the reality to be modeled.
Indeed, a high-dimensional dataset may present a phenomena
called curse of dimensionality. The target of a model is to
identify similarities within observations belonging to the same
class, and such similarities need to be statistically significant to
not mislead during the training of a model. Hence, the amount
of observations needed to prove that a similarity is not due
to sparsity grows exponentially with the number of features
of the dataset. Thus, a dataset with an unbalanced amount
of observations among classes (e.g., the unbalance between
the number of malicious and benign traffic traces in malware
analysis) and a high-dimensionality may be not able to prove
whether the features are statistically significant. Moreover, the
high amount of features also increase the computational cost
to train a model. In order to cope with that, it is possible
to apply feature selection (or feature reduction) techniques,
among which:
• Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) [76] is a statistical method
to analyze the difference between the mean values of
features in a dataset. ANOVA evaluates the statistical signifi-
cance of features in the dataset running a statistical test (i.e.,
a t-test that aims to reject the null hypothesis) generalized
to work on multiple means.
• Principal Components Analysis (PCA) [77] and Indepen-
dent Component Analysis (ICA) [78] are used in signal
processing to identify the components of a signal, but they
are also used for feature selection tasks. PCA aims to
find and remove correlated features in order to reduce the
dimensionality of a dataset. To do so, PCA decomposes the
feature set into a set of orthogonal components that show a
high variance (i.e., covariance matrix’s eigenvectors of the
original dataset). Similarly to PCA, ICA removes correlated
features by finding statistically independent components.
• Relative Mutual Information (RMI) measures the mutual
dependence between couples of features. In practice, RMI
quantifies the amount of information expressed by a feature
evaluating the conditional entropy of that feature given
another one [79].
3) Model Selection and Training: Once the features set
is defined, the learning process can proceed with the actual
training of a model. A model has to be selected taking into
account two main factors: (i) the goal of the analysis; and (ii)
the availability of labeled data. For this reason, it is necessary
to carry out some preliminary analysis to understand which
model is the most suitable for the available data. These factors
also determine whether the outcome result has to be a binary
or multi-labels classification, or a clustering task. Once the
candidate models have been selected according the available
dataset and the goal that has to be achieved, it is possible to
evaluate the performance of such models varying their hyper-
parameters. This procedure is called model selection, and it is
a good practice to carry it out before training a final model.
It is possible to run this evaluation on a dataset portion (i.e.,
training set) leaving the remainder of the dataset (i.e., testing
set) for the evaluation of the final model. For the sake of
simplicity, here we only mention the so called holdout method,
but we describe in detail this and other dataset partitioning
methods in Section VII-A3.
In what follows, we introduce two main machine learning
approaches used in mobile traffic analysis: supervised and
unsupervised learning.
a) Supervised Learning: The most frequently used ma-
chine learning methods in traffic analysis follow the supervised
learning paradigm. This paradigm permit to extract knowledge
from labeled datasets. This category of learning also compre-
hends semi-supervised learning, which allow the presence of
unlabeled data.
• Support Vector Machines (SVM) classifier is a method
that aim at separate observations into classes relying on a
hyperplane (which is identified by three observations, i.e.,
vectors). Since observations may not be separable by an
hyperplane (i.e., linear SVM), it is possible to apply kernel
functions, such as Polynomial Kernel (PK) and Radial Basis
Function (RBF), to make the observations linearly separable
by projecting them to a high dimensional feature.
• Decision Trees classifier is a simple method that relies on
tree structures. The components of these structures are: (i)
nodes, each representing a condition on a feature; (ii) leaves,
each representing a feature vector. Among the possible
algorithms to generate a decision tree, the most popular are
ID3, C4.5, and J48.
• Ensemble Methods combine the results of many weak
classifiers into a more powerful one. This combination of
results follows a strategy such as Boosting or Bootstrap
aggregation. An example of ensemble methods is Random
Forest (RF) classifier which usually relies on decision trees
as weak learners.
• The Probabilistic Learning methods leverage Directed
Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) to represent the probability between
variables, each represented by a node. For each edge that
connects a node A from to a node B, it is associated
with a probability function that, given an input, outputs the
probability to have a transition from A to B.
Bayesian network (BN) is an example of method that
assumes each variable is conditionally independent from
the others, i.e., Naı¨ve Bayes (NB). As another example,
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) assumes a conditional proba-
bility distribution among hidden variables (i.e., unobservable
states) respecting the Markov property. HMM is often
applied in pattern and speech recognition.
• Regression methods consist of explaining through a function
the relation between a dependent variable (i.e., class) given
an independent variable (i.e., data). An example is the
Linear Regression (LiReg), which aims to fit the data with
a linear model. Another example is the Logistic Regression
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(LoReg) which is a linear regression that gives in output not
a continuous value, but a binary value instead.
• k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) method simply consists of map-
ping labeled observations into a space. During the classifi-
cation of an unlabeled example X , the algorithm assigns the
most recurrent class label among the k nearest neighbors of
X (with k fixed beforehand).
• Artificial Neural Networks (NN) are learning methods based
on nodes (i.e., neurons) connected to each other and ar-
ranged into layers. Each neuron applies a propagation func-
tion to its incoming connections and generates an output.
The connections between neurons are weighted, and dur-
ing the training such weights are updated using a back-
propagation algorithm (e.g., gradient descent). Traditional
neural networks have three kinds of neuron, according to the
location (i.e., input, hidden, or output layer). In particular,
a neural network without cycles (i.e., feed-forward) with
more than one layer of hidden neurons is called Multilayer
Perceptron (MLP). Some other variants that allow cycles and
multiple layers of hidden neurons are Convolutional (CNN)
and Recurrent (RNN) neural networks. Another example of
neural network is the Neural-Fuzzy classifier (NFz). Neural
networks can be also used for unsupervised and reinforced
learning.
b) Unsupervised Learning: This machine learning ap-
proach aims to group observations into clusters according to
their similarity. This task is called unsupervised because it
does not need any previous knowledge about observations.
Indeed, unsupervised learning is useful in goals of analysis
that do not rely on a labeled datasets, such as traffic charac-
terization.
Clustering methods rely on distance metrics to measure the
similarity between observations. Such metrics are particularly
useful when network entities (e.g., packets, flows) and sets are
involved. Examples of distance metrics used in the surveyed
work are Euclidean and Compression distances, the optimal
warping path of Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [80], and
Jaccard’s Index (JI) [81].
Hierarchical Clustering (HC) is a clustering method that
aims to build a hierarchy of clusters according to a specific
strategy. The agglomerative strategy starts with a cluster for
each observation and iteratively merges clusters according to
their similarity (keeping trace of the hierarchy among clusters),
until all observations are aggregated in a single cluster (a.k.a.,
Bottom-up strategy). The hierarchy of clusters resulting from
this process can be represented through a dendrogram. By
setting a cut-off parameter, it is possible to cut the resulting
hierarchy at a specific height to obtain a set of clusters.
k-Means Clustering (kMeans) is a method that aims to
group observations into k clusters. Such method is initialized
with a preliminary division of the observations according to
their position in the feature space. Then, it iterates on each
observation alternating two steps: “assignation” and “update”.
The “assignation” step associates an observation to the cluster
whose centroid (i.e., mean of all cluster elements) is the
nearest (i.e., having the shortest distance centroid-observation).
The “update” step recomputes the centroids of clusters given
the observation’s new assignation. The algorithm converges
when the assignation step does not move any observation from
the previous iteration.
B. Machine Learning Applications by Goal of the Analysis
Machine learning is effectively applied in most of the works
we survey to perform such type of analysis targeting mobile
devices. In the following sections, we review the applications
of machine learning according to the popularity of the goal of
the analysis (in the same order used in Section III).
1) Traffic Characterization: Nayam et al. in [49] study the
network behavior of 63 Android and 35 iOS free apps. To find
similarities between the apps, the authors apply the following
methodology:
• The TCP and UDP traffic of each analyzed app is partitioned
according to the type of domains to which it is related:
(i) advertisement; (ii) tracking; (iii) popular services (e.g.,
Google, Facebook); and (iv) other domains.
• For each app, the following attributes are computed: (i) total
number of sessions; (ii) session rate for each type of domain;
and (iii) percentage of sessions for each type of domain.
• k-means clustering is applied to group together the apps that
show a similar network behavior.
In Table XVII, we report the resulting app classification.
2) App Identification: Supervised learning is applied for
app identification in [28], [5], [42], [6], [47], [61]. The
methodology followed to build the app classifier is the same
in all such works: (i) the network traffic of the selected mobile
apps is captured; (ii) for each mobile app, feature vectors
are extracted from its network traces and labeled with the
name/type of that app; and (iii) the chosen classifier is trained
on the labeled feature vectors. In Table XVIII, we report the
leveraged features and employed classifiers for each of the
surveyed works in which machine learning is applied for app
identification. Moreover, in the following we provide addi-
tional information about the reinforced-learning-based method
that Taylor et al. propose in [61] to cope with the problem
of ambiguous networks flows, i.e., network flows that are not
useful in order to uniquely identify an app. Generated by third-
party libraries (e.g., ad libraries) which can be embedded in
different apps, such flows hinder the training of a classifier. To
tackle the problem, the authors propose a method composed
of four stages: (i) a preliminary classifier is trained using
a preliminary training set; (ii) the preliminary classifier is
evaluated using a preliminary testing set; (iii) samples which
are wrongly labeled by the preliminary classifier are re-labeled
as “ambiguous”; and (iv) a reinforced classifier is trained using
the re-labeled dataset, including “ambiguous” as a new class.
3) PII Leakage Detection: Machine learning is applied for
PII leakage detection in [27], [50], [57]. In particular, the
authors of such works leverage hierarchical clustering [27],
C4.5 decision tree [50], and random forest [57].
Kuzuno and Tonami in [27] investigate the leakage of
sensitive information due to ad libraries embedded into free
Android apps. The proposed framework works as follows:
• The HTTP traffic of the target mobile apps is captured.
• The payloads of HTTP messages are inspected, and each
message is labeled according to the fact that it contains
sensitive information or not.
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TABLE XVII
CLASSIFICATION OF THE APPS ACCORDING TO THEIR NETWORK BEHAVIOR (NAYAM ET AL. [49]).
Cluster Network behavior Classification
0 Excessive ad-related traffic, and excessive number of sessions
Suspicious
1 Excessive ad- and tracking-related traffic, and excessive number of sessions
2 Excessive ad-related traffic, excessive traffic related to other domains, and excessivenumber of sessions
3 Excessive tracking-related traffic, and excessive number of sessions
4 Excessive ad-related traffic, but very low network activity
5 High portion of traffic related to popular services, but very low use of them and verylow network activity Innocuous
6 High use of popular services, but very low network activity
7 High portion of traffic related to other domains, but very low tracking-related trafficand very low use of popular services Potentially suspicious
8 High portion of traffic related to other domains, but very low use of them and very lowportion of tracking-related traffic
9 High portion of traffic related to other domains, but very low use of them
TABLE XVIII
THE SURVEYED WORKS IN WHICH MACHINE LEARNING IS APPLIED FOR APP IDENTIFICATION.
Year Paper Features Classifier
2013 Qazi et al. [28] N/A C5.0 decision tree
2015 Le et al. [5]
84 network-level features belonging to five typologies (packet length statistics,
payload length statistics, inter-arrival time statistics, bursts timing, overall flow
statistics, and TCP flags)
Linear SVM
Wang et al. [42] Average and standard deviation of the size/time of all the transmitted/received802.11 frames, and average size/time of the low 20%, mid 60%, and high 20% Random forest
2016 Alan et al. [6]
Burst sizes (rounded to the nearest 32 bytes) of the first 64 IP packets Based on Jaccard index
Sizes of the first 64 IP packets (using the minus sign for incoming packets) Gaussian NB
Sizes of the first 64 IP packets (using the minus sign for incoming packets),
modified by term frequency – inverse document frequency transformation and
normalization
Multinomial NB
Mongkolluksamee et al. [47] 35 graphlet- and 24 histogram-based features extracted from network informa-tion (source/destination IP address, protocol, source/destination port, size) Random forest
2017 Taylor et al. [61]
18 statistics (minimum, maximum, mean, median, absolute deviation, standard
deviation, variance, skew, kurtosis, percentiles from 10% to 90%, and number
of values) computed on the transmitted/received/both IP packet sizes within
TCP flows
Random forest
• The HTTP messages containing sensitive information are
clustered using hierarchical clustering. The following met-
rics are employed:
– The HTTP message destination distance ddst, which is
defined as:
ddst(px, py) = dip(px, py)
+ dport(px, py) + dhost(px, py) (VI-B3.1)
where pn = {ipn, portn, hostn} with ipn a destination
IPv4 address, portn a port number, hostn a HTTP host,
and the distances are defined as:
dip(px, py) = lmatch(ipx, ipy)/32
dport(px, py) = match(portx, porty)
dhost(px, py) =
ed(hostx, hosty)
max(len(hostx), len(hosty))
(VI-B3.2)
where lmatch() returns the number of common upper
bits in two IP addresses, match() returns 1 on matching
ports and 0 otherwise, ed() returns an edit distance, len()
returns the length of a character string, and max() returns
the greater of its two arguments. In particular, the values
of distances dip, dport and dhost are within an interval
[0, 1].
– The HTTP message content distance dheader, which is
defined as:
dheader(px, py) = drline(px, py)
+ dcookie(px, py) + dbody(px, py) (VI-B3.3)
where pn = {rlinen, cookien, bodyn} with rlinen a
request line, cookien a cookie, bodyn a message body,
and the distance is defined as:
di(px, py) = ncd(ix, iy) ∈ [0, 1] (VI-B3.4)
where i ∈ {rline, cookie, body} and ncd(k, z) is the
normalized compression distance of the strings k and z.
– Given Cx and Cy two clusters of HTTP messages, the
linkage criterion is the following:
d(Cx, Cy) =
∑
px∈Cx
py∈Cy
dmsg(px, py)
|Cx| ∗ |Cy| (VI-B3.5)
where:
dmsg(px, py) = ddst(px, py)
+ dheader(px, py) (VI-B3.6)
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• The conjunction signature set resulting from the clustering is
employed to detect sensitive information leakage in mobile
HTTP traffic.
Ren et al. in [50] focus on the mobile apps for Android, iOS,
and Windows Phone. The presented framework is composed
of three steps:
• The collected network traffic (which consists of
HTTP/HTTPS flows) is inspected looking for the PII
related to the target mobile devices. Each flow is labeled
according to the fact that it leaked PII or not.
• In the feature extraction phase, a bag-of-words model is
used, with the flows being the documents and the structured
data being the words. More in detail, each flow is partitioned
into words (using tokens), then it becomes a vector of binary
values. In such vector, each word is set to 1 if it appears in
the flow, otherwise it is set to 0.
• For each destination domain (identified using the Host field
of the HTTP header), the framework selects the features
(i.e., the words) that are more suitable for classification.
Finally, a C4.5 decision tree is trained on the feature vectors
associated to that destination domain.
The framework presented by Cheng et al. in [57] for
detecting the PII leaks of Android apps consists of three
phases:
• In the pre-processing phase, the network traffic of the
targeted apps is partitioned into flows according to the
information available in IP and TCP headers. Moreover,
among the flows of each app, the flow with the minimum
overall distance (computed using Dynamic Time Warping)
from the other flows of the app is elected as leader. Finally,
the flows are converted into time series of packet sizes.
• In the feature extraction phase, each time series is converted
into a feature vector by computing the following features:
the distance (computed using Dynamic Time Warping) of
the series from the nearest leader, the weight of the behavior
that generated the series (i.e., click, swipe, or other), the
series duration, the number of packets in the series, the
average packet size of the series, and the average packet
interval of the series.
• In the classification phase, a random forest classifier is
trained using the feature vectors.
4) Malware Detection: Researchers have effectively em-
ployed machine learning techniques to detect mobile malware
from the network traffic of mobile devices. In particular, they
have applied both supervised learning [22], [24], [35], [48],
[8], [55] and unsupervised learning [25].
a) Malware Detection via Supervised Learning: In Ta-
ble XIX, for each of the surveyed works in which supervised
learning is applied for malware detection, we report the
leveraged features and employed classifiers.
Regarding the work by Shabtai et al. in [22], the features
reported in Table XIX are only the ones related to network
traffic.
Regarding the work by Arora and Peddoju in [55], the au-
thors present a feature selection algorithm to find the minimal
set of features that achieves the best detection performance (the
first that is reported in Table XIX). Given a set of features
{F1, . . . , Fn}, the proposed algorithm is composed of the
following steps:
• Rank the features according to different metrics. Each metric
produces a different ranking. The authors uses the following
metrics: (i) the information gain of a feature F , which is
the reduction of entropy after observing F ; and (ii) the chi-
squared test, which expresses the difference between the
expected and observed values.
• For k = 1 up to n:
– Extract the top-k features from each ranking, and keep
only the ones that are present in all the rankings;
– Use the selected features to perform a classification using
a naive Bayes classifier, and compute the achieved F-
measure;
– If the F-measure computed above is greater than the one
achieved in the previous steps, update the minimal set of
features with the currently selected features.
b) Malware Detection via Unsupervised Learning: The
framework proposed by Wei et al. in [25] works as follows:
• A monitor collects DNS response messages.
• The IP addresses within the answer and additional sections
of the DNS response messages are mapped to geographical
coordinates.
• Independent Component Analysis (ICA) is used to compute
the spatial uniform distribution of hosts (i.e., uniformity
degree in the geographic distribution of hosts) and their
spatial service relationship (which describes the relationship
between a provider and a consumer by a service distance,
and tends to be zero for a benign domain). Both of these
metrics are leveraged to label mobile apps as benign or
malicious.
5) User Action Identification: Machine learning is applied
for user action identification in [30], [32], [39], [45], [46],
[52]. In these works, the authors leverage several techniques: in
the field of unsupervised learning, agglomerative hierarchical
clustering and k-means clustering; in the field of supervised
learning, linear regression, naive Bayes, random forest, and
support vector machine.
Watkins et al. in [27] employ a neural-fuzzy classifier that
exploits the inter-packet time of responses to ICMP packets
(i.e., pings) to infer the type of action that the target user is
performing on her mobile device. In particular, the authors
focus on three types of user action: (i) CPU intensive; (ii) I/O
intensive; and (iii) non-CPU intensive.
Coull and Dyer in [32] try to infer the language (among six
possible choices: Chinese, English, French, German, Russian,
and Spanish) and length of the messages exchanged between
iMessage clients (on both iOS and OS X) and Apple’s servers.
For the language, a multinomial naive Bayes classifier is used
with the count of each length/direction pair observed (direction
indicates whether the data is going to or coming from Apple’s
servers). For the length, linear regression (with least squares
estimation) is employed using the payload length as the
explanatory variable and the message size as the dependent
variable.
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TABLE XIX
THE SURVEYED WORKS IN WHICH SUPERVISED LEARNING IS APPLIED FOR MALWARE DETECTION.
Year Paper Features Classifier
2012
Shabtai et al. [22] Cellular/Wi-Fi sent/received bytes/packets
Bayesian networks
J48 decision tree
Histograms
k-means
Logistic regression
Naive Bayes
Su et al. [24]
Average and standard deviation of the number of sent/received
packets, average and standard deviation of the number of
sent/received bytes, and average session duration
J48 decision tree
Random forest
2014 Shabtai et al. [35]
Average sent/received bytes, average received bytes in percent out of total
amount of transmitted bytes, inner/outer average send/receive interval, and
average sent/received data in percent out of total transmitted data
Decision tree
2016
Narudin et al. [48]
Source/Destination IP address, source/destination port, frame
length/number, HTTP request type, number of frames received
by unique source/destination in the last t seconds from the same
destination/source, and number of packets flowing from source
to destination and vice versa
BN with/without feature selection
MLP with/without feature selection
J48 with/without feature selection
kNN with/without feature selection
RF with/without feature selection
Wang et al. [8]
Per-TCP-flow sent/received bytes, sent/received packets, and average
sent/received packet size C4.5 decision tree
Per-HTTP-message Host, Request-URI, Request-Method, and User-Agent
2017 Arora et al. [55]
Sent/Received packets per second/flow, ratio of incoming to outgoing
bytes, maximum/average packet size, and minimum time interval between
sent/received packets Naive Bayes
Sent/Received bytes/packets per second/flow, ratio of incoming to outgoing
bytes/packets, first sent/received packet size, maximum/average packet size,
minimum/maximum/average time interval between sent/received packets, aver-
age flow duration, and ratio of number of connections to number of destination
IPs
Conti et al. in [45] combine unsupervised and supervised
learning to fingerprint several user actions of popular Android
apps. The proposed framework works as follows:
• The network traffic generated by each user action is par-
titioned into flows (each flow is a time-ordered sequence
of TCP segments exchanged during a single TCP session).
Each flow is converted into three time series of packet
sizes (with negative sizes for incoming traffic). One series
is for incoming traffic, one is for outgoing traffic, and one
combines traffic in both directions.
• The flows are clustered using the agglomerative hierarchical
clustering with the following linkage criterion:
d(u, v) =
∑
1≤i≤n
1≤j≤m
distance(u[i], v[j])
|u| ∗ |v| (VI-B5.1)
where distance() is a distance function, and u and v are
clusters of n and m elements, respectively. The distance
function is defined as follows:
distance(fi, fj) =
n∑
k=1
wk ×DTW (T ik, T jk ) (VI-B5.2)
where fi is a flow consisting of a set of n time series
{T i1, . . . , T in}, wk is a weight assigned to the kth time series,
and DTW (x, y) is the optimal warping path between the
time series x and y.
• For every user action, each flow f is assigned to the cluster
that minimizes the distance between f and the leader of
the cluster (which is the flow that has the minimum overall
distance from the other flows of the cluster). The kth feature
indicates the number of flows that have been assigned to the
kth cluster after the execution of that user action.
• The final classification is performed using a random forest
classifier.
The systems for user action identification developed by Park
and Kim in [39] and Saltaformaggio et al. in [52] are similar
to the one by Conti et al. [45]. However, there are a few
differences:
• In [39], each flow is represented by a single time series
including both incoming and outgoing traffic. As a conse-
quence, the clustering is applied to time series (in [45], the
authors consider sets of time series). Moreover, the distance
function in the formula of the linkage criterion is simply
DTW ().
• In [52], the IP traffic is partitioned into server transactions,
each containing the IP headers (ordered by time) of the
packets exchanged with a specific remote host. The server
transactions are converted into feature vectors by the follow-
ing 26 features: (i) send/receive average inter-packet time;
(ii) the ratio of the number of packets sent/received to/from
the server over the total number of packets exchanged with
the server; (iii) the ratio of the size of the data sent/received
to/from the server over the size of the total data exchanged
with the server; and (iv) the number of packets sent/received
within each of ten size ranges, normalized by the total
number of sent/received packets. The feature vectors are
then clustered using k-means clustering (following an in-
cremental approach to find a suitable value for k), and the
final classification is performed using a multi-class support
vector machine.
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The framework proposed by Fu et al. in [46] is based on
supervised learning and consists of the following steps:
• The captured network flows are partitioned into sessions,
then hierarchical clustering is applied to group together the
sessions that are related to the same user action (the authors
call such groups of sessions as dialogs).
• The dialogs are converted into feature vectors by extracting
features that are related to the size (e.g., median, standard
deviation, percentage of packets in a given range) and timing
(e.g., median, standard deviation) of IP packets. Each feature
vector is labeled with the user action that generated the
corresponding dialog.
• A classifier is trained and evaluated on the feature vectors.
The authors consider the following classifiers: random for-
est, gradient boosted trees, support vector machine, naive
Bayes, and k-nearest neighbors.
• The dialogs related to multiple user actions, which have been
classified as “unknown” in the previous step, are split into
sub-dialogs that are then classified using a trained hidden
Markov model.
6) Operating System Identification: Supervised learning
techniques are applied for operating system identification
in [31], [32], [51], [60].
Chen et al. in [31] present a naive Bayes classifier that
leverages the following binary features:
• TTL = 128 (Windows) and TTL 6= 128 (Windows,
Android, or iOS), where TTL is the Time-To-Live (TTL)
field of the IP header.
• IDmvr < 0.05 (mostly Windows, rarely Android),
IDmvr ∈ [0.05, 0.40] (mostly Android, rarely Windows),
and IDmvr > 0.40 (mostly iOS, rarely Android), where
IDmvr is the monotonicity violation ratio of the identifica-
tion (ID) field in the IP headers.
• TSratio < 0.05 (Windows) and TSratio ≥ 0.05 (Android
or iOS), where TSratio is the ratio of segments with TCP
timestamp option.
• WS = 4 (mostly Windows, rarely Android), WS = 16
(iOS), WS = 64 (mostly Android, rarely Windows), and
WS = 256 (Windows), where WS is the TCP window size
scale option.
• clockSD ≤ 3 (mostly Android, rarely iOS and Windows)
and clockSD > 3 (iOS), where clockSD is the standard
deviation of a device clock frequency, estimated using
packets coming from its IP address.
Coull and Dyer in [32] leverage the sizes of encrypted
packets exchanged between a target iMessage user and Apple’s
servers. The aim of this analysis is to determine whether the
iMessage client is running on iOS or OS X. The authors use a
binomial naive Bayes classifier with one class for each of the
four possible (OS, direction) pairs, with direction indicating
whether the packet is going to or coming from Apple’s servers.
The classifier operates on a binary feature vector of (size,
direction) pairs, where the value for a given feature is 1 if
the corresponding pair is observed and 0 otherwise.
The framework presented by Ruffing et al. in [51] combines
together supervised learning and analysis of the frequency
spectrum of packet timing. The proposed methodology is
composed of two phases:
• Training phase:
– Each traffic trace, which is labeled with the operating
system that generated it, is converted into a frequency
spectrum.
– Frequency components are extracted from the frequency
spectra generated in the previous step.
– A genetic algorithm is applied to separate the frequency
components that are related to OS features from those
that bring noise. The former are promoted features.
• Identification phase:
– A new traffic trace x is converted into a feature-extracted
frequency spectrum F x.
– The identified operating system is provided by the fol-
lowing formula:
argmax
os∈OS
1
nos
nos∑
i=1
corr(F x, F osi ) (VI-B6.1)
where OS is the set of the considered mobile OSes, nos
is the number of feature-extracted frequency spectra of
the mobile operating system os, F osi is the i
th feature-
extracted frequency spectrum of the mobile operating
system os, and corr(X,Y ) is a function that computes
the correlation between the frequency spectra X and Y .
Malik et al. in [60] carry out OS identification by exploiting
the inter-packet time of packets coming from the target mobile
device. In particular, the authors focus on two types of packet:
(i) the response to an ICMP packet sent to the target mobile
device (active measurement); and (ii) an IP packet related to
a video stream involving the target mobile device (passive
measurement). The presented framework consists of a random
forest classifier that is trained and evaluated on the inter-
packet times of three mobile devices running Android, iOS,
and Windows Phone, respectively.
7) Position Estimation: Musa and Eriksson in [21] present
a system for converting the detections of the Wi-Fi probe
requests periodically transmitted by a target mobile device into
a highly likely spatiotemporal trajectory within the monitored
area.
The position estimation problem is formulated using a
hidden Markov model (HMM): (i) each street of the covered
area is partitioned into segments, and each segment represents
a rectangular area in which a mobile device may be located;
and (ii) a state of the HMM is assigned to each segment,
and transition probabilities are used to model the behavior
of mobile devices at intersections (i.e., go straight, turn left,
or turn right). For each detection deti of the target mobile
device and each state si of the HMM, the emission probability
p(deti|si), which represents the probability of making the
detection deti if the current state is si, is computed. Finally,
the Viterbi’s map-matching algorithm is applied to find the
maximum-probability path, which is represented by a sequence
of hidden states visited in the Markov model.
8) User Fingerprinting: Verde et al. in [36] present a
framework for fingerprinting mobile users from NetFlow
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records. The proposed solution is based on supervised learning
and hidden Markov model (HMM):
• Feature vectors are extracted from the NetFlow records of
the target user, and then partitioned into subsets. Each subset
is related to a specific network service. For each service,
several HMMs are created by varying the number of states
and the subset of features, and setting up their parameters via
the k-means algorithm. The HMMs are trained in parallel,
and subsequently converted into binary classifiers using
a probability threshold t (i.e., if the observation has a
probability lower than t, it will be classified as 0, otherwise
it will be classified as 1). Finally, the best performing HMM
is selected for that network service.
• Feature vectors are extracted from the NetFlow records
captured at the monitored network, and subsequently parti-
tioned according to the network service they belong to. Each
feature vector is classifier with the HMM corresponding to
its service. For each time interval, the results are aggregated
into a new record that contains, for each HMM h, the
number of feature vectors recognized by h as belonging
to the target user during the interval, times the weight of
h (which is computed during the training phase). Finally,
a machine learning classifier is used to determine whether,
during each of the time intervals, the network traffic contains
data transmissions from the target user. The framework
supports the following classifiers: support vector machine,
random forest, RIPPER, multi-layer perceptron, and naive
Bayes.
9) Ad Fraud Detection: Crussell et al. in [33] present
a system being able to automatically run Android apps in
emulators and analyze their application-layer traffic in order
to detect whether they: (i) request ads while being in the
background (i.e., ads are not displayed to the user); and (ii)
click on ads without user interaction (i.e., false user clicks are
simulated). The framework is based on supervised learning:
• The HTTP and DNS traffic of each analyzed app is extracted
from its network traces, then causally related HTTP requests
are linked to form request trees.
• For each request page (identified by the host and path names
of its URL), all the related HTTP requests are aggregated.
After that, the authors extract 33 features as follows:
– Ten features derive from query parameters:
∗ For each query parameter, it is computed the ratio of
distinct values found for that parameter over the total
number of times the parameter appeared in a request,
as well as the ratio of distinct values found for that
parameter over the total number of distinct apps. Each
ratio is segmented into several intervals and the number
of query parameters whose ratio is in each interval is
counted. These counts contribute six features.
∗ It is also computed the entropy of each query param-
eter. The entropy is considered high if it is greater
than 216 bits, low otherwise. The number of query pa-
rameters that have, respectively, high and low entropy
contribute two features.
∗ The last two features are the average and the total
number of query parameters.
– Sixteen features derive from the request trees. Such fea-
tures are related to their structure (e.g., average height and
depth of trees containing the page), number of children,
their MIME types, and types of edge that connect the
children to their parent.
– Seven features derive from HTTP headers (e.g., status
codes, requests’ length, replies’ length).
• The authors train a random forest classifier to classify each
request page as ad-related (ARQ) or not (NARQ).
• The ad request pages (i.e., the ARQ pages) and the HTTP
request trees are leveraged to extract and verify ad impres-
sions (i.e., displaying) and clicks.
10) Tethering Detection: Chen et al. in [31] apply super-
vised learning to detect whether a target mobile device is
tethering its Internet connection to other devices. The proposed
probabilistic classifier leverages the following binary features:
• nOS = 1 (no tethering) and nOS > 1 (tethering), where
nOS is the number of operating systems identified from
the packets coming from the same IP address (also the OS
identification framework is based on machine learning, see
Section VI-B6 for details).
• nTTL = 1 (no tethering with high probability) and nTTL >
1 (tethering with high probability), where nTTL is the
number of distinct TTLs in the packets coming from the
same IP address.
• tsmvr ≤ 0 and tsmvr > 0, where tsmvr is the violation
ratio of the TCP timestamp monotonicity of the segments
coming from the same device (the idea is to exploit the
fact that segments generated by the same device tend to
monotonically increase TCP timestamp values, whereas
segments from different devices tend to have mixed TCP
timestamp values).
• clockSD ≤ 35 and clockSD > 35, where clockSD is the
standard deviation of the clock frequency estimated using
the packets coming from the same IP address (a large
standard deviation is likely due to tethering).
• bootSD ≤ 1455 and bootSD > 1455, where bootSD is the
standard deviation of the boot time inferred from the TCP
timestamp values in the segments coming from the same
device (the idea is to exploit the fact that different devices
have distinct boot times and distinct initial TCP timestamp
values).
11) Website Fingerprinting: Spreitzer et al. in [53] finger-
print the websites visited by an Android user via the web
browser of her mobile device, by leveraging the data-usage
statistics of the browser app. The proposed framework is based
on supervised learning:
• Each considered website wi is opened in the web browser
of an Android device. At the same time, the TCP bytes
transmitted and received by the browser app are sampled
at a frequency f for a period of t seconds. The readings
constitute a sample of the website wi. The sampling pro-
cess stops after collecting n samples, which constitute the
signature of the website wi. All the generated signatures are
included in a database T .
• T is loaded into an unprivileged Android app that is installed
on the target mobile device. When the user opens a website
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within the web browser of the device, the app samples
the transmitted and received TCP bytes of the browser
app, and builds a signature s. For each signature si in T ,
the similarity (which is a function based on the Jaccard
index) between s and si is computed; the app returns the
website corresponding to the signature si that maximizes
the similarity with s.
C. Other Analysis Methods
Some traffic analyses does not require machine learning
techniques to achieve their goals. In this section, we report two
alternative methods. In Section VI-C1, we describe a way to
turn a dictionary1 into an effective classifier. In Section VI-C2,
we report two methodologies that rely on graphs.
1) Dictionary: A dictionary can be used as a one-feature
classifier whether: (i) the keys are the values that the feature
can take; and (ii) a set of class labels is associated to each
key. This solution is suitable to solve classification problems
in which there is a single feature, which takes a limited set of
values.
Coull and Dyer in [32] target iMessage, Apple’s instant
messaging service, which is available as a mobile app for iOS
or a traditional computer program for OS X. The objective
is to fingerprint five distinct user actions (i.e., start typing,
stop typing, send text, send attachment, and read receipt) by
leveraging the size of the packets exchanged between the target
iMessage client and Apple’s servers. The authors study the
packet sizes corresponding to the considered user actions, and
notice that each user action has two distinctive packet sizes:
(i) one when a message is sent to Apple’s servers; and (ii)
one when a message is received from Apple’s servers. This
property can be exploited to build a classifier that takes the
form of a dictionary in which one or more user action labels
are associated to each packet size observed in the training data.
When a new packet arrives, the dictionary is queried to retrieve
the user action label(s) for its payload length: if only one label
is found, the packet is given that label; if two or more labels
are returned, the user action most frequently associated to that
payload size during training is chosen.
2) Graph Analysis: In this section, we highlight a few
works in which graph theory is leveraged for mobile traffic
analysis.
Barbera et al. in [26] combine graph theory and traffic
analysis to carry out sociological inference targeting mobile
users (their findings are reported in Section III-K). More
precisely, they present a methodology to build the social
network2 of a group of mobile users from the probe requests
sent by their mobile devices. The proposed procedure consists
of the following steps:
• The dataset of collected probe requests is turned into an
affiliation network. An affiliation network G = (V1, V2, E)
is a bipartite graph in which V1 is a set of actors, V2 is a
1We use the term dictionary to indicate a collection of (key, value) pairs,
such that each key appears at most once in the collection, and a value can be
either a single value or an unordered set of values.
2In a social network, the nodes correspond to the individuals, while the
edges model the relationships between them.
set of groups the actors belong to, and each edge e ∈ E
connecting an actor v1 ∈ V1 to a group v2 ∈ V2 represents
a group membership. In the work by Barbera et al. [26],
V1 is the set of mobile devices (identified by their MAC
address) that sent at least one probe request, V2 is the set
of SSIDs contained in the collected probe requests, and an
edge e ∈ E connecting a mobile device v1 ∈ V1 to an SSID
v2 ∈ V2 represents v1 having v2 in its Preferred Network
List (PNL), which is the list of the SSIDs of the Wi-Fi
networks v1 connected to in the past.
• A similarity measure f : V1×V1 → R is chosen to represent
the strength of the social relationship between the users of
each pair of mobile devices u and v. Based on the Adamic-
Adar similarity measure [82], Barbera et al. [26] define the
f function as:
f(u, v) =
∑
w∈N(u)∩N(v)
1
log2 (|M (w) |)
(VI-C2.1)
where N (u) is the PNL of the mobile device u, and M (w)
is the set of mobile devices that have the SSID w in their
PNL.
• The affiliation network G is turned into a social network
G′ = (V1, E′) by applying the following rule:
∀u, v ∈ V1 : (u, v) ∈ E′ ⇔ f (u, v) > t (VI-C2.2)
where t is a minimum similarity threshold.
Vanrykel et al. in [54] present a graph building technique
that processes a mobile traffic dataset in order to partition the
network traces it contains by user. The idea is to exploit the
sensitive identifiers that are typically present in the network
traffic generated by mobile devices. The proposed methodol-
ogy consists of the following steps:
• Through the analysis of TCP timestamps, the packets that
belong to the same app session (therefore to the same mobile
user) are grouped together into a node. Alternatively, it is
possible to partition the packets by TCP session.
• For each node, the sensitive identifiers present in HTTP
messages are extracted according to host-specific rules.
• To cluster the nodes into components, each one representing
the network traffic related to a specific mobile user, the
following rules are iteratively applied to all nodes:
– If the node’s identifiers (or their hashed/encoded values)
match the identifiers of an existing component, add the
node to that component and merge their identifiers.
– If the node’s identifiers (or their hashed/encoded values)
match the identifiers of multiple existing components,
merge those components together, add the node to the
resulting component, and merge their identifiers.
– If the node’s identifiers (or their hashed/encoded values)
do not match the identifiers of any existing component,
make the node a component on its own.
VII. VALIDATION METHODS AND RESULTS FOR TRAFFIC
ANALYSIS TARGETING MOBILE DEVICES
In this section, we critically evaluate and compare the
results achieved by the surveyed works in the field of traffic
analysis targeting mobile devices. Such results are linked to
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the analyzed datasets and presented by the goal of the analysis.
To help the reader, we also devote an initial section (VII-A) to
describe: (i) the evaluation metrics for the analyses that can be
considered as a classification problem, as well as those metrics
that are specific of a particular goal; (ii) the dataset partitioning
techniques for the analyses that follow the supervised learning
paradigm; and (iii) the conventions that we will follow in the
tables.
To offer a clear comparison among works, for each goal
of the analysis (sorted by popularity as in Section III) we
summarize with tables the information about validation in
terms of datasets, methods, and results. Moreover, we discuss
interesting aspects of validation and we comment the obtained
results.
A. Preliminaries
1) Evaluation Metrics for Classification Problems: In a
classification problem, given a set of n ≥ 2 classes (or labels)
C = {C1, . . . , Cn} and a new instance x, the goal is to infer
which class x belongs to (i.e., which is the index i such that
x ∈ Ci). We distinguish between two types of classification:
binary and multi-class.
In a binary classification problem, we have only two classes
(i.e., n = 2): a positive one, which represents a given property
P , and a negative one, which represents the negation of that
property (P¯ ). The goal is to infer whether P holds for the new
instance x. Under such conditions, we define as true positives
the correctly classified positive instances, as false positives the
negative instances incorrectly classified as positive, as true
negatives the correctly classified negative instances, and as
false negatives the positive instances incorrectly classified as
negative.
In a multi-class classification problem, instead, we have at
least three classes (i.e., n ≥ 3). In such scenario, given two
(possibly equal) class indexes i and j (1 ≤ i, j ≤ n), we define
as ci,j the number of instances belonging to the class Ci that
are classified as belonging to the class Cj . As a consequence
of the above definition, ci,i represents the number of instances
belonging to the class Ci that are correctly classified.
To evaluate the results achieved in the surveyed works that
present traffic analyses we can consider as classification prob-
lems, we use four performance metrics: accuracy, precision,
recall, and F-measure.
Accuracy — We define as accuracy the number of correctly
classified instances (i.e., the number of true positives TP
plus the number of true negatives TN ) over the total number
of classified instances (i.e., the sum of the number of true
positives TP , the number of false positives FP , the number
of true negatives TN , and the number of false negatives FN ):
accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FP + TN + FN
(VII-A1.1)
Accuracy measures how much the considered instances have
been correctly classified, and ranges from 0.0 (none of the
instances has been correctly classified) to 1.0 (all the instances
have been correctly classified).
Precision — We define as precision the number of true
positives TP over the total number of instances that have been
classified as positive (i.e., the number of true positives TP plus
the number of false positives FP ):
precision =
TP
TP + FP
(VII-A1.2)
Precision measures how much the instances classified as
positive have been correctly classified, without any insight into
the positive instances that could have been missed. Precision
ranges from 0.0 (none of the instances classified as positive
is positive) to 1.0 (all the instances classified as positive are
positive).
Recall — We define as recall the number of true positives
TP over the total number of instances that belong to the
positive class (i.e., the number of true positives TP plus the
number of false negatives FN ):
recall =
TP
TP + FN
(VII-A1.3)
Recall measures how much the instances belonging to the pos-
itive class have been correctly classified, without any insight
into the negative instances that could have been classified
as positive. Recall ranges from 0.0 (none of the instances
belonging to the positive class have been correctly classified)
to 1.0 (all the instances belonging to the positive class have
been correctly classified).
F-measure — We define as F-measure the harmonic average
of precision and recall:
F-measure = 2× precision× recall
precision + recall
(VII-A1.4)
The F-measure provides a single score to express the perfor-
mance in a classification task, and ranges from 0.0 (precision
and recall are both 0.0) to 1.0 (precision and recall are both
1.0).
2) Goal-specific Evaluation Metrics: To evaluate the results
achieved in the surveyed works that deal with app identifica-
tion and user fingerprinting, we use additional performance
metrics that are specific of those types of analysis: app
matching rate and app identification rate for app identification;
data aggregation rate for user fingerprinting.
App Matching Rate (AMR) — We define as app matching
rate the ratio between the number of network transmissions
that are successfully matched with one of the targeted apps
(nmatch), over the total number of captured network transmis-
sions (ntotal):
AMR =
nmatch
ntotal
(VII-A2.1)
The app matching rate measures how much the captured
network transmissions belong to the targeted apps, and ranges
from 0.0 (none of the transmissions belong to the targeted
apps) to 1.0 (all transmissions belong to the targeted apps).
The app matching rate is often used when no ground truth
is available, i.e., the apps that actually generated the captured
network transmissions are unknown.
App Identification Rate (AIR) — We define as app identi-
fication rate the ratio between the number of identified apps
(nidentify), over the total number of targeted apps (ntotal):
AIR =
nidentify
ntotal
(VII-A2.2)
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The app identification rate measures how many of the targeted
apps have been successfully identified, and ranges from 0.0
(none of the targeted apps have been identified) to 1.0 (all the
targeted apps have been identified).
Data Aggregation Rate (DAR) — We define as data ag-
gregation rate the percentage of network data related to a
mobile user that is correctly linked to that mobile user. The
data aggregation rate ranges from 0.0 (none of the network
data related to the mobile user has been linked to that mobile
user) to 1.0 (all the network data related to the mobile user
have been linked to that mobile user).
3) Dataset Partitioning Techniques for Supervised Learn-
ing: To evaluate the performance of a supervised-learning-
based analysis, it is necessary to partition the dataset. The
holdout method is the fundamental method to partition the
dataset in order to get the data for training and testing,
respectively” This method first creates two empty sets: training
set and testing set. Then it randomly assigns each observation
in a dataset to one of those sets according to a given pre-
determined parameter Straining. This parameter indicates the
proportion in terms of the number of elements that the training
set include compared to the total elements of the dataset. As
an example, with Straining = 0.7 the training set will include
the 70% of the total elements of the dataset, while the testing
set will include the remaining 30%. Such proportion can also
be expressed using two integers n and m that stand as the
number of equipotent parts in which the dataset is partitioned
and the number of parts used as testing set, respectively. As
an example, with n = 5 and m = 2 a dataset is partitioned
into five equipotent parts of which three used as training set
and two as testing set.
All model selection and training processes must be done
exclusively using the training set, without involving the testing
set in any case. Indeed, it is possible to further partition a
training set and use part of it as a reduced testing set (i.e.,
validation set) to perform model selection and hyper-parameter
tuning. The testing set has to be used for the only purpose of
evaluating the performance of the trained model.
In multi-class classification, it is useful to ensure that train-
ing and testing sets hold the same proportion of observations
belonging to a class. This option is called stratification and
is used to avoid imbalance of class representation between
training and testing sets.
Another method to evaluate a learning model is to perform
a cross-validation. The cross-validation method consists in
partitioning a dataset into k folds (i.e., complementary and
equipotent subsets) and iteratively training and testing a given
model for k times. For each run, one fold is considered as
a testing set and the remaining k − 1 folds as training set.
The overall results are obtained by aggregating the results
of each run. As for multi-class holdout method, the dataset
can be partitioned in folds using the stratification option.
Cross-validation can also be used on the training set only to
perform model selection and hyper-parameter tuning. A variant
of cross-validation called leave-p-out cross-validation allows
specifying the exact number of observations p to holdout as
a testing set at each run (the case in which p = 1 is called
leave-one-out cross-validation).
4) Table Conventions: To uniquely identify the datasets that
have no name in a given work, we will use arbitrary names of
the form “[yy].[author] [n]”, where [yy] is the last two digits
of the publication year of the work, [author] is the surname of
the first author of the work, and [n] is a progressive number,
starting from zero.
Moreover, since we are space-constrained, we will shrink
the content of the tables by using the following shortenings:
• We will use the character “#” to shorten the word “number”.
• Given a number n, we will write “n+” for “over n”.
• We will write “Tx” and “Rx” for “transmitted” and “re-
ceived”, respectively.
• To reference a given OSI layer, we will use the correspond-
ing ordering number (e.g., “layer 2” for the data-link layer,
“layer 3” for the network layer, “layer 4” for the transport
layer, “layer 7” for the application layer). To reference a
given OSI layer and the layers above it, we will add the
character “+” to the ordering number of the bottom layer
(e.g., “layer 3+” for layers from network to application).
• Given two decimal numbers Straining and Stest such that
Straining + Stest = 1, we will write “Straining/Stest” to indicate
the holdout dataset partitioning technique with Straining of
the data reserved to the training set, and Stest of the data
reserved to the test set (e.g., “0.7/0.3”).
• Given two integer numbers n and m such that m < n,
we will write “out(n,m)” to indicate the holdout dataset
partitioning technique with m parts out of n reserved to the
test set, and the remaining ones reserved to the training set
(e.g., “out(10, 2)”).
• Given an integer number k, we will write “kCross(k)” to
indicate the k-fold cross-validation.
B. Traffic Characterization
In this section, we focus on the datasets used for traffic
characterization works, since we have already summarized the
findings of these works in Section III-A.
In Table XX we provide information about the datasets
analyzed in the surveyed works that deal with traffic char-
acterization targeting specific apps and/or mobile services. As
we can notice, most of these works rely on data from the
data-link layer and above. Four out of nine works consider
only one or two apps in their analysis (e.g., Skype, Youtube).
Two works focus on a specific category of apps: Chen et al.
in [37] on malware, and Nayam et al. in [49] on apps related
to health and fitness. Moreover, Lindorfer et al. in [34] study
a set of one million apps.
In Table XXI, we report the information about the datasets
of the works that focus their analysis on a population of mobile
devices. Most of the works consider more than two hundred
devices (five out of nine), among which three works on more
than two thousand devices. Unfortunately, Chen et al. in [19]
and Lee et al. in [16] do not specify the number of devices
involved in their analysis.
C. App Identification
In Table XXII, we summarize the information about valida-
tion for works that deal with app identification. Since this goal
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TABLE XX
THE DATASETS OF THE SURVEYED WORKS THAT DEAL WITH TRAFFIC CHARACTERIZATION TARGETING SPECIFIC APPS AND/OR MOBILE SERVICES.
Year Paper Mobile Platform(s) App(s)/Mobile Service(s) Dataset Point of Capturing Content
2011
Finamore et al. [14] Platform-independent YouTube
US-Campus Wired (within a campus
network, one week)
IP packets
EU1-Campus
EU1-ADSL Wired (within an ISP’s net-
work, one week)EU1-FTTH
EU2-ADSL
Rao et al. [17] Android, iOS Netflix NetMob Wired (forwarding server,
180 seconds per video)
Layer-2+
dataYouTube YouMob
2012 Baghel et al. [18] Android
Facebook 12.Baghel 0 Wired (forwarding server,
90 minutes) Layer-2+
data
Skype 12.Baghel 1 Wired (forwarding server,five hours)
Wei et al. [4] Android 19 free and 8 paid apps 12.Wei 0 Devices (two devices) Layer-2+data
2014 Lindorfer et al. [34] Android Over 1,000,000 apps 14.Lindorfer 0 Emulators (240 secondsper app)
Layer-2+
data
2015 Chen et al. [37] Android 5560 malicious apps (from
177 malware families) 15.Chen 0
Wired (forwarding server,
five minutes per app)
Layer-2+
data
2016 Nayam et al. [49]
Android 63 free apps (“Health &Fitness” category) 16.Nayam 0
Wired (forwarding server,
three 30-minutes-long runs
per app)
HTTP
messages
iOS 35 free apps (“Health &Fitness” category)
Tadrous et al. [7] Android, iOS Five apps (common to thetargeted mobile platforms) 16.Tadrous 0
APs (one AP, 300 sessions
per app)
802.11
frames
2017 Espada et al. [59] Android Spotify 17.Espada 0 Devices (one device) Layer-2+data
TABLE XXI
THE DATASETS OF THE SURVEYED WORKS THAT DEAL WITH TRAFFIC CHARACTERIZATION TARGETING A POPULATION OF MOBILE DEVICES.
Year Paper Dataset Point of Capturing # Mobile Devices Content
2010
Afanasyev et al. [9] 10.Afanasyev 0 APs (28 days) 2500 simultaneous
Layer-2 and -3 data from RA-
DIUS logs
10.Afanasyev 1 Wired (central Internetgateway, five days)
Layer-3+ headers (no DHCP
data) of the first packet of each
flow for the first quarter of each
hour
Falaki et al. [10] Dataset1 Devices
Two Android, eight Win-
dows Mobile Layer-2+ data
Dataset2 33 Android Per-app Tx/Rx bytes
Maier et al. [12]
SEP08
Wired (an ISP’s edge
router, one day)
200+
Anonymized DSL dataAPR09 400+
AUG09a 500+
AUG09b 500+
Shepard et al. [13] 10.Shepard 0 Devices 25 iOS IP packets
2011 Gember et al. [15]
Net1 APs (campus network,
three days)
32,166 Layer-2+ data
Net2 112
Lee et al. [16] 11.Lee 0 Wired (top-level router of acampus network, six days) N/A IP packets
2012 Chen et al. [19] 12.Chen 0
Wired (gateway router of
a campus Wi-Fi network,
three days)
N/A Up to 900 bytes of each incom-
ing/outgoing packet (including
IP, TCP, and application-level
headers)12.Chen 1
Wired (gateway router of
a campus Wi-Fi network,
one day)
N/A
2015 Fukuda et al. [38]
2013
Devices 800+ Android, 700+ iOS Per-app/Per-interface Tx/Rxbytes/packets2014
2015
2017 Wei et al. [62] Traffic-May
Wired (Internet gateway of
a campus network, one
month)
10,756 Android, 11,328
iOS, 618 BlackBerry Layer-3+ data
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involves multi-label classification, we also provide results of
traffic analysis proposals. Eight works out of ten consider a
reasonable sample of apps (i.e., more than 40), while Wang et
al. in [42] and Mongkolluksamee et al. in [47] only consider
thirteen and five apps, respectively. Most of the works provide
accuracy as a metric to evaluate their proposal, but recall and
precision would have provided a better understanding of the
performance.
In what follows, we provide some additional observations
about these works. We observe that Lee et al. in [16] and
the mobUser dataset by Rao et al. [29] have no ground truth,
therefore only app matching rate is provided as a result. Alan
et al. in [6] provide two additional findings: (i) a performance
drop when trained classifiers are tested on updated versions
of the same apps; (ii) a performance drop when training and
testing involve different devices, which introduces a possible
bias towards a specific OS or vendor. Although it is not clearly
stated, the results reported in the Table XXII for this work
seem to be the ones using network traffic from the same app
versions and installed on the same devices.
Regarding the work by Mongkolluksamee et al. in [47],
we underline that ”16.Mongkolluksamee 0” dataset (which the
reported metrics refer to) is filtered out of background network
traffic of Android OS and other apps. The authors observe
a performance drop if such background traffic is kept, and
mitigate that drop by removing short-lived flows.
Taylor et al. in [61] further investigate other aspects with
additional experiments (not reported in the table): (i) the effect
of training on a dataset older than the testing one; (ii) the effect
of performing training and testing on datasets from different
devices, with different app versions, and both; and (iii) the
effect of the proposed reinforced learning approach to deal
with ambiguous flows.
D. Usage Study
In Table XXIII we provide information about the datasets
analyzed in the surveyed works that deal with usage study.
We can notice that eight works out of ten that deal with
usage study also deal with traffic characterization (Tables XX
and XXI). Nonetheless, Table XXIII is meant to offer a proper
comparison also with works that purely deal with usage study.
An evident difference is that pure usage studies employ fewer
devices when compared with other works. Indeed, while most
of the other works employ more than two hundred devices,
Ham et al. in [20] and Soikkeli et al. in [40] validate their
finding on only ten Android and 120 (unspecified) devices,
respectively. Moreover, it is interesting to notice that both these
works just rely on transmitted and received bytes.
E. PII Leakage Detection
In Table XXIV, we summarize the validation methods used
by works that deal with PII leakage detection. Most of the
works on PII leakage detection focus on providing findings
and observations about user private information transmission
(in clear) to third-party services (summarized in detail in
Section III-D), rather than provide actual results from a
classification task. Despite this, Kuzuno et al. in [27] and Ren
et al. in [50] report results in terms of accuracy since they are
the only ones that rely on machine learning methods. It worths
also noticing that Kuzuno et al. in [27] only report classifica-
tion accuracy without providing any additional finding.
As an overall consideration about datasets, five works out
of eight carry out an analysis on more than one thousand apps.
Besides, Song et al. in [41] consider only 53 apps and Le et al.
in [5] do not specify the number of considered apps. Moreover,
Stevens et al. in [23] carry out their analysis on a custom app
that includes thirteen popular Android ad libraries.
F. Malware Detection
We present the validation methods and results for works
that deal with malware detection in Table XXV. It worths
noticing that five works out of eight validate their proposals on
datasets collected from less than two devices. Moreover, only
Wei et al. in [25] and Wang et al. in [8] rely on a forwarding
server, while the other datasets are collected directly from
devices. Surprisingly, Narudin et al. in [48] are the only that
rely on emulators to collect malware traffic, despite the use
of emulators-based sandboxes is a common practice in mobile
malware analysis.
In what follows, we provide some additional observations
regarding the validation of malware detection works. The
results of the work by Shabtai et al. in [22] are referred
to their experiment I. Since experiment I provides two sub-
experiments (i.e., gaming apps and tool apps), we averaged
the results for each metric. Moreover, the authors carry out
three other experiments: in experiment II, the authors evaluate
the effect of testing on apps not used in training; in experiment
III, the authors evaluate the effect of performing training and
testing on different devices; and in experiment IV, the authors
evaluate the combination of both. The authors also evaluate
three metrics for feature selection: chi-square, Fisher score,
and information gain.
Regarding the datasets used by Shabtai et al. in [35], the
“14.Shabtai 0” dataset refers to the experiments with the
infected versions of the benign apps, while “14.Shabtai 1” and
“14.Shabtai 2” refer to the experiments with the self-updating
malware.
Despite Zaman et al. in [44] rely on DPI on HTTP messages
and only focus on two malware samples, their proposal is
able to identify only one malware out of two (i.e., Droid-
KungFu), thus having an accuracy of 0.5. Moreover, their
dataset involves traffic collected from a single device. Clearly,
this proposal cannot be considered effective and well validated.
Narudin et al. in [48] validate their proposal on two datasets,
namely “Ds1000” and “Priv”. In particular, the authors argue
that applying feature selection on “Ds1000” dataset slightly
improves classifiers performance (except for multi-layer per-
ceptron which has a performance drop).
G. User Action Identification
In Table XXVI, we compare the validation methods and
results of works that aim at identifying user actions. Given the
nature of this goal and the difficulty to build a ground truth, all
the works leverage their own dataset to validate their analysis.
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TABLE XXIII
THE DATASETS OF THE SURVEYED WORKS THAT DEAL WITH USAGE STUDY.
Year Paper Dataset Point of Capturing # Mobile Devices Content
2010
Afanasyev et al. [9] 10.Afanasyev 0 APs (28 days) 2500 simultaneous Layer-2 and -3 data from RADIUS logs
10.Afanasyev 1 Wired (central Internetgateway, five days)
Layer-3+ headers (no DHCP data) of
the first packet of each flow for the first
quarter of each hour
Falaki et al. [10] Dataset1 Devices
Two Android, eight Win-
dows Mobile Layer-2+ data
Dataset2 33 Android Per-app Tx/Rx bytes
Maier et al. [12]
SEP08
Wired (an ISP’s edge
router, one day)
200+
Anonymized DSL dataAPR09 400+
AUG09a 500+
AUG09b 500+
2011
Finamore et al. [14]
US-Campus Wired (within a campus
network, one week)
N/A IP packets
EU1-Campus
EU1-ADSL Wired (within an ISP’s net-
work, one week)EU1-FTTH
EU2-ADSL
Gember et al. [15] Net1 APs (campus network,three days)
32,166 Layer-2+ data
Net2 112
Lee et al. [16] 11.Lee 0 Wired (top-level router of acampus network, six days) N/A IP packets
2012 Ham et al. [20] 12.Ham 0 Devices Ten Android Per-process/Per-interface Tx/Rxbytes/packets
2015 Fukuda et al. [38]
2013
Devices 800+ Android, 700+ iOS Per-app/Per-interfaceTx/Rx bytes/packets2014
2015
Soikkeli et al. [40] 15.Soikkeli 0 Devices 120 Tx/Rx bytes
2017 Wei et al. [62] Traffic-May
Wired (Internet gateway of
a campus network, one
month)
10,756 Android, 11,328
iOS, 618 BlackBerry Layer-3+ data
Among such works, only one relies on dictionaries (i.e., Coull
et al. in [32]), while the others use machine learning tech-
niques. In what follows, we provide additional observations
about datasets, considered actions, and experiments.
Watkins et al. in [30] do not consider actual actions for
their analysis. More precisely, they focus on the resource
consumption of actions, dividing these into three categories: (i)
CPU intensive; (ii) I/O intensive; and (iii) non-CPU intensive.
The reported accuracy is the average accuracy across the two
employed devices (i.e., 93% and 95%, respectively).
Coull et al. in [32] consider only the iMessage app and
choose the following actions: “start typing”, “stop typing”,
“send text”, “send attachment”, and “read receipt”. The re-
ported result (i.e., accuracy > 0.99) is related to the identi-
fication of such actions, except “read receipt” which is often
confused with “start typing”. Moreover, that results assume
that traffic from iMessage app has been correctly detected.
The authors carry out other experiments related to message
attributes which are not reported in Table XXVI:
• The first experiment aims to infer the language (among
six languages: Chinese, English, French, German, Russian,
and Spanish) of the exchanged messages. It uses a multi-
nomial naive Bayes classifier with 10-fold cross-validation.
Assuming to have correctly identified an iMessage action
on a mobile device running iOS, the language classification
achieves more than 80% accuracy by considering the first
50 packets.
• The second experiment aims to infer the length of the
exchanged messages. It uses linear regression and 10-fold
cross-validation. This method is able to achieve an average
error of 6.27 characters for text messages, and an absolute
error of at most 10 bytes for attachment transfers.
Park et al. in [39] consider eleven user actions performed on
the KakaoTalk app: “join a chat room”, “leave the chat room”,
“receive a message”, “send a message”, “add a friend”, “hide
a friend”, “block a user”, “unblock a blocked user”, “re-add
a blocked friend”, “view a user’s profile”, and “synchronize
friend list”. The precision, recall, and F-measure reported in
Table XXVI are the average across all the considered user
actions. The results achieved by Fu et al. in [46] refer to the
best-performing classifier (i.e., the random forest).
H. Operating System Identification
In Table XXVII, we report datasets and results for the
works that deal with operating system identification. As we can
notice, all four works employ supervised learning techniques.
Coull et al. in [32] aim at determining whether the user is
using iMessage on iOS (i.e., mobile) or OS X (i.e., desktop)
and they are able to distinguish such operating systems with a
perfect accuracy (i.e., 100%) after observing only five packets.
In their experiments, Ruffing et al. in [51] observe that,
in case of heavy multitasking, the OS detection accuracy can
reach 100% with only 30 seconds of network traffic. Consid-
ering Android and iOS, the authors also evaluate whether their
approach is suitable to discriminate different versions of the
same OS. Moreover, the OS detection accuracy can reach 98%
and 50% on fifteen-minutes-long traces from the Skype and
Youtube apps, respectively.
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I. Position Estimation
In Table XXVIII we summarize the information related
to the datasets used by the works that deal with position
estimation.
Husted et al. in [11] show that, in a metropolitan population
of users equipped with 802.11g mobile devices, having only
10% of tracking population is sufficient to track the position
of the remaining 90% of users. Besides, the tracking benefits
from extending the broadcasting range of the mobile devices
(better with newer 802.11 standards).
Musa et al. in [21] evaluate the accuracy of their trajec-
tory estimation method by considering three deployments of
monitors and leveraging GPS as ground truth. Using monitors
spaced over 400 meters apart, the proposed system achieves a
mean error of less than 70 meters.
J. User Fingerprinting
In Table XXIX, we report validation methods and results of
the two works about user fingerprinting. Despite the common
goal, these two analyses are quite different. Indeed, Verde et
al. in [36] collect datasets of NetFlow records, while Vanrykel
et al. in [54] rely on a dataset of HTTP messages. Besides,
the former work employ machine learning techniques while
the latter performs a graph-based analysis.
Regarding Verde et al. in [36], the results achieved on the
“14.Verde 0” dataset refers to the best performing classifier
(i.e., random forest). On the other hand, the results achieved
on the “14.Verde 1” dataset are the average across the five
targeted mobile users. To build a reliable profile for those
users, their network traffic is captured from a Wi-Fi access
point (under the control of the authors). Vanrykel et al. in [54]
are able to link 57% of the unencrypted mobile traffic collected
to a specific user/device using graph-based analysis on HTTP
messages.
K. Ad Fraud Detection
The only work that investigates ad fraud is the one by
Crussell et al. in [33]. The authors validate their proposal
on a dataset of network traffic (i.e., layer-2+) collected from
mobile device emulators on which they run 130,339 Android
apps from nineteen marketplaces, and 35,087 Android apps
that probably contain malware. To build the ground truth, the
authors manually labeled the page requests of the domains
related to ad providers. The authors used a random forest
classifier applying a three-fold cross-validation on such labeled
dataset. The achieved results are an accuracy of 0.859 and a
recall of 0.718. As an additional finding, the authors discover
that around 30% of apps with ads request to display an ad
while running in the background, and 27 apps generate clicks
without user interaction.
L. Sociological Inference
In this section, we report the datasets used for validation
by Barbera et al. in [26], the only work that carries out
sociological inference. The authors collect datasets containing
802.11 probe requests. The datasets are related to an event or
place in which the monitor(s) are deployed:
• Datasets P1 and P2 at a political meeting (five monitors);
• Datasets V1 and V2 at a Pope’s mass (five monitors);
• Dataset M at a big shopping mall (five monitors);
• Dataset TS at a train station (five monitors);
• Dataset U at a university’s campus (one monitor);
• Dataset others at city streets and squares (one monitor).
Relying on these datasets, the authors provide the findings that
are discussed in Section III-K.
M. Tethering Detection
Only one work aims to detect tethering and it is proposed
by Chen et al. in [31]. The authors build the first dataset using
several points of capturing: a wired network equipment (i.e.,
a network switch), Wi-Fi monitors (i.e., nine monitors for two
days at OSDI 2006, eight monitors for five days at SIGCOMM
2008), and an access point. In particular, they capture DHCP
and DNS payloads, and layer-2+ headers from the network
switch; size and header of IP packets from monitors; and IP
and TCP headers from the access point. The second dataset
contains one week of network traffic (i.e., IP packets) collected
at the Internet gateway of a campus Wi-Fi network serving
12, 600 users.
The authors develop an ad hoc probabilistic classifier to
carry out their analysis. The achieved results on the first dataset
are 0.68-0.85 recall with precision fixed at 0.95, and 0.78-
0.89 recall with precision stable at 0.8. Besides, the results
on the second dataset are 0.86 precision, 0.74 recall, and 0.8
F-measure.
N. Website Fingerprinting
The work by Spreitzer et al. in [53] deal with website fin-
gerprinting. This work relies on a dataset containing statistics
provided by a mobile browser in terms of transmitted and
received bytes of TCP connections. The authors develop a fin-
gerprinting system that employs a machine learning classifier
based on Jaccard’s index. Under a normal Internet connection,
such fingerprinting system can correctly infer 97% of 2,500
page visits out of a set of 500 monitored pages. Instead,
with the traffic routed through Tor by using the Orbot proxy
combined with the Orweb browser, the proposal identifies 95%
of 500 page visits out of a set of 100 monitored pages.
VIII. COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST MOBILE TRAFFIC
ANALYSIS
In this section, we present possible countermeasures pro-
posed in the literature to thwart mobile traffic analysis. In the
first instance, we discuss how encryption on different layers
can affect the surveyed work in Section VIII-A. We will show
that part of the surveyed work is able to cope with encryption.
Hence, we survey the state-of-the-art countermeasures and
their effectiveness and limitations in Section VIII-B.
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A. Encryption
The first countermeasures in place are network traffic
encryption methods. Such methods aim to guarantee users’
privacy against information leaks and DPI. Encryption can
be applied at different levels of network protocol stack, such
as network (e.g., IPsec) and transport (e.g., SSL/TLS) layers.
From the network analysis perspective, the primary effect of
the encryption at a given layer is to make unavailable the
information of the above layers. This means that SSL/TLS en-
cryption will hide the transport-layer payloads, but TCP/UDP
headers will be still available; IPsec encryption, instead, will
also hide the TCP/UDP headers, leaving only IP headers for
analysis. It is worth noticing that for the sake of simplicity
we use the term “IPsec encryption” to refer all the methods
that make available IP headers only, such as IPsec (in both
transport and tunnel mode), Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
and Tor (The Onion Routing).
As a preliminary overview, for each surveyed work we listed
in Table I, we pointed out whether its analyses were applicable
in presence of the aforementioned encryption methods. In what
follow, we discuss in detail whether encryption affects or not
the network analysis techniques adopted by the surveyed work.
On one hand, 40 works in this survey are still able to carry
out their analysis if SSL/TLS encryption is in place. On the
other hand, only 21 works do not rely on information that is
hidden by IPsec encryption. The effect of encryption on the
analysis strictly depends on the point of capturing. For this
reason, for each point of capturing (ordered by the number
of related works, as in Section II-B) we report which analysis
and why is affected by which type of encryption. In particular,
given a point of capturing we discuss the works by year of
publication.
1) Wired networks: In this section, we discuss the impact
of encryption when the point of capturing is wired networks.
We divide the presentation of the works into small and large
scale networks.
a) Small Scale:
• Rao et al. in [17] study the network traffic of the Android
and iOS apps for Netflix and YouTube. They successfully
inspect the HTTP messages to get the encoding rate of the
videos, therefore both services stream videos in clear (at
least, they did so at the time the authors collected their
datasets).
• The analysis carried out by Baghel et al. in [18] needs
to inspect the transport-layer headers, therefore it does not
work if IPsec is employed to hide the payload of IP packets.
The Android malware detector by Wei et al. [25] requires
to access DNS data, which is not possible if the traffic is
encrypted.
• To carry out PII leakage detection, Rao et al. in [29] and
Ren et al. in [50] inspect HTTP traffic, which is sent in clear,
and also HTTPS traffic, which is decrypted using SSLsplit.
This approach cannot work, however, if the traffic of a given
app is protected by IPsec.
• Chen et al. in [37] focus on the properties of the network
traffic of malicious Android apps, and their findings are
mainly related to the application layer. For this reason, such
findings are limited to the data that the analyzed apps sent
in clear during the capturing process.
• The user action identification frameworks developed by
Conti et al. in [45], and Park and Kim in [39], the app
identification solution proposed by Taylor et al. in [61] and
the PII leakage detection method by Cheng et al. in [57]
leverage the information available in IP and TCP headers.
As a consequence, such approaches are by design resilient
against SSL/TLS, but cannot cope with encryption via IPsec.
• To study the network behavior of several Android and
iOS free apps, Nayam et al. in [49] inspect the HTTP
messages, and employ a proxy server to deal with HTTPS
traffic. Although such approach does not work with apps
that employ IPsec to hide their network transmissions, it
seems that all the analyzed apps do not leverage such type
of encryption.
• The PII leakage detection and user fingerprinting framework
proposed by Vanrykel et al. in [54] is focused on unen-
crypted mobile traffic only, since it requires to inspect HTTP
messages.
• Wang et al. in [8] present two Android malware detection
models which leverage TCP- and HTTP-related information,
respectively. The latter cannot work for apps that encrypt
their network traffic using SSL/TLS, and both cannot cope
with apps that employ IPsec for their data transmissions.
• The PII leakage detection solution by Continella et al. [58]
requires to access the HTTP messages. Although a man-in-
the-middle approach is adopted to deal with HTTPS traffic,
the framework cannot cope with network traffic protected
by IPsec.
b) Large Scale:
• Afanasyev et al. in [9] focus part of their analysis on the
applications that generate mobile and non-mobile traffic. In
particular, they need to inspect transport- and application-
layer headers. For this reason, the reported findings do not
cover the encrypted traffic present in the collected network
traces. The same holds for the mobile traffic characterization
by Chen et al. [19].
• The analysis carried out by Maier et al. in [12] requires to
access transport- and application-layer information, there-
fore it cannot deal with encrypted traffic.
• The study by Finamore et al. in [14] focuses on YouTube
traffic carried over HTTP and does not consider the users
that watch videos via a secure connection (i.e., HTTPS).
• The app identification via payload signatures proposed by
Lee et al. in [16] cannot work with apps that encrypt their
network traffic. Moreover, in case of encryption the authors’
studies of mobile traffic characteristics and mobile users’
habits are severely limited.
• The tethering detection technique proposed by Chen et al.
in [31] requires to inspect the information available in TCP
headers, therefore it does not work if IPsec is employed to
hide the payload of IP packets.
• As we previously mentioned in Section IV-A, the mobile
user fingerprinting framework by Verde et al. in [36] is
encryption-agnostic even in their experiment carried out on a
large-scale network, since it takes NetFlow records as input.
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• A few of the findings about mobile traffic reported by Wei et
al. in [62] are based on application-layer information, which
is unavailable in case of traffic encryption.
2) Mobile Devices: Regarding the works that capture net-
work traffic directly within mobile devices, we provide the
following observations about the effect of encryption.
• Network traffic statistics (e.g., the amount of received bytes
through the cellular network) are not affected by encryption,
therefore the methods that leverage them are encryption-
agnostic. These works are the ones proposed by Ham and
Choi in [20], Shabtai et al. in [22], Shabtai et al. in [35],
Fukuda et al. in [38], Soikkeli and Riikonen [40], Spreitzer
et al. in [53], and Arora and Peddoju in [55]. It is worth to
notice that this assertion is not trivial for the work in [53]
since its authors leverage the TCP bytes sent/received by
the browser app, which it is still available even if the traffic
is encrypted via IPsec.
• Falaki et al. in [10] carry out both traffic characterization
(Section III-A) and usage study (Section III-C). The former
is focused on the TCP protocol, therefore it does not
cover the traffic protected by IPsec, whenever present in
the collected network traces. The latter leverages the per-
app transmitted/received bytes, which are network traffic
statistics (i.e., they are not affected by encryption).
• Shepard et al. in [13] provide a few findings about the
network traffic of iOS devices. Their analysis is focused
on the TCP protocol, hence it does not cover the network
traffic protected by IPsec.
• Su et al. in [24] propose a classifier for Android malware
detection that cannot process the network traffic encrypted
via IPsec since one of the leveraged features is the average
TCP session duration, which is not computable without
accessing TCP headers.
• To identify Android apps, Wei et al. in [4] perform the
following operations: (i) inspect the IP addresses of the
captured packets; (ii) compute the amount of transmit-
ted/received data; and (iii) discriminate between HTTP and
HTTPS traffic. The first two operations are encryption-
agnostic, while the third one is not possible in case an app
communicates through IPsec.
• To apply clustering for PII leakage detection, Kuzuno and
Tonami in [27] use two metrics that are based on information
within HTTP messages which are not accessible when any
form of encryption is in place.
• To evaluate their solution for Android app identification,
Qazi et al. in [28] set up a monitored access point serving
a few mobile devices. The network traffic flowing through
the AP is captured, and netstat logs from the devices are
gathered. Such logs are then used to match the network
flows observed at the AP with the TCP transmissions from
the mobile devices, hence this methodology does not work
if IPsec is employed.
• The user action and OS identification methods devised
by Coull and Dyer in [32] are designed to work with
the network traffic of iMessage (Apple’s instant messaging
service), which uses encryption by default.
• Le et al. in [5] carry out both app identification (see
Section III-B) and PII leakage detection (see Section III-D).
The former requires to access the flags of TCP segments,
which are hidden if IPsec is employed. The latter needs
to inspect application-layer data, which is infeasible if the
traffic is encrypted.
• The app for PII leakage detection by Song and Hengart-
ner [41] employs a man-in-the-middle approach to inspect
TLS traffic, but it cannot deal with IP packets whose
payloads are encrypted by IPsec.
• The Android malware detection solution by Zaman et
al. [44] needs to access the URLs within HTTP messages,
which are not available if the traffic is encrypted.
• Mongkolluksamee et al. in [47] extract the TCP and UDP
data from the collected network traffic of the apps to be
profiled. After that, they inspect the headers to reconstruct
the captured network flows and compute their statistics (e.g.,
per-flow total amount of transferred bytes). This approach
cannot be applied to apps that encrypt their network traffic
using IPsec.
• The malware detection framework by Narudin et al. [48]
requires to inspect HTTP messages, therefore it cannot work
with encrypted traffic.
• By employing the mobile traffic characterization framework
proposed by Espada et al. [59], it is possible to check
whether the network traffic of an Android app satisfies a
given property. The effect of encryption on the analysis
depends on the properties to be verified. Regarding the
presented case study (Spotify), the authors successfully
access HTTP headers and compute traffic statistics (e.g.,
number of sent/received TCP segments).
3) Wi-Fi Access Points: In this section we consider works
in which network traffic is captured from access points in
a controlled or not controlled environment. We provide the
following observations about the effect of encryption.
APs in a controlled environment — Stevens et al. in [23]
study thirteen popular ad libraries for Android. For each
library, the authors build a simple app that makes ad requests,
then they execute it on a mobile device while capturing
the network traffic at the access point to which that device
is associated. Since only one of the considered ad libraries
leverages encryption to protect its network traffic, the authors
apply deep packet inspection to investigate the leakage of
the user’s PII. Qazi et al. in [28] set up a wireless access
point running OpenFlow and instruct it to extract features from
the network traffic of the associated mobile devices. Since it
requires to inspect transport-layer information, the proposed
framework cannot process network traffic protected by IPsec.
The framework for user action identification presented by
Watkins et al. in [30] exploits the inter-packet time of the
responses to ICMP packets sent to the target mobile device by
a laptop connected via cable to the same network, therefore
it is not affected by traffic encryption. The OS identification
method by Chen et al. [31] needs to access the headers of
TCP segments, so it cannot work if IPsec is employed to hide
the payload of IP packets. The app identification solution by
Yao et al. [43] requires to access HTTP messages, which is
not possible if the traffic is encrypted. The app identification
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framework proposed by Alan and Kaur [6] provides three
different classifiers. Two of them only leverage the size of IP
packets, thus they can take encrypted traffic as input. Instead,
the other classifier requires to inspect the content of TCP
headers, therefore it works on network traffic encrypted via
SSL/TLS, but it does not via IPsec.
The solutions proposed by Saltaformaggio et al. in [52]
(user action identification), as well as Tadrous and Sabharwal
in [7] (traffic characterization), are encryption-agnostic: the
former requires only to inspect IP headers; the latter needs
only the size and header information of 802.11 frames. The
framework for OS identification presented by Malik et al.
in [60] exploits the inter-packet time of the packets (either
ICMP responses or IP packets related to video streaming)
coming from the target mobile device, therefore it is not
affected by traffic encryption. Finally, the proposal by Fu et
al. in [46] rely on IP headers only, thus it is resilient to traffic
encryption.
APs in a uncontrolled environment — Gember et al. in [15]
carry out a comparison between mobile and non-mobile de-
vices with regard to network traffic properties and habits
of users. Since the analysis is mainly focused on transport
and application layers, most of the authors’ findings are
related to non-encrypted traffic. Whenever the encryption at
network (IPsec) or transport layers (SSL/TLS) is employed,
the HTTP information becomes inaccessible, thus making the
discrimination process (if not the entire analysis) infeasible.
4) Wi-Fi Monitors: As we discuss in Section IV-E, Wi-
Fi monitors scan radio bands to capture IEEE 802.11 frames
which can be encrypted at data-link layer using Wired Equiv-
alent Privacy (WEP) or Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA).
The attacks by Musa and Eriksson in [21] and Barbera et
al. in [26] cannot be affected by encryption because they rely
on probe requests. Due to their nature, probe requests are
transmitted in clear. The analyses carried out by Wang et al.
in [42] and Ruffing et al. in [51] are encryption-agnostic since
they leverage only size and/or timing of the captured 802.11
frames. However, this statement does not hold for Chen et al.
in [31], since their analysis requires to access IP payloads.
5) Mobile Device Emulators: Mobile device emulators are
employed as sandboxes for ad fraud detection and malware
analysis. All the three works that rely on emulators aim to
inspect HTTP messages, thus the proposed solutions would
not work anymore if encryption is applied.
Crussell et al. in [33] carry out ad fraud detection relying
on emulators. The proposed framework is not resilient to
encryption since it needs to inspect the HTTP and DNS data
generated by apps. However, the authors’ analysis covers most
of the available ad libraries. This means that such libraries
do not usually employ any form of encryption for their data
transfers, and simply rely on plain HTTP.
The ANDRUBIS framework proposed by Lindorfer et al.
in [34] relies on Android emulators to carry out dynamic
malware analysis. Such framework focuses its analysis on
high-level protocols (e.g., DNS, HTTP, IRC), which is not
feasible if the analyzed app encrypts its network traffic. Yao
et al. in [43] propose an app identification method on three
mobile platforms (i.e., Android, iOS, and Symbian). Unfortu-
nately, since the system requires to inspect HTTP messages,
it does not work if an app leverages HTTPS or lower-layers
encryption.
Narudin et al. in [48] and Chen et al. in [56] propose
machine learning to detect Android malware and a method
for app identification, respectively. Both these works rely
on HTTP messages inspection, hence they cannot cope with
encrypted network traffic.
6) Network Simulators: The work on position estimation
by Husted and Myers in [11] is the only work that relies
on software network simulators to generate mobile traffic.
This work is not affected by encryption since it focuses on
propagation of probe requests, which are not encrypted.
B. Other Countermeasures
As a countermeasure to privacy invasive mobile traffic anal-
yses (i.e., app identification, user action identification, website
fingerprinting, and user fingerprinting), encryption alone is not
enough to neutralize them. Indeed, such analyses often focus
on network flows behavior or packets exchange patterns. A
research field that provides solutions to thwart these kinds of
analysis is the one that investigates countermeasures against
websites fingerprinting. In this research field, researchers con-
sider an adversary that is able to observe timing, direction, and
size of packets within an encrypted connection when a browser
loads a webpage [68], [69], [70], [83]. Similarly to our IPsec
scenario, the considered attacks rely on IP headers only since
they assume to carry out traffic analysis in presence of an
anonymity network such as a VPN or Tor. Under these settings,
the countermeasures proposed to tackle traffic analysis can
be divided in two categories: padding- and distribution-based
countermeasures. In what follows, we describe such kind
of countermeasures. Moreover, we discuss what impact their
application could bring on mobile network traffic.
a) Padding-based Countermeasures: This category of
countermeasures considers an active modification of the net-
work traffic at packet level. Packet padding is a technique that
consists in appending extra information to a packet payload in
order to obfuscate its original size. Implementations of SSL
3.0 and TLS 1.0+ already apply a random padding between 0
and 255 bytes to encrypted packets. Unfortunately, SSL/TLS
padding provides a limited protection since a padding of at
most 255 bytes, compared with the Maximum Transmission
Unit (MTU) does not introduce a significant level of noise. For
this reason, other padding techniques propose to add dummy
bytes to reach a packet size that is multiple of 128 bytes (i.e.,
linear padding), the nearest power of two (i.e., exponential
padding), or MTU.
Researchers propose more sophisticated techniques that not
only apply padding on packets’ sizes, but also to timing.
Dyer et al. in [84] present BuFLO (Buffered Fixed-Length
Obfuscation), which apply padding in such a way that packets
are sent with a fixed size. Moreover, BuFLO also fixes the
packet transmission rate to cope with timing attacks. Cai et al.
in [85] propose Tamaraw which is based on BuFLO, but apply
a different padding according to the direction of the packet.
More recently, Wang et al. in [86] present Walkie Talkie which
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modify a web browser to buffer packets, add padding, and
transmit them in bursts (i.e., half-duplex mode).
b) Distribution-based Countermeasures: A different ap-
proach to counter traffic analysis aims to intervene on the
distribution of packets in a network flow. Wright et al. in [87]
proposed traffic morphing, a distribution-based countermea-
sure which transforms the original distribution of network
packets to a pre-defined target distribution. In practice, traffic
morphing reshapes network flows by truncating and padding
packets, not only modifying packets sizes but also changing
the very number of packets.
Another example of traffic morphing is called Glove, which
is proposed by Nithyanand et al. in [88]. In first instance,
Glove regroups websites which network flows are similar into
clusters. Hence, Glove applies the minimum dummy traffic in
such a way that all websites in a cluster will have the same
shape, thus they cannot be distinguished from each other. This
means that an attacker cannot identify a specific website, but
only the cluster to which it belongs.
c) Countermeasures Applied to Mobile Traffic: In the
mobile scenario, we have to take into account that we are
considering devices that are powered by batteries. Another
aspect that has to be considered is that mobile users have a
limited volume of Internet traffic given the subscription with a
telephonic company (usually a fixed amount of gigabytes). On
one hand, the aforementioned padding-based countermeasures
generate a bandwidth overhead that ranges between 31% and
145%, with a time overhead that ranges between 34% and
180% for [86] and [84], respectively. On the other hand,
distribution-based countermeasures change the shape of a
network flow. This procedure has computational costs due to
packets aggregation and segmentation while still relying in
part on padding.
Countermeasures that introduce a high overhead in terms of
bandwidth, time, and computational cost are not feasible on
mobile device since such overhead directly result in additional
monetary cost, worse user experience, and increased battery
consumption. Among the considered countermeasures, the
most mobile friendly seems to be Walkie Talkie [86], since it
offers a reasonable trade off between bandwidth and time over-
head. Another possible solution is to deploy a countermeasure
(even with high overhead) on the access point rather than on
the mobile device, offloading to the access point the padding
and computational burdens. Unfortunately, this solution does
not protect from attacks that eavesdrop the traffic between
mobile devices and access points.
IX. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE OF TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
TARGETING MOBILE DEVICES
In this section, we first provide an overall discussion about
today’s challenges and pitfalls that emerged from the surveyed
works in Section IX-A. Then, we outline possible future
research directions of mobile traffic analysis in Section IX-B.
A. Challenges and Pitfalls
In state-of-the-art works on mobile traffic analysis, re-
searchers encounter several challenges while devising their
analyses. A first challenge involves the discrimination between
mobile and non-mobile traffic in large-scale networks. As
a common practice to overcome this challenge, researchers
leverage the information available from network traffic. In
case of unencrypted traffic, HTTP messages contain the user-
agent field from which it is possible to obtain information
such as mobile device and operating system [12], [14], [19].
In presence of traffic encryption, it is still possible to rely on
the default Time-To-Live (TTL) value of IP packets. Another
method uses DHCP logs to map an assigned IP address with
a MAC address, then to identify mobile devices by extracting
the Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI) from those MAC
addresses. In the aforementioned methods, researchers assume
that user-agent fields and MAC addresses are not spoofed,
and TTL values are the default ones given by the operating
systems.
Another challenge is collecting a dataset that includes a
solid ground truth, a fundamental task to obtain truthful results.
While dataset collection process and data format strictly de-
pend on the point of listening, network traffic labeling requires
additional information that has to be retrieved from a different
source. For some specific goals of the analysis, traffic labeling
can be simple but, especially when it considers real mobile
devices, it can become challenging.
In general, it is possible to build a solid ground truth
whether one of these two conditions occur: (i) the goal of
the analysis is related to the property of the device itself; (ii)
the researchers can gain full control of the experiment. On one
hand, the former condition can be applied to operating system
identification and user fingerprinting. In fact, knowing the pre-
assigned IP address or the MAC address of a mobile device
is enough to label the traffic as belonging to a specific user
or operating system. On the other hand, two examples of the
latter condition are works that perform app identification and
user action identification, since the goal of these analyses is
related to OS internal processes and human-device interaction.
For this reason, researchers need to acquire full control of the
experiment in order to build a reliable ground truth. While for
user action identification tasks researchers have to provide a
solid time correlation between a user action and the resulting
network traffic, building the ground truth for app identification
tasks is more challenging, since they need to know exactly
which app generated which network packet or flow. To cope
with this problem, a good practice on Android devices is to
rely on a logging app (e.g., NetworkLog [89], DELTA [71])
that associates the Process ID (PID) of an app to each network
packet or flow it generates.
Common pitfalls of mobile traffic analysis are mostly related
to the experimental design and data collection. In app identi-
fication tasks, researchers have to take into account that apps
often rely on common third-party libraries (e.g., ad libraries
in free apps), thus some traffic patterns generated by an app
are not useful to discriminate it among the other considered
apps. Hence, the analysis has to cope with such ambiguous
traffic and filter it out.
A possible error is not considering enough data sources
in order to build a representative dataset for the goal of
the analysis. The work by Malik et al. in [60] is a clear
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example of this kind of pitfall. In this work, the authors aim at
distinguishing between three operating systems but they collect
network traffic of only three devices (i.e., one for each targeted
operating system). The collected dataset is not representative
enough for operating system identification because the traffic
may be influenced by both device model and OS version
(i.e., bias on the data). Hence, the accuracy is related to the
recognition of a specific device (i.e., device model, OS, and
its version altogether) among the three considered ones.
Another similar pitfall is to perform an analysis under a
close-world assumption. This assumption does not consider
aspects or possible events in the real world. This means that
in a classification task it must be taken into account not only
the classes on which the analysis is focused, but also other
possible classes. As an example, in app identification it has to
consider, in addition to the targeted apps, the other applications
on the market (e.g., as a stand-alone class). Another pitfall
is related to mobile malware detection. Proposed works on
this topic use emulators instead of real devices. Unfortunately,
emulators can be detected using sandbox detection techniques.
Hence a malware that detects a sandbox could not execute its
malicious payload, thus evading malware analysis [90].
B. Possible Future Directions
In this survey, we can observe an imbalance in terms of the
number of works per goal of the analysis. Indeed, some goals
are not covered enough by the state of the art of mobile traffic
analysis. This makes room for interesting research directions
that could have severe economic and privacy implications.
Research on user fingerprinting, sociological inference, and
position estimation could be vastly improved since those
fields are seriously related to user privacy. Indeed, information
obtained from such types of analysis can be used to track
the user’s movements and infer user sensible information
(e.g., nationality, relationships). Surprisingly, only one work
investigates ad fraud detection. Ad providers are economically
affected by such frauds since they result in a financial loss.
Another interesting research direction could be investigating
whether there exist differences between mobile and desktop
websites in terms of network traffic.
Solutions proposed for mobile traffic analysis can also be
applied to the emerging Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm. IoT
devices are interconnected and they can both sense the real-
world status (i.e., sensors) and intervene to change it (i.e.,
actuators). Similarly to mobile devices, the communications
between IoT devices generate network traffic and they are
carried through the same protocol stack. For this reason,
we believe that the surveyed analyses on network traffic of
mobile devices can become valuable in the IoT domain. As an
example, user action identification techniques could be applied
to infer information about the real world from the actions
performed by an actuator. Moreover, OS or app identification
techniques could be used to infer an IoT device’s model or
firmware version.
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we surveyed the state of the art of the
methods for analyzing the network traffic generated by mobile
devices. In particular, we are the first that surveyed the
works in which the mobile traffic is captured from alternative
sources to cellular networks: Wi-Fi monitors and access points;
wired networks; logging apps installed on mobile devices; and
networks of mobile devices simulated via software. For each
point of capturing, we described its characteristics, the number
of mobile users that it monitors, as well as the issues related
to the capturing process. Moreover, we observed that the most
frequently used approach to capture mobile traffic is logging
at either wired networks or mobile devices themselves.
We provide a systematic classification of the state of the art
according to the goal of the analysis that targets the network
traffic of mobile devices. In particular, we realized that most
of the works focus on studying the features of the network
traffic generated by mobile devices. Other popular goals are
app and user action identification, usage study, and Personal
Identifiable Information (PII) leakage and malware detection.
While a lot of work has been done on such goals, promising
topics, such as user fingerprinting and sociological inference,
still offer much room for further investigation.
We also categorized the works on mobile traffic analysis
according to the targeted mobile platforms. We observed that
Android is not only the most popular mobile platform, but
also the most targeted by the analysis methods (i.e., 42 out
of 45 works which are not platform-independent). In fact, we
demonstrated that the openness of the Android platform is
a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it provides mobile
users with a large number of apps that enable the most
disparate functionalities; on the other hand, it helps malicious
developers distribute malware, and more generally, apps that
behave ambiguously with regard to the security of mobile
devices and the privacy of mobile users.
We observed that most of the surveyed works rely on
machine learning techniques, thus we outline the procedure to
carry out a machine-learning-based analysis as a tutorial for
new researchers. In particular, we also observed a prevalence
of frameworks based on supervised learning, clustering, or a
combination of both. For each framework, we reported and
discussed actual application and performance. We also report
possible countermeasures to tackle against mobile traffic anal-
ysis and preserve user privacy. Finally, we discuss challenges,
pitfalls, and possible future research directions in the field of
mobile traffic analysis.
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